Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements
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Hostage Updates
500 DAYS, 500 DAYS
It is truly unfathomable that we have reached this unbelievable number and we still have hostages in Gaza. Excuse my language but this has to be brutal and obscene. How the fuck did we get to 500 days and there are still 73 hostages, our brothers, our fathers, our grandfathers, our sons, in captivity? There is only one person on this entire earth who could have gotten them home so much sooner, one person who should have taken responsibility and done everything in his power to get them home, pay whatever price needed to be paid on a national level and more importantly, on a personal level to get them home. But from day one, he shirks all responsibility and his main concern remains himself above all others, above the needs of the State, the needs of the people, the needs of the hostage families, the needs and lives of the hostages. Benjamin Netanyahu, j'accuse. It is your fault that at least 30 hostages have died in captivity, their blood is directly on your hands, and the suffering of those who have only recently returned is on your hands, and the worst of the worst is that you have left tens more of living hostages to continue to suffer, to be tortured, to be deliberately starved, to feel the threat of death every second of every day, to wonder if they will ever see their loved ones again. You have blocked every opportunity to bring them all home for your own personal interests to stay prime minister and to attempt to erase from the people's mind that you bear most of the responsibility for October 7, before and since and that this will only be a blip in the history books. But don't you worry Benjamin Netanyahu. None of us will forget. It will not be erased from our memories and will not be a blip in the history books. It will be the headline and you will be remembered for bringing us the worst day in the 77 years of our history and the worst day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust. You will be remembered as being the most dangerous prime minister of Israel and most of us want only to see you and your vile machine of poison gone from our sight and sound and never to be seen or heard of again. As Sagi Dekel-Chen said to his wife, for us it has been 498 days, for him it was been 43 million seconds because every second they are suffering and don't know if it will be their last. "Yair (Horn, just released from captivity on shabbat) asks why they don't take everyone, all the hostages out of Gaza. He knows that his brother was left behind, and he doesn't understand why they aren't all here. His joy is partial." None of us understand why his brother was left behind, why anyone has been left behind. We don't understand how our government, our prime minister has broken the sacred covenant with the people not just on October 7 but for 500 days and counting. We don't understand but we know the who. It is Benjamin Netanyahu. You can make all the excuses and rationalizations in the world, but they are just that, excuses and rationalizations. You have abandoned them and all of us and since you chose to reject your responsibilities and stay in your position, it is upon you to bring them all home now, not in a week, not in a month, not in another year, but now!!!! BRING THEM HOME NOW!!!!
500-minute fast urged by hostages’ families begins, as freed captive says rallies lift abductees’ spirits
Freed captive Ohad Ben Ami speaks in a video message published February 15, 2025. (Hostages and Missing Families Forum)
A 500-minute fast advocated by activists for the hostages to mark their 500th day of captivity in Gaza and “identify with their pain” has begun, and will go on until 8 p.m. when the Hostages and Missing Families Forum says it will hold an “emergency gathering” at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, freed hostage Ohad Ben Ami calls on the public to take part in the nationwide demonstrations today.
“I intend to go outside and fight for them,” says Ben Ami, who was released by Hamas this month, emaciated after 16 months of mistreatment.
“What strongly kept my hopes up down there was that I knew people were fighting for me,” he adds, saying that what could truly raise the spirits of those still in captivity is if masses head out to demonstrate for the abductees today.
“You have no idea how much strength it would give to those left behind,” he says.
43 million seconds without sunlight: Hostage families relate horrors of captivity from hospital
Troufanov’s girlfriend said that he told her Saturday night that during his captivity, he prayed she would not wait for him because he did not believe he would return alive.
“Sagui hasn’t seen daylight since October 7,” Sagui Dekel-Chen’s wife, Avital, said Sunday, the day after his release after spending 498 days in Hamas captivity.
Avital added that he did not know what happened to her or his daughters on October 7 and only learned they were alive the day before his release.
“Watching Gali and Bar run to their father, and Shachar seeing her father in person for the first time instead of in photos - alongside the great joy of having Sagui home, I couldn't help but think of all the children still waiting for their fathers to return,” Avital continued. She then called for the return of the remaining hostages held in captivity.
Avital said that Sagui told her on Sunday, “It's nice that people write 498 days, but really, it's more accurate to say we were there for over 43 million seconds of hell.”
Family members of Sagui Dekel-Chen and Alexander (Sasha) Troufanov also gave their first statements to the press from Sheba Medical Center.
Prayers from captivity
Alexander Troufanov’s girlfriend, Sapir Cohen, said that Troufanov told her on Saturday night that throughout his captivity, he prayed for her to find a man she loved and hoped she would not wait for him. He told her he did not believe he would survive and didn’t want her to wait for a man who would never come home.
Troufanov’s mother, Lena, said that Sasha was shot in both legs during his kidnapping and said it was a “clear miracle” that he could stand and walk.
“With all my joy, I don't forget for a moment the hostages still in captivity. We must do everything to get everyone out now!" she concluded.
All the family members who spoke thanked all of those who worked for their loved ones’ release, including US President Donald Trump and the Israeli government.
Sasha Troufanov: Time to end game of ‘Russian roulette’ and bring all hostages home
Freed hostage Sasha Troufanov, center, with his mother Yelena, left, and his girlfriend Sapir Cohen in an Israeli Air Force helicopter on the way from the Gaza border area to Sheba-Tel Hashomer Medical Center near Tel Aviv, February 15, 2025. (IDF)
Sasha Troufanov, who was freed yesterday from close to 500 days of Hamas captivity, calls for an end to the cruel “Russian roulette” game being played with the lives of the hostages and bring them all home.
Troufanov met today with Mor Korgold, the brother of hostage Tal Shoham, who was taken hostage from Kibbutz Be’eri on October 7 and is slated to be freed in the first stage of the ceasefire deal. Tal was kidnapped along with his wife, two children, mother-in-law, and a number of other relatives who were freed in November 2023.
Korngold posts a photo of himself with Troufanov on Instagram, writing that the pair “sat and talked and ate the first food Sasha wanted (and it was surprising).”
Korngold writes on the platform that when Troufanov heard he was active on social media, “he asked me to send a message in his name.”
“The time has come to end the game of Russian roulette and save everyone,” the freed hostage says, according to the message. “I thank all of my friends and those who fought for my return and I ask you to keep up the struggle to bring everyone back.”
Amos Horn, the brother of Yair Horn who was released yesterday, said: We asked my brother Yair what he wanted us to bring him - and he said: "I want you to bring Eitan from Gaza." Dalia Horn, Yair's sister-in-law, said: "Yair asks why they don't take everyone, all the abductees out of Gaza. He knows that his brother was left behind, and he doesn't understand why they aren't all here. His joy is partial."
Wife of freed hostage Sagui Dekel-Chen: He only learned we’d survived Oct. 7 a day before his release
Avital Dekel-Chen, the wife of released hostage Sagui Dekel-Chen, says in a tremulous statement at Sheba Medical Center that she can hardly believe that the love of her life, the father of her children, came home to them.
“He is here, really here, standing on his legs with a huge smile and happiness in his heart,” says Dekel-Chen.
Dekel-Chen shares that Sagui, a dual US-Israeli citizen, did not know what had happened to his family on October 7 until the day before he was released.
“That’s when he found out that we were alive,” she says. “How did he succeed in surviving? Love.”
Dekel-Chen says she felt like she was still in the sealed room in her Nir Oz home for all these months, just waiting for Sagui to come rescue her.
“Yesterday, when I finally saw him, I felt we can finally leave the sealed room as a family, three girls, mom and dad, to be rehabilitated.”
Dekel-Chen talks about the fear and terror she experienced on October 7, 2023, waiting in their Kibbutz Nir Oz sealed room with her two little girls, while also in an advanced stage of pregnancy.
“I waited for him for hours to come back, to take us out,” she says. “I found myself getting on a bus alone without him, with our two little girls on this journey that was the longest of my life.”
Dekel-Chen says that some people warned her about possible endings to her story and others said the ending would ultimately be a good one.
“And I knew that no matter how many days it would be, that Sagui would come home,” says Dekel-Chen. “I said if there’s anything that can overcome this, it’s the love and connection that Sagui and I have.”
Freed hostage Sagui Dekel-Chen is reunited with his wife Avital on his return to Israel after 498 days in captivity in Gaza, February 15, 2025. (IDF)
Dekel-Chen speaks of all the other fathers with young children still held hostage, and all the other hostages, whom she says must be brought home. She talks about the huge sense of pain for all the friends she lost, and all the soldiers who fell in battle.
She says that Sagui said to her yesterday that “it’s nice that everyone keeps writing” that he and the other two hostages freed Saturday were released after 498 days. But really, he told her “‘it’s more accurate to say we were there for over 43 million seconds of hell.’ They don’t count days or hours – they count seconds.”
“And Sagui asked me to say to the entire nation of Israel, ‘Thank you very much.'”
Sagui Dekel-Chen’s father, Jonathan Dekel-Chen, also speaks about the family’s home community, Kibbutz Nir Oz, which was destroyed on October 7, and still has 20 hostages being held captive in Gaza.
“We can all agree that it’s not a perfect deal,” says Dekel-Chen, a native of the US who was very active in the struggle for the hostages and his son. “But if all return home, then we will be able to try and heal everyone.”
Cabinet to discuss phase 2 of Gaza deal, Witkoff says it 'is absolutely going to begin'
U.S. special envoy says phase two includes return of 19 live IDF soldiers among others and while it contemplates an end of the war it also contemplates Hamas not being involved in Gaza Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff that he will convene the security cabinet on Monday to discuss phase 2 of the cease-fire and hostage release deal in Gaza, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) said on Sunday evening.
The announcement came shortly after Witkoff said in an interview that the talks on phase 2 have already begun and are expected to continue. The next phase of the cease-fire agreement includes the return of all hostages held by Hamas in exchange to an end to the war and a complete withdrawal of IDF troops from Gaza.
"Phase two is absolutely going to begin," Witkoff told Fox."I've had very productive and constructive talks on Sunday with Netanyahu, Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani and Egypt's director of intelligence about the sequencing of phase two, setting forth positions on both sides, so we can understand ... where we are today, and then continuing talks this week at a location to be determined so that we can figure out how we get to the end of phase two successfully," Witkoff said."
"Phase 2 Includes 19 IDF soldiers we believe all of them are alive and some others as well, it includes Edan Alexander who of course we've been pressing for because he is an American and Israel citizen as well so it includes all of these people it also includes getting the families back the bodies of family members of their families who have died."
Witkoff said the next phase of the deal was more intricate and complicated. "Phase 2 contemplates an end of the war but it also contemplates Hamas not being involved in Gaza and being gone from Gaza."
The PMO also announced that a delegation would leave for Cairo on Monday to discuss the hostage deal's second phase. "The delegation will receive guidelines for further talks after the Security Cabinet convenes on Monday."
Last week Netanyahu denied reports that negotiations had begun, even contradicting Likud chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuli Edelstein who told the families of hostages that Israel was discussing the next phase of the deal. Netanyahu's coalition partner Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has warned that such an agreement would result in his party's resignation from the government.
Earlier Netanyahu met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. After the meeting Netanyahu said he and U.S. President Donald Trump were working in full coordination. "We have a common strategy and we can’t always share details of this strategy with the public,” he said, “including when the gates of hell will be opened, as they surely will if all our hostages are not released, until the last one of them.” LINK. If we had a prime minister or coalition that really cared about our hostages and did not totally shirk their responsibilities, the hostages would have been home a long time ago, and if not so much earlier, there wouldn't have been phases in this deal, and if there had to be phases, there wouldn't be any issues of whether or not to negotiate Phase 2. It would have been automatic. But we don't have a prime minister who gives a damn about the hostages, their families or the country. He only cares about himself. And we don't have a government that cares. Otherwise, there would have been ministers who would bang on the table and demand to bring the hostages home immediately or they would bring down the government. We only had the extremist messianics who banged on the table and threatened to bring down the government if a deal is made.
It was just announced on the news that Netanyahu is sending the team to Doha to discuss Phase 2 but they will only have a very reduced mandate, which means that there is not possible to truly make a deal. It appears to only be lip service to Witcoff. He is doing more to get the hostages home than our own prime minister and politicians. This has been the same situation since the beginning of the war when it was Biden and his administration doing more throughout the war including communications with the hostage families. Utterly disgusting.
Israeli official says talks set to kick off on hostage deal’s 2nd phase
It was “no coincidence” that US special envoy Steve Witkoff said yesterday that talks on a second stage of the hostage deal would start this week, and that the Prime Minister’s Office announced shortly afterward that a team would be headed to Cairo, an Israeli official tells The Times of Israel.
Nor did Israel’s decision come about as the result of US pressure, says the official. “The moment Hamas carried out the recent hostage release, as far as we’re concerned, we’re continuing the agreement.”
“There is no change to the continuation of the deal. That means entering now into talks on the second phase,” says the official, adding that it will happen after the security cabinet approves the Israeli positions. The ministerial body is set to convene today.
The official insists that under no circumstances will Hamas be allowed to stay in Gaza whether through negotiations or by other means. “War is a means, not a goal. The goal is that Hamas will not remain in power.”
Israel is still working on getting the six remaining living hostages to be freed in the ongoing first stage out as soon as possible, says the official, either during the week or on Saturday.
Israel is “embracing with both hands” US President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, says the official, stressing that it would entail voluntary migration from Gaza. “Our goal is to allow the creation of an infrastructure to enable Gazans to leave, and we assess that many will leave.”
This doesn’t have to wait for the end of the war, says the official. “We are trying in the near term to implement his vision and lay out technical, operational and practical details.”
According to Sky News Arabia, Hamas told mediating countries that it was willing to hand over governance of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. It made the decision under pressure from Egypt, according to the report.
“Not going to happen,” Netanyahu spokesman Omer Dostri writes on X.
Ofer Calderon’s relative says freed hostage lost 55 lb in captivity, was ‘fattened’ by Hamas before release
Freed hostage Ofer Calderon raises both hands and blows kisses to friends outside the Sheba Medical Center on his return to Israel, February 1, 2025 (Eyal Hadani/AFP)
Recently released hostage Ofer Calderon’s uncle tells the Knesset Health Committee that at one point during captivity, Calderon had lost 25 kilograms (55 pounds), and that once Hamas decided it would release him as part of the ceasefire deal, the terrorists fed him large amounts of food, including rotten vegetables, so he would appear healthier upon release.
“Ofer had a difficult week, starting with a severe flu and pneumonia, to the point that his children could not meet him,” his uncle tells the committee, according to Hebrew media reports.
“Ofer said that three months ago, he weighed 25 kilograms (55 pounds) less,” he says. “When [Hamas] realized that Ofer would be among those who were freed, they fattened him so he would look the way he did.”
“He said that he was forced to eat rotten vegetables,” Calderon’s uncle adds.
Senior security official to media: Netanyahu working to prevent deal’s second phase
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to prevent the implementation of the hostage deal’s second phase, a senior Israeli security official familiar with the negotiations tells the Ynet news site.
“Every time you think it’s impossible to stoop any lower… it turns out that it is possible, and that there is still much lower that these people are willing to stoop to achieve political goals at the expense of hostages’ lives,” the anonymous official tells the news site, fuming over a statement issued by Netanyahu’s spokesperson last week in which the latter insisted that Israel is not currently holding negotiations regarding the second phase of the hostage deal.
The senior Israeli security official maintains that this amounts to a violation of the hostage deal, which stipulated that the parties begin holding negotiations regarding phase two of the deal no later than the 16th day of the first phase, which was on February 3 — nearly two weeks ago.
The official claims that even if Israel changed its approached and immediately engaged intensely in negotiations regarding the second phase of the deal, there is not enough time left to finish those talks by the end of the first phase on March 2.
The terms of the agreement do, however, allow for the first phase to continue indefinitely so long as the sides remain at the negotiation table in good faith.
“Netanyahu and his followers are trapped. They don’t care what’s happening in the outside world, outside the world of politics and outside of Israel. Therefore, Netanyahu is careful to immediately deny that such negotiations are even taking place. But he doesn’t blame Hamas because if he does, that would suggest that Israel is interested in holding negotiations regarding phase two in the first place,” the senior Israeli security official says.
Gaza and the South
**Exposure | Hamas Communication Recordings During Peak Fighting: Internal Strife, Battles Over Aid – and Accusations Against the Leadership**
Hamas operatives as we’ve never heard them before • Communication recordings of Hamas, revealed by Channel 12 News, show the clashes between operatives and the leadership – and the scramble for humanitarian aid: "You only care about yourselves, there is no leadership. Tell the leadership in Khan Younis – we will tear you apart" • Israel presented the recordings to the U.S. in an attempt to halt the entry of aid – but the Americans continued to insist on allowing the trucks, which primarily reached Hamas leadership.
**Unusual Images from the Gaza Border – and the Clash of Narratives Between the Army and the Minister in Charge, Israel Katz:**
A video circulated today (Sunday) from the border documented a bulldozer 200 meters from the fence, deep inside the perimeter, a buffer zone defined by Israel that is supposed to be empty of people.
"Hamas infrastructure teams are working at this time inside the perimeter (security zone) while the IDF secures them," said members of the "Israeli Envelope Forum" in a video they filmed. "How is it possible that internet infrastructure is being repaired in the Gaza Strip while our hostages are still being held there? How is it possible that Hamas terrorists are 'working' so close to our homes? How is it possible that we are not allowed to move near the fence while Gazans are? Instead of leveraging a strategic asset, we are giving rewards to the enemy. This is not how security is created, and this is not how the hostages will be brought home."
The IDF Spokesperson did not officially respond to these claims, but a military source told N12 that "this is work linked to the restoration of civilian infrastructure – controlled and coordinated with the IDF. It involves a few specific engineering vehicles."
**Defense Minister Katz Reacts with Anger to the Footage:**
Contrary to what is happening on the ground, Defense Minister Katz published a response stating that the directive is to target anyone who enters the perimeter. "The directive to the IDF is clear and unequivocal: anyone who enters the Gaza buffer zone, whether on foot or in a vehicle – their blood is on their head – and this is exactly how the IDF must act. Our duty is to protect the lives of IDF soldiers and the residents of the south from any threat and danger, and we will not compromise on security. We will not return to the reality of October 7th."
EU set to tell Israel Gazans must return home, bloc will rebuild Strip
The EU plans to tell Israel next week that Palestinians uprooted from their Gaza homes should be ensured a dignified return and that Europe will contribute to rebuilding the shattered territory, according to a document seen by Reuters.
That echoes Arab positions but conflicts with US President Donald Trump’s stated aim for America to take over the Strip and rebuild it into a “Riviera of the Middle East” while Gazans emigrate to other nations.
The EU, which has been a major aid provider to Palestinians, is to outline its position to Israeli officials in talks in Brussels on February 24 as part of the EU-Israel Association Council, the first such session since 2022.
A document outlining the draft EU position emphasizes both Europe’s commitment to Israel’s security and its view that “displaced Gazans should be ensured a safe and dignified return to their homes in Gaza.”
“The EU will actively contribute to a coordinated international effort to early recovery and reconstruction in Gaza,” it says, also calling for full humanitarian access.
“The EU deeply deplores the unacceptable number of civilians, especially women and children, who have lost their lives, and the catastrophic humanitarian situation notably caused by the insufficient entry of aid into Gaza, in particular in the North.”
Israel launched the war against Hamas in Gaza after thousands of Hamas-led Palestinian terrorists committed the October 7, 2023, massacre in southern Israel. The war has displaced Gaza’s population, especially those in the territory’s north where the vast majority of buildings were destroyed.
“The EU strongly opposes all actions that undermine the viability of the two-state solution,” the document adds, referring to its position that Palestinians should have an independent homeland alongside Israel.
Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria
IDF believed set to withdraw from Lebanon in coming days; Hezbollah drone launch specialist eliminated
Defense establishment estimates that the withdrawal of forces will be completed in parallel with the deployment of the Lebanese army in the area, while Israel still demands military control of five strategic points along the border; Saturday evening: The Israeli Air Force attacked a vehicle in southern Lebanon and killed one of the heads of the Hezbollah drone unit. The extension of the cease-fire agreement with Hezbollah will expire in three days, and the defense establishment is optimistic about the implementation of the rest agreement, and estimates that the withdrawal of forces from southern Lebanon will be completed in the coming days, parallel to the deployment of the Lebanese army in these areas under the supervision of the U.S. mechanism.
A critical meeting was held between the two sides over the weekend, with the participation of American officers and UNIFIL leaders. The sides described it as successful, with agreement on the IDF's withdrawal from the Shiite villages on the demarcation line. At the same time, Israel insists on militarily controlling five strategic points along the border, on the Lebanese side, because they have control over observation sites and lines of fire, as well as infiltration routes into nearby Israeli communities. The sides are expected to hold final negotiations on this in the coming days, and Israel has not ruled out the possibility of a further extension of the cease-fire.
The IDF has already been gradually withdrawing from most areas in southern Lebanon in recent weeks, parallel to the withdrawal of Lebanese army forces into the area. Either way, the effort to complete the negotiations and withdrawal corresponds with the plan at the political and military levels to return the population evacuated from the Galilee in the north to their homes in as little as two weeks.
At the same time, the IDF is expected to continue its aggressive enforcement of the cease-fire, as it has been in recent days deep inside Lebanon and north of the Litani River, and also to prevent the transfer of weapons or support from Iran to Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, the IDF announced Saturday evening that the Israeli Air Force had eliminated Abbas Hamoud in southern Lebanon, one of the leaders of the Hezbollah aerial forces who was responsible for launching drones into Israel. "The IAF conducted a precise and intelligence-based strike on a central terrorist in Hezbollah’s aerial unit in the area of southern Lebanon," the IDF said in a statement. "The terrorist was targeted after repeatedly violating the understandings between Israel and Lebanon over the past few weeks, including his role in leading the launch of UAVs toward Israeli territory."
The Israeli Air Force struck a vehicle carrying a Hezbollah terrorist in southern Lebanon
Lebanese media confirmed that Hamoud was killed in a car attack in the village of Jarjua, in the Nabatieh region in southern Lebanon, and reported that Ahmed Farhat was also killed alongside him. Lebanon's Ministry of Health claimed that five people, including two children, were injured in the attack.
Defense Minister Israel Katz said that Israel would consider to strike back against attacks from Lebanon.
"As I warned - if there are drones, there will be no Hezbollah," Katz said. "We will not allow the reality of drone launches toward the State of Israel. The launch of the drones constitutes crossing a red line and a blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Lebanon. We will continue with the policy of strong enforcement against any violation of the cease-fire and protect the security of the residents of the Galilee; We will not allow a return to the reality of October 7."
His office reported that "the minister instructed the IDF to act firmly against those responsible for the drone launches from Lebanon." link
Israel airstrike reported near village in northeastern Lebanon
Lebanese media reports an Israeli airstrike near the village of Harbata in the Baalbek District in northeastern Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.
Harbata is located some 100 kilometers from the border with Israel.
There is no immediate comment from the IDF on the strike.
IDF confirms airstrikes on Hezbollah facilities in northeastern Lebanon
The IDF confirms carrying out airstrikes deep in Lebanon a short while ago, saying it targeted Hezbollah facilities where activity by the terror group was identified.
The Hezbollah sites included rocket launchers and other weapons, according to the military.
“The activity of terror operatives at these sites is a violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon,” the IDF says.
Lebanese media reported that the strikes were carried out near the village of Harbata, in the Beqaa Valley, some 100 kilometers (62 miles) from Israel.
Report: Israeli strike in Lebanon targeted senior Hamas military official
The Saudi al-Hadath outlet reports that the target of the Israeli drone strike in the coastal Lebanese city of Sidon was a senior Hamas military official.
The IDF has not yet commented on the strike that reportedly killed one person.
Israel planning to pull out of Lebanon tomorrow, Israeli official says
Israeli soldiers seen on the border fence with Lebanon, northern Israel, on February 2, 2025. (Ayal Margolin/Flash90)
Israel is planning on withdrawing from Lebanon tomorrow, an Israeli official tells The Times of Israel on condition of anonymity.
However, Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer has previously said the IDF will stay in five strategic locations in Lebanon’s south.
The ongoing ceasefire with Hezbollah stipulates that the pullout must be completed by a delayed deadline of February 18. Hezbollah is also meant to vacate southern Lebanon, with the Lebanese army maintaining the only military presence there.
“We intend to leave and fulfill the agreement,” says the official, “and of course, enforcement will continue.”
“As you see, we just killed a senior Hamas official there in Lebanon — in Sidon, not in southern Lebanon. So we will continue with determined enforcement and what happened before October 7 will not happen again.
“We will attack every threat we see, and we will make sure that Hezbollah does not evade and does not receive funding from Iran… It just will not happen.”
The Israel Defense Forces confirms troops will remain deployed to five strategic positions in southern Lebanon after tomorrow’s deadline to withdraw as part of a ceasefire agreement, and provides the locations.
The United States has authorized the IDF to remain in the five points, though it is not clear yet how long troops will stay there.
At the five positions, the IDF has constructed military posts that will be manned by troops.
The posts are located at: a hill near Labbouneh, across from the the Israeli border town of Shlomi; the Jabal Blat peak, across from Zar’it; a hill across from Avivim and Malkia; a hill across from Margaliot; and a hill across from Metula.
None of the posts are located within built-up areas of Lebanon. The IDF will be withdrawing from all Lebanese border villages and towns tomorrow by 10 a.m.
The IDF has also ramped up its defenses on the Israeli side of the border, with several new army posts, one in front of every Israeli border community; better surveillance capabilities, including more cameras, radars, and sensors; and triple the number of troops compared to before the war.
The military expects Hezbollah supporters to stage protests as residents of the south Lebanon border villages return to their homes. Troops by then will not be located in any of the towns, so there should be no direct friction, according to the IDF.
The IDF, however, will prevent suspects from approaching the Israeli border and the newly established army posts at the five strategic positions.
IDF says it blew up tunnel near Israel-Lebanon border belonging to elite Hezbollah unit
The IDF says it recently demolished a Hezbollah tunnel on the Lebanese side of the Mount Dov border area.
According to the IDF, the tunnel, belonging to Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force, was dozens of meters long. It included several rooms and caches of weapons.
The tunnel was located several weeks ago by the 810th “Mountains” Regional Brigade, and it was demolished yesterday by combat engineers.
West Bank and Jerusalem and Terror attacks within Israel
Left-wing watchdog says plans advancing for nearly 1,000 settler homes in West Bank
View of houses in the West Bank settlement of Efrat, south of Jerusalem. October 25, 2021. (Gershon Elinson/Flash90)
Israel has issued a tender for the construction of nearly 1,000 additional settler homes in the West Bank, an anti-settlement watchdog says.
Peace Now argues that the development of 974 new housing units would allow the population of the Efrat settlement, south of Jerusalem, to expand by 40% and further block the development of the nearby Palestinian city of Bethlehem. Hagit Ofran, who leads the left-wing group’s settlement monitoring, says construction could begin after the contracting process and issuing of permits, which could take another year at least.
Peace Now, which campaigns for a negotiated two-state solution to the conflict, accuses Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government of pressing ahead with settlement construction while public attention is directed elsewhere.
“While the people of Israel [set] their sights on the release of the hostages and an end to the war, the Netanyahu government is operating ‘on steroids’ to establish facts on the ground that will destroy the chance for peace and compromise,” it says in a statement.
Politics and the War (general news)
High Court rejects petition demanding full text of Gaza ceasefire deal be published
Demonstrators protest for the release of the hostages and against the government, outside the IDF's Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv, February 15, 2025. (Miriam Alster/Flash90)
The High Court of Justice rejects a petition demanding that the full agreement between Israel and the Hamas terror group for the ongoing ceasefire and hostage release agreement be published, ruling that Basic Law: The Government entitles the government to conduct secret diplomacy.
Although part of the agreement was published, an Appendix B that include maps and other details outlining the parameters of the deal was not made public by government.
The Israel Democracy Guard (IDG) organization filed a petition arguing that the citizens of Israel have the right to know the nature of the agreements that were signed between the government of Israel and the Hamas terror organization.
IDG asserted that this right should override concerns and claims of the government about security risks regarding publication of the deal, since Hamas itself is fully aware of the terms of the agreement it signed.
The state argued that publishing the details of the agreement would endanger its implementation, and therefore state security and the country’s foreign relations; that the right of the public to know was not absolute; and that Basic Law: The Government entitles it to keep such matters secret.
The court notes that the petition stemmed from “a deep concern for the wellbeing of the hostages being held by Hamas,” and concedes that transparency of government action and the right of the public to receive information about what its representatives do “are the foundation stones of democratic governance” which are founded within Israeli law.
However, it ultimately rules that these principles are relative and not absolute, and subject to conditions stipulated in law, including Basic Law: The Government, which expressly entitles the government to keep secret decisions relating to state security and foreign relations.
The court says, as it has repeatedly, that it defers to the government and the security services regarding claims about national security, and therefore rejects the petition.
Not Attacking Hezbollah on October 11—the greatest missed opportunity in Israel’s military history'
Since his dismissal as defense minister, Yoav Gallant stayed silent—until now. In an extensive interview with Nadav Eyal, he shares his version of how the war unfolded for the first time: From the devastating early-morning phone call with the IDF chief, to the grim faces in the command bunker and the realization that the war rested on his shoulders; From his plan to detonate Hezbollah’s pagers and assassinate Nasrallah at the outset, to the political maneuvering that delayed the northern offensive by a year; From his warnings to Netanyahu during the judicial overhaul crisis, to the leak to Smotrich that torpedoed a hostage deal back in Passover. Yoav Gallant, has Israel’s government, of which you were part, done everything to bring back the hostages?
“I think the government of Israel has not done everything to bring back the hostages.”
Yoav Gallant has remained silent since his dismissal as defense minister—and, in fact, since the war began. In a rare and comprehensive interview with Nadav Eyal, he shares his account of the war, speaking for the first time. From the chilling 6:30 a.m. phone call from the IDF chief of staff to the grim faces in the Kirya command bunker and the realization that the war’s fate rested on his shoulders.
Gallant reveals his early plan to cripple Hezbollah’s communications—rigging their pagers and walkie-talkies with explosives—alongside a targeted strike to eliminate Hassan Nasrallah at the outset. He details the political maneuvering that delayed a northern offensive by a full year, his warning to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the judicial overhaul, and how Bezalel Smotrich’s leak sabotaged a hostage deal over Passover.
It was a year ago—one of the most harrowing and symbolic encounters of this war. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant toured Nir Oz, unaware that just meters away, Reuma Kedem was standing in the ruins of her family home. It was there that her daughter, Tamar Kedem Siman Tov, son-in-law, Yonatan, and their three children—Shahar, 5.5, Arbel, 5.5, and Omer, 2—were brutally murdered by Hamas.
Kedem had come to the burned-out house to collect toys that once belonged to her slain grandchildren. The massacre in Nir Oz was devastating. Not a single IDF soldier fired a shot that day. Hamas’s Nukhba unit roamed the kibbutz unchallenged, murdering or kidnapping one in every four residents before retreating to Gaza. Security forces arrived hours later—too late.
'Every word she said was etched in my heart': Yoav Gallant meeting Reuma Kedem in Kibbutz Nir Oz
Kedem saw the defense minister and made no effort to contain her grief and anger. Dressed in black as usual, Gallant listened in silence while the entire encounter was captured by a TV crew. “What is this? How is it possible? My daughter and my three grandchildren…One phone call the night before and Tamar would have been out of there. I have no heart left. My heart is burnt,” Reuma Kedem told him. “This is how you abandoned us… there is a God in heaven! How long will we stay silent? What? A lousy government—what are you doing?!"
Gallant was caught off-guard. He simply looked at the grieving mother and grandmother, and remained silent—displaying a behavior foreign to the government of which he was a member, and essentially to that of the current political culture.
“Look,” he says. “My meeting with Reuma Kedem ranks among the hardest, most moving and saddening in my whole life. I stood in front of her for minutes. It wasn’t planned. I heard her, listening intently. Every word she said was etched in my heart. The most forceful thing she said was why didn’t you tell us? Why wasn’t the IDF here? Why didn’t the IDF show up?”
This is the first interview the former defense minister has given since October 7—and, in essence, since the start of the judicial overhaul two years ago, a time that now feels like a lifetime ago.
Our conversation offers a detailed account of 13 turbulent months in Israel and the Middle East, as seen through the eyes of its defense minister. In January 2023, Yoav Gallant was sworn in, finally reaching the role he had spent his entire career working toward. Within months, he was at the center of an unprecedented political crisis with profound security implications. Nine months later, he was leading a war unlike any in Israel’s history.
As defense minister, Gallant wielded immense influence, drawing on his military experience to unify the defense establishment. With few exceptions, he shaped Israel’s strategy—from the initial response to Hamas’ October 7 massacres to containing the attack and confronting Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance.” His tenure came to an abrupt end on the morning of Donald Trump’s re-election, with a terse letter of dismissal from Netanyahu.
I reminded Gallant of his dramatic meeting at Nir Oz and how we talked about responsibility – his own responsibility, for Israel's worst security failure ever.
His answer: Israel needs a state commission of inquiry. “Everything Reuma Kedem said is correct. Sadly, we can’t turn back the clock. She’s right, from her perspective, for sure. The pain here is immense. That wasn’t my first visit to Nir Oz, nor was it my last. I made sure to get myself to all of the places - Be’eri, Kfar Azza and Nir Oz as well as all of the other communities – Sufa, Kerem Shalom, Holit, Netiv Ha’Asara, and obviously the Nova party massacre site. I met residents and went to see all such sites. I was dealing with stuff from the very first day.”
You were fired by Netanyahu, and then you resigned from Knesset. But it doesn’t seem like you decided your political career had to come to an end as a result of assuming responsibility for October 7.
“I’m not absolving myself of any responsibility. As far as I’m concerned, looking ahead, I think we have to examine what happened, how it happened and why. What happened in the preceding decade. What brought us to this. And all this will happen when there’s a state commission of inquiry.”
When you hear that Gallant visited every massacre site and everywhere Israeli blood was spilled, repeatedly, what you’re not hearing is the subtext of his message about Netanyahu. Gallant is making it clear that he represents everything Netanyahu does not. While Netanyahu has traveled to Washington twice since the war broke out, he has still not found the time to visit the destroyed kibbutz of Nir Oz.
The fired defense minister is calling for a state commission of inquiry—something Netanyahu is actively resisting, with the full support of the Likud party in parliament. Gallant believes Israel needs a universal draft for all its citizens, while Netanyahu has been working on legislation that would essentially allow the Haredi exemption from mandatory army service to continue.
And yet, throughout our conversation, Yoav Gallant firmly refrains from providing an opinion regarding Netanyahu in the war, gauging his abilities or judging his performance. He stresses his desire to speak, “in facts, rather than interpretations or assessments.” And we certainly talked about facts. The first in this story, concerns that bitter morning that changed the Middle East.
Part One
Where were you at around 6:30 in the morning, October 7, 2023?
“I was at home, getting ready for a bike ride. At 6:30 a.m., I got a phone call from my daughter (an Air Force officer), telling me there were sirens in Tel Aviv. I immediately hung up, and a minute later, I spoke with the chief of staff. He said, ‘It’s from Gaza. It’s not just rockets. There’s also a ground incursion. I’ll do a situation assessment and then update you.’ I put on my black clothes (Gallant's black attire became his signature during the war) and drove to the Kirya (IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv). I didn’t return home at all for the next three months. For me, this was the beginning of the war.”
I can imagine you all were in complete shock. It exceeded any possible scenario.
“It was a complete surprise, for me obviously, more than others. They (the IDF generals) didn’t even wake me up in the night for any stage of their consultation. It found me as it was at 6:30 in the morning. On my way to the Kirya, I tried talking to everyone I could: municipal leaders, people I know. It was very hard to directly get reports from the army or the military secretariat. They were all busy addressing the Hamas attack. When I got to the Kirya, I went into the Pit (the IDF command bunker). I think the most striking thing was that people didn’t know what was going on. The picture wasn’t clear and neither was the scope. It was hard to build a situation report of such a wide-scale attack in such a short space of time.”
'It was a complete surprise': Palestinian bulldozer breaking through the Gaza border barrier, October 7, 2023
How long did it take to build a situation report?
“I went into a room where the chief of staff was conducting a situation assessment with the head of the Operations Division. I gathered everyone together and held a situation assessment at eight o'clock. I quickly told them, ‘One, we’re at war. Two, mobilize everyone we have: regulars, reserves, the entire army. Three, send troops north, including on chains (i.e., tanks on the roads).’ My assessment was that Hamas wouldn’t start a war like this without Hezbollah backing them.
“I then addressed the public, understanding the panic and confusion. I was the first government representative to speak. I said, ‘Hamas has waged war on us. They will pay a very heavy price. We will win.’ From that moment until the end of my role 13 months later, that was my focus—winning the war and achieving its goals, including, of course, bringing back the hostages.”
When did you realize it was actually an invasion? In those early hours, it seemed like we were learning about things from Hamas’s media, from their videos.
"Look, I wasn’t sitting there watching screens. I was conducting situation assessments and discussions, and gradually, a clearer picture emerged. At first, we were dealing with reports of dozens killed, then ‘a few communities’ were affected, and slowly, the scope became clearer. Within an hour, I understood we were facing a large-scale event. I just didn’t know the full extent of it. The next day, I was in Ofakim, Be'eri and other places. I saw it firsthand—the breaches in the fence. I think the fog of war and the sheer surprise of it all prevented the IDF and Shin Bet from having a clear and coherent situation report."
When did you and the prime minister first talk?
“As far as I remember, during the situation assessment we did in the morning hours.”
What were the prime minister’s instructions?
“I don’t remember anything specific. I think we discussed calling up the reserves. In those early days, I set the goals for the war, and the Security Cabinet simply adopted them. I sat down, wrote them out, and presented what was needed, like calling up the reserves. That was under my authority for a while. But shortly after, it was transferred to the decisions of the Security Cabinet and the government.”
Would you describe the prime minister as dominant in the first month of the war?
“Let's put it this way. When I went into the Pit, I very quickly understood this was a large-scale event, that the responsibility on me had no substitute, and that in many ways, the fate of the war rested on my conduct, decision-making, setting a personal example, expressing composure, support, representing and leading it all. It was clear to me from the start, that all roads led to me.”
Later in the interview, when Gallant described Netanyahu’s “pessimistic” approach at the start of the war, I pressed for a clearer assessment of the prime minister’s performance and returned to the point:
Some say Netanyahu wasn’t functioning, that he was in a state of shock for the first month. Is this true?
“I’m not getting into this kind of analysis.”
You don’t want to address the issue of whether Netanyahu was in state of shock?
“I don’t. I’ve no understanding of the angle you’re describing, and so I’m describing the factual matters – what happened and what was said.”
Okay. Shortly after the Hamas attack began, the IDF activated the “Parash Pleshet” order, an emergency response to hostile incursions, which granted division commanders the authority to use military force within Israel’s borders. Then, the IDF implemented a directive known in the media as “Hannibal,” aimed at preventing kidnappings, even if it meant putting Israeli hostages’ lives at risk. Were you involved in these decisions?
"You have to understand the scale of what was happening. There were infiltrations at dozens of points. The division commander was engaged in fighting Hamas at the division base, holding his ground inside the headquarters while they fired at his position. A southern brigade commander was killed. People were running into battle. What you're describing are local operations. My orders were clear: close the border, eliminate anyone in our territory and stay in contact with local municipal officials. I assigned each leader a representative to coordinate directly with the army. The reason for this was that I recognized the pace of execution was slow. The IDF’s real problem at that time was the failure to act the night before."
Gallant repeatedly refers to that night, often using the word “frustration” in different ways. This was the night that SIM cards, secretly planted by the Israeli Shin Bet to provide early warning of a possible Hamas attack, were activated by Hamas fighters. Other signals were intercepted by Israeli intelligence and Shin Bet, but they were mostly interpreted as part of a possible Hamas drill and not as a sign for an imminent attack.
The Military Intelligence chief, the head of the IDF Southern Command, the chief of staff and the head of the Operations Directorate were all notified. They woke up, held discussions and issued instructions. Gallant says the IDF was effectively operating from that night onward based on a situation assessment that assumed, at worst, a limited attack.
"It’s not that bad people didn’t update me. They’re all good people." Still, for him, the fact that they didn’t wake him up that night remains “the greatest frustration of my life.”
Why?
“Because they deprived me of the last point in which I could intervene. Ultimately, the defense minister can intervene days or hours before such an attack, giving instructions and supply trajectories. He’s not standing there at the fence with a gun, and he’s not commanding a battalion, zone or command region. This really is the most frustrating point. Why? Because I’m used to being woken up in the middle of the night. I’ve been woken up a lot. I’ve always taken it seriously. I’ve always given the most stringent of instructions. From all my life experience, there’s one thing I know for certain I’d have done. I’d have told them: ‘I hear the situation assessment and what you’re doing. Let’s assume your situation assessment is lenient. What General Staff operations, what troop deployments are you ordering to secure the situation for the eventuality that you’re wrong, and something worse is going on?’ Just by asking that question, I believe something would have happened. More aircraft would have been sent into the air. All commanders would have been put on high alert. Maybe additional battalions would have been mobilized. In the end, by the morning hours, there were only four battalions in the sector—everything else takes time to mobilize and organize.”
There’s a debate over, ‘Why didn’t they wake up the prime minister.’ The question isn’t actually why they didn’t wake up the prime minister, but rather why they didn’t wake up the defense minister. Have you asked the chief of staff, ‘Why didn’t you wake me up?’
"The answer is simple—they didn’t think it was serious enough. That’s why they didn’t take all the necessary actions. They didn’t scramble the entire Air Force. They didn’t mobilize all available forces, and certainly not all the commanders. Why go far? In some battalions, there wasn’t even a state of alert at dawn. What does that mean? It means that this was an event where the battalion commanders weren’t even told there was a potential security threat. And by extension, it also means that the defense minister wasn’t woken up. But I don’t know everything. This, of course, follows a long series of intelligence reports that came in over the years—reports that weren’t acted upon as they should have been.”
From everything you know in hindsight about that night, including as someone who was the defense minister at those critical moments—what, in your view, was the most obvious military mistake during those hours leading up to the attack? The most glaring one?
"It’s a bit presumptuous to give a definitive answer about such a massive event. I think it comes down to what I told you I would have done. In a situation where there was a failure to fully understand the intelligence in advance, you have to mitigate the risk through actions that take a worst-case scenario into account. The scenario they considered dangerous, and the actions they took in response, were not aligned with the actual threat. Of course, this is also tied to how threats accumulated and were handled over the years.”
Gallant gives me an example—Operation Shield and Arrow, the campaign against Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza a few months before the Hamas attack, during which the entire security leadership held hundreds of situation assessments over two weeks, focusing in "maximum detail" on PIJ and Hamas, fearing that Hamas might intervene.
"And yet, not a single person stood up and said that Hamas had an offensive plan—one that included the possibility of seizing parts of the Negev or entire communities. What we later came to know as the Wall of Jericho plan."
When did you first hear the words, ‘The Wall of Jericho’?
"About a month after the campaign began. In my view, the real story is that both the name and the plan were known to senior officials in the military high command. They were familiar with it (the Wall of Jericho scenario). And yet—again, these are not bad people—despite their awareness, it didn’t sink in, and the result was never presented to me. The possibility or course of action in which Hamas would carry out something far more ambitious than we had assessed was not fully considered."
I saw the public statements given by the prime minister and yourself following Operation Shield and Arrow. Israel’s military and political echelons took pride in the fact that Hamas did not intervene and argued it is deterred. In retrospect, it turns out that Hamas was deliberately reserving its forces for a huge attack on Israel.
“As defense minister, I was relying on three basic channels of information. Firstly, what comes up about the enemy in intelligence, secondly; what comes up in discussions and situation assessments that make their way to me, which ultimately goes through all the echelons, and thirdly; my going to the field and meeting brigade and battalion commanders, and certainly division commanders and the generals. This delves deeper and is more specific to each sector. In all these places, and by all these methods and stages, including during Operation Shield and Arrow, but in other scenarios too, there was no information anywhere – neither in the information channels nor the discussions or observations channels when something happens (as to Hamas in Gaza). I’ll tell you more than that: When I was visiting the Gaza Division, on more than one occasion, I told them, ‘Look, the defense minister, chief of staff and the prime minister have strategic intelligence. Don’t rely on it. Do what you’re good at – observation, patrols, stakeouts, tactical monitoring of communications. Everything you can give that increases our capabilities. Show your advantage in the field.’”
When asked about having no intelligence coverage of Hamas walkie-talkies, the spotter soldiers’ warnings and the general Military Intelligence's failure, specifically in the elite Unit 8200 where senior personnel were not called in from their homes that night, Gallant says he’s not getting into the operational side: “At the end of the day, I’m defense minister with a dozen echelons beneath me who have to the work. But, ignoring tactical intelligence is, without a doubt, has been at the heart of the whole issue. If you ask me what I saw – and by the way, I made these comments in the Northern Command too – there’s an ever-increasing addiction to strategic intelligence which is higher quality, but it isn't the bread and butter and the foundation of tactical power.”
A week and a day before Hamas attacked, on the first day of Sukkot, the defense minister goes down to the Gaza border, on his own initiative.
Instinct, perhaps. “In afternoon hours, I told my people that I want to go to the Gaza Division, to see what’s going on. For no particular reason. We don’t need the chief of staff or division command. I was told the northern brigade commander is on duty and I go to meet him. Me and him. We looked over Gaza and I asked him questions: What was going on here and there, and whether they’ll get past. He explained the technique (of the barrier) and how they’ll trap them between the fences, the Hover's Axis (the road on the perimeter fence with Gaza). I then went to the nearby Iron Dome battery. I’m telling you this because I’m trying to show that I was trying to best understand what was going on in the sector. But in the end, you have to rely on what the intelligence and commanders tell you.”
And you had no indication.
“I am frustrated. For the entire year, or for nine months, they were in no way giving any kind of information about anything materializing (in Gaza’s Hamas). I met with the present general officer commander (GOC), the previous GOC, the chief of staff, the previous chief of staff in the first month we were together. Not a word. Any activity on the fence – like friction and disturbances in the month leading up to October 7 – were explained away as efforts to draw concessions regarding the number of daily workers [permitted into Israel], aid to Gaza and similar aspects. That’s the explanations I received.
Moreover, you knew secret negotiations were underway in Cairo at this stage, regarding the possibility of bringing back Israelis [Avera] Mengistu and [Hisham] al-Sayed, and the bodies of [Hadar] Goldin and [Oron] Shaul. In other words, Hamas was deceiving the Israelis.
"There is no doubt that this was a deception that successfully misled Israeli intelligence. I left the sector 12 years earlier—that was the last time I was in the chain of command. Since then, there have been three IDF chiefs of staff, six defense ministers, and one prime minister for most of the time. When I left, there was no underground city in Gaza, and there were no attack tunnels penetrating into Israel. We were on the verge of breaking Hamas' back in Operation Cast Lead, but I didn’t receive approval from the chief of staff and defense minister at the time. So I had a certain perspective. Throughout all these years, there were people in the most central positions, specializing in this sector—and in the end, you rely on these systems."
Gallant says that when he took office, he intervened in the IDF's preparations in the north in response to Hezbollah’s public plans to invade the Galilee. “I told them, you are not prepared for a large-scale offensive by Hezbollah.” He discussed the matter with the chief of staff three times and demanded preparations as if Hezbollah’s Radwan Force—a specialized commando brigade trained for cross-border raids—was "a division on the border."
“As a result, they began working on fortifications, reinforcing airpower, and initiating artillery-related operations. I give this as an example of a situation where I had a ‘sensor.’ That’s why it frustrates me so much that I had nothing (ahead of Hamas’s attack from Gaza), and in those final 24 hours, in the last few hours, I wasn’t even aware (of the overnight consultations). That frustrates me enormously. To influence things as defense minister, I need some kind of foothold. If I had even the smallest foothold, I would have used it.”
Let’s get back to that morning. There’s another problem emerging – that of command and control, beyond the fog of war. Hamas had taken down the communications lines, taken over junctions. Each tank was working alone.
"In the first hours, the IDF was in a situation where it was under attack by Hamas, but in reality, it was facing a commando division of 4,000–5,000 fighters, equipped with boats, drones, motorized gliders, 4x4 vehicles mounted with heavy machine guns, Hamas command posts, communication devices, and even Hamas medical teams. There was a severe force ratio problem—this was the core issue. They were fighting against four battalions that were on low Sabbath readiness. Once key commanders in the sector were hit—like the brigade commander and others who were wounded—the battlefield became decentralized, and there was no overall control. This didn’t happen at the General Staff level. I doubt—this needs to be investigated—what was happening at the regional command and division levels. But if you ask me, that was the moment when the consequences of previous errors became irreversible."
I ask Gallant whether the atmosphere was like in the Pit in 1973, two days after the Yom Kippur War broke out, when Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was talking about the "fall of the Third Temple -" the possibility of Israel being wiped out. He instantly rejects this.
“I told people we were at war. We’ll win. The confusion and lack of data was immense, but I don’t think the chief of staff was in any kind of situation similar to what you’re describing. He wasn’t losing his composure. He was controlling things in the emerging situation. Throughout the first days, however, and even on that day, I saw people who had to sit in the first row, as I sat at the head of the table, who suddenly moved back to the second row – and weren’t there. I suddenly saw that the personal burden on their shoulders resulting from the failure was very heavy indeed. Without saying it in words, I held them accountable. I asked them questions and brought them back into the circle of operation. Because I understood that with this composition, we were going all the way to victory.”
You mention former Military Intelligence chief General Aharon Haliva.
“I didn’t name names.”
There are two arguments here. The first is how such a surprise could happen. The second – the surprise has already occurred. How is it possible that the IDF didn’t arrive in time? The all-powerful IDF couldn’t arrive and recapture, let’s say, any kibbutz or village by 1:00 p.m.? Even if there was an invasion of thousands of terrorists?
“I think it’s a matter of IDF response. At the end of the day, the IDF needs to bring troops from somewhere, organize the troops in Judea and Samaria or at a training ground, get them on trucks or helicopters and transfer them. That’s the time it probably took. The special forces landed earlier, and showed up. Sadly, they paid a heavy toll with many killed in all of these units, who really did an incredible work.”
Even after speaking with former chiefs of staff and security experts, it remains unclear – how could it be that Israelis were screaming for help from bomb shelters in kibbutzim for hours, and it was being broadcasted, while for hours they were telling us the terrorists were on the other side of the door? Did you, as a decision maker during this time, and your colleagues, understand the situation of thousands of Israelis under siege?
"I’ll put it simply: A) The situation was unclear. B) The defense minister doesn’t stand with a rifle or even a radio. In the end, the IDF is responsible for conscripting every eligible man and woman each year, providing them with basic training and equipment, with unlimited powers and billions of shekels to ensure security. That’s their job. But there’s no doubt that the price for the lack of warning was the delay in halting the threat. And that delay was 12 hard hours. The first six hours were especially difficult. Since the situation wasn’t clear, the roads were blocked, and no one was reporting, etc. – in this chaos, it was the frontline officers who solved the issues. It was the bravery of the soldiers that helped the IDF hold the line. The clearest example is the number of senior commanders, lieutenant colonels and others, who were killed in the first days. When you understand that, you realize where the army was. Brigadier generals fought with knives, and generals killed terrorists with pistols."
And reservist generals like Yair Golan and Israel Ziv, went down south with guns and rescued people, including from the Nova party. The displays of bravery are beyond doubt. Still, the expectation is that the government, the defense establishment and the IDF should be able to provide adequate containment within the territory of the State of Israel within a few hours.
“The catastrophe of it all was the encounter at zero range, a head-on collision. This means the braking distance took hours. The military apparatus wasn’t ready. The communities and soldiers paid the price at the line of contact, and the price was horrific. I saw it with my own eyes. At the end of the day, there’s one thing you can’t ignore – this is the army’s task. This is what it’s there for. This is one of several issues, I believe a commission of inquiry must investigate. It can’t be an internal investigation conducted only by the IDF. Everything has to be investigated, to see what the general directions were, what the instructions were, what troops were operated.”
If Hezbollah had launched a surprise attack that morning in the north, could the existence of the State of Israel have been at risk?
“I don’t think it was in danger.”
In October 2023, it was 50 years since the Yom Kippur War. political and military leaders were giving speeches about lessons learned. One of the Agranat State Commission’s conclusions was to prepare in accordance with capabilities, rather than threats and intentions of the enemy. Was the problem that intelligence was telling you Hamas didn’t have the capability?
“None of this was in anyone’s spectrum of thought. The best example for this: Before assuming my rule, compulsory military service was cut down from 36 to 32 months. What does this tell us about what Israel thinks about threats?
“When I assumed office, the allocation of funds to the IDF budget in real terms was decreasing compared to GNP. What does this tell you about where we were? I could carry on. At the end of the day, when you look at the tunnels in Rafah, we’re talking about things over a decade. These aren’t things hidden from view.
“Another example: in my first days as defense minister, I do what we call an inventory, a power assessment. It turns out, in 2022 the Americans took 200,000 artillery shells the IDF was counting on for the war in Ukraine. These are the American military warehouses. Another 50,000 were due to be taken in the summer. I asked the previous defense ministry director-general what they were doing about it. They told me – 'nothing'. Along with the new director-general (Eyal Zamir), I told Elbit (an Israeli defense contractor) to start producing artillery shells, and they did. When the war met us in October, the machines were already working. Without this, we’d have been six months behind. I got something where the state of mind was very much removed from a widescale attack on all fronts. It also had no intelligence backing.”
What about your personal responsibility as defense minister? For example, the transfer of funds from Qatar to Hamas, or the idea of a settlement with Hamas. That's in your time in office, too. Even if you weren’t aware of "The Wall of Jericho"—just as critics think Netanyahu should take responsibility and step down, so should you.
“A state commission of inquiry, that will objectively discuss all the details, not just in the army sector, but rather a decade back and the public will decide the rest. I’m prepared to be put to the test, any investigation, any procedure. That’s it. I can’t address everything that’s said. At the end of the day, I can only address what I know and what I’m familiar with.”
You were the defense minister. Whether you knew or not, you’re responsible.
"On responsibility, I spoke about it in the first days, in the staging areas. That’s why I said, 'Let’s establish a state commission of inquiry.' There is direct responsibility for those in charge, those with the ability to give orders. There are those who must provide the intelligence. There is also contributory responsibility for other matters: billions of dollars flowing from Qatar to Hamas, building the military infrastructure, the tunnels, all of it. There is a process that has escalated, with actions aimed at division within Israeli society, creating a growing weakness in our security structure. The dangerous part is that the enemy identified this as a point of vulnerability, and perhaps an opportunity. So much so that the enemy, in general – not just Hamas – asks itself: 'Do I need to help Israel collapse, or will it collapse on its own?' That’s why I’m so concerned about this issue and made my statement. I thought it was the last thing that could still be done."
Gallant is referring to his speech on March 25, 2023, in which he warned that the government's judicial overhaul must be halted and a compromise reached, citing a "clear, immediate, and tangible danger to state security." This public statement led to his dismissal by Netanyahu, which triggered the now-famous "Gallant Night."
On that night, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in widespread civil disobedience, preventing Gallant’s dismissal and halting the judicial overhaul. However, it was clear to political observers that, in the long term, Gallant’s public opposition to the prime minister would eventually lead to his removal.
Gallant recalls that before delivering the speech, he told his family he likely would be fired. "I spoke with my family about it. I told them, ‘I’m going to give a speech. I estimate a 20 percent chance that a few people will join me and share my opinion—despite not coordinating with anyone. This could lead to a halt in the overhaul. But I estimate an 80 percent chance that I’ll be fired and home by next week.’ I told them I was willing to take the risk. Look, being defense minister is the job of my life..."
And you had only been in the position for two months.
“Two and a half, I’d done all I could to reach this position. I believed I’d do the job for a long period of time. Yet as I’ve done my whole life, I put the good of the country and the IDF before my own. That’s to say - to anyone with any doubts about where my principles and sense of responsibility lie - when I see warning signs, I act.”
The speech came following failed talks with Netanyahu. Gallant says that three days earlier, Netanyahu had promised him he would “take steps,” but then, "went public" and "said different things." Gallant says he received disturbing prior reports from the heads of the Military Intelligence and its Research Division, Shin Bet and Mossad, all confirming the severity of the situation.
Mass protests in Tel Aviv during the first Gallant Night
(Photo: Ziv Koren)
“Look, I met with Netanyahu regarding the issue ten times or more. Apart from that, the chief of staff, the Mossad and Shin Bet chiefs, both together and separately (issued warnings, n.e). The Military Intelligence chief too. What I said in the speech wasn’t against judicial reform, but rather that we had a greater security urgency – that our enemies had identified an opportune moment.”
You’re saying you met with the prime minister ten times regarding “the issue.” Regarding what exactly?
"I spoke to him about the urgent need to halt the reform process, as it was putting us in a dangerous situation that we couldn’t afford. I told him that it didn’t matter who was right or who started it—the outcome is what counts. We cannot give our enemies an opportunity to exploit the situation. I saw it as a major threat. I have to clarify that Hamas wasn’t my primary concern. What worried me more, based on the intelligence—though nothing concrete had been identified—was the growing power of Hezbollah and Iran."
You’re saying you identified an immediate threat to national security, amid the ongoing legislation. What was in the intelligence?
“Clear danger. Clear and present. That’s what I said in the speech. Our enemies have identified a weak spot. They thought that Israel was on the path to collapse. Some of it was said publicly, some behind closed doors. By the way, I wasn’t against judicial reform. I think changes must be made addressing the balance of power between the judicial system and the government and Knesset. But you can’t come along with six immediate reforms four days after forming the government without the defense minister being updated – and I don’t know who was – and expect this to be a national priority without any major discussion.”
If that’s the case, and there was a sense of clear and present danger, did you order any change in the IDF deployment?
"My directives focused mainly on Iran and Hezbollah since we had intelligence that they were stronger. As for the north, I’ve already detailed what I did. The second thing is that, in my first three months in office, a team of experts worked to provide the defense establishment with additional perspectives on our plans regarding Iran. This team was led by former IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz, and included three other generals and two further senior officials. Following their conclusions, I conducted a war game exercise with the IDF in July 2023. Based on that, I issued directives the principles of which stated that if, for any reason, we get into a confrontation with Iran—deterrence alone is not enough. The whole conflict must end with them weaker and us stronger. And that was the basis of the successful October 26, 2024 operation against Iran."
Netanyahu's supporters argue that if you thought the situation was so severe, and there were warnings—and the warnings weren’t just a political ploy to thwart the judicial reform—why weren’t deployments made on the borders, including in the north?
"I’ve told you why: when I came into the job, mandatory military service was down to 32 months rather than 36. When I came into this role, I set up a ministerial committee about the reserves. There were 60,000 active reservists serving more than 21 days a year - for which the government refused to pay. I sat with ten ministers and some asked me, ‘Why do we even need a reserve army?’ This is in the summer of 2023. The IDF operates with the resources it has. Had there been a specific threat, we’d have prepared for it. In defense, which is the basic situation, you allocate all the resources—certainly the troops, etc., and distribute them across each day. For the enemy, every day and every hour is an opportunity to attack. If you don’t know when [the attack will be], you spread the resources across the board the best you can. Now, you can’t stop training for a whole year. Under the given circumstances, the IDF was on the highest level of readiness it could maintain for months at a time. That’s the story."
Gallant is visibly angry. "When all the security bodies are saying there's a tangible danger, an increased threat level, it’s unimaginable not to take it seriously. To present the problem as if it’s just the IDF’s or the security system’s issue – while it’s a national problem of the highest magnitude – the most glaring example is that I had to speak publicly for this to stop in the end. We were warning to do two things: One, allocate resources. Two, take action to stop the root cause of the threat. Neither of these things were done. Resources were not allocated. The issue (of Israel’s enemies recognizing an opportunity) was not given the proper national attention. At the same time, while I’m trying to convince (ministers) – I'm trying to demonstrate to you how these things were not being taken seriously – we see that what could be a powder keg, we don’t know in which front, is Ben-Gvir's visits to the Temple Mount. No one is stopping this."
Netanyahu might respond by saying the problem was that the security apparatus failed to properly address the protest movement that infiltrated the military—reserves announcing they would not volunteer for service, broadly referred to as a refusal to serve. According to the prime minister's associates, this failure played a key role in enabling the Hamas attack.
"This doesn’t warrant a response. This isn’t someone else’s country. We have an elected government. It has a prime minister. As far as I am concerned, refusing to serve is extremely serious. I’ve fought against it my whole life and I continued to fight against it. All these slogans are lies and nonsense. We addressed refusal to serve very decisively at many junctures. I didn’t allow former chiefs of staff to come into the IDF and speak as they’d said something that could have been interpreted as supporting it. And the test of what really happened is the real test. In the end, a war broke out. The reserve army attendance rate was 150–200 percent beyond anything the IDF needed. The way we handled it, when put to the test, October 7 saw everyone, without exception - double the numbers needed—show up. And yet - at the end of the day, in a democratic country, people can say whatever they like and do whatever they want, but they can’t use their positions [in the army] and ranks to add credence to what they say, and certainly not coerce an elected political leadership.
Part Two
The most important daily meeting in Israel during the first year of the war took place at the Defense Ministry. Starting in the third week of the war, Gallant convened top security officials every morning at 10:30 a.m. ("exactly," he notes, "and not on Zoom"): the IDF chief of staff, the heads of the Shin Bet and Mossad, the Defense Ministry director-general, the head of the Hostages Directorate, the coordinator of government activities in the territories (COGAT), the IDF spokesperson, the Home Front Command chief and others. "This was highly effective," Gallant says. "It was the beating heart of the entire process. And I insisted that the top officials themselves be there, not their representatives."
A similar, though smaller, meeting laid the groundwork for the current hostage deal. In hindsight, Netanyahu privately described the proposal as an "ambush" orchestrated by the security establishment.
The former defense minister assessed that it was unlikely Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar would have launched the war without some level of coordination with Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. "Indeed, months later, we found in Hamas computers in Gaza Sinwar’s speeches (to senior Hamas officials), as well as orders, discussions and coordination efforts. As early as the summer, they had sent people to coordinate with Hezbollah."
This story is closely tied to a relatively unknown figure in Israel: Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine Branch in the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Last week, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a detailed report on Izadi, based on captured documents from Gaza. These documents underscore the extent of Iran’s influence over Hamas and Izadi’s role in planning the “great campaign” that became the October 7 attack.
In July 2022, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh reported to Sinwar about a meeting that Izadi had arranged with Nasrallah. Haniyeh confirmed that Nasrallah viewed the destruction of Israel as a realistic and imminent scenario and that the Iranian representative sought to examine Hamas’ plans in depth.
A year later, senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya, a close associate of Sinwar, traveled to Beirut carrying a message about Hamas’ intention to launch an attack soon. For reasons that remain unclear, Nasrallah refused to meet him. Instead, al-Hayya met with Izadi and informed him that Hamas would strike Israel. Yet it does not seem that Nasrallah knew or acted upon this.
It can now be reported that during negotiations between Hamad and Israel for the return of Israeli captives and bodies from Gaza, just before October 7, one of the ideas proposed by mediators—originating from Hamas—was to grant Sinwar permission to leave Gaza for abroad, something he desired. The matter reached Gallant, who immediately rejected it. Had Sinwar traveled to Beirut, there is no doubt Nasrallah would have met him; the message that his associate al-Hayya had delivered about launching a war against Israel during the holidays would have reached Hezbollah's leader. And who knows what might have happened on October 7.
For the first time, Gallant now reveals Sinwar’s strategic directives on October 7 itself, based on captured Israeli intelligence. "Sinwar said there was a 'small plan'—that was Hamas. We would conquer the entire western Negev. There was a 'second plan'—that Hezbollah would join, seize the Galilee, and create a major threat. And if Iran joined, we would eliminate Israel."
Gallant says he quickly realized the need to restore Israeli deterrence. "When about 1,200 of your people are killed on the first day, then to reestablish deterrence, you need to eliminate the organization that attacked you. Because even if you kill 12,000 people, that’s an acceptable ratio for Hezbollah—and tomorrow, they will go to war against you."
The objectives, as he defined them and which were later adopted, included dismantling Hamas' military capabilities, securing the return of the hostages, eliminating Hamas' leadership and eradicating its governing authority in Gaza.
"I estimated that Hezbollah would join the war, and on the second day, October 8, they indeed began firing. At that point, we were fighting against an axis led by Iran, extending through Hezbollah to Hamas. I coined the term ‘the seven-front war.’ And from the first day, it was clear to me that in order to achieve our goals, we would need to conduct a ground operation to take over all of Gaza and dismantle its infrastructure. It was evident that there were unknowns—we had never fought in a battlefield filled with tunnels, and our experience in densely built-up areas was limited. But I told everyone who would listen, including within the IDF: through a ground maneuver, you destroy Hamas' strength, create conditions for retrieving the hostages and facilitate a regime change. Some said, 'Negotiate with them. Give them whatever they want, and they'll return the hostages.' I replied—under no circumstances."
There have been claims that an early deal could have brought all the hostages home at the start of the war.
"That was never the case. During those days, Hamas was even demanding Israeli concessions in Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria. At no point in any discussion was a deal like that proposed, and I am unaware of any intelligence supporting it. On the other hand, I saw what Hamas was saying. When we began mobilizing forces, they dismissed it as mere media theatrics. When we started minor maneuvers on the outskirts of Gaza, they said we wouldn't cross open terrain. When we entered the open areas, they said we wouldn’t go further. Slowly, they began to understand what was happening."
At the time, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu opposed a ground incursion into Gaza for weeks, fearing the IDF would suffer thousands of casualties.
"The prime minister said, 'Operate from the air. If we conduct a ground maneuver, we will lose thousands of soldiers.' I told him, ‘Mr. Prime Minister, first, we will not lose thousands of soldiers. Second, what is the army for, if after 1,000 of our civilians are slaughtered, we don’t move in?’ This was part of the same debate we will discuss in relation to October 11. There was a deep skepticism about the IDF’s capabilities and a severe sense of pessimism."
Gallant praises IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, saying he was "highly effective" in executing the maneuver plan in Gaza, which included a large-scale deception of Hamas in the first two months of fighting: "A combined operation was conducted at the highest level."
There were reports in Israeli and international media that you authorized strikes on the homes of all Hamas members, even if their families and uninvolved civilians would be killed, and that the identification of these targets was assisted by artificial intelligence.
"In terms of operations, you should discuss that with the military. Both the IDF chief of staff and I insisted that targets be strictly legal, in accordance with international law, and approved by the military advocate general. But I must emphasize the context. There are two million civilians in Gaza. At the outset, we had 251 hostages and around 1,200 people killed. These are factors that must be balanced. The country is fighting for its survival—not necessarily in the sense of physical destruction, but in terms of its standing and deterrence in the Middle East. Otherwise, Israel’s long-term viability is not guaranteed. This brings me to October 11."
For the first time, Gallant publicly reveals details of that dramatic Cabinet debate, in which ministers decided—against his recommendation and that of nearly the entire security establishment - to reject a large-scale preemptive strike on Hezbollah. He does not mince words about the decision. Here is a concise account of one of the most ambitious military plans ever presented to Israeli leaders:
"I believe that failing to act against Hezbollah on October 11 was the greatest missed opportunity in Israel’s military history. From the moment Hezbollah opened fire, it was clear we were confronting the Iranian-Hezbollah-Hamas axis. When you fight multiple enemies, you must strike the strongest one first. I didn’t invent this; it’s classic military strategy from [Carl von] Clausewitz—if you start with the weaker enemy, you won’t have the strength left for the stronger one. That’s why I told them: ‘We must begin with Hezbollah.’"
The plan for action against Hezbollah had three components. “First, there was an opportunity to eliminate senior Hezbollah leaders, including Iranian operatives and top commanders, from Nasrallah down. Immediately afterward, the IDF would have launched a large-scale strike on Hezbollah’s rocket and missile infrastructure, similar to what was ultimately carried out in September the following year. In 2024, Israel managed to neutralize about 80% of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities, but on October 11, the military could have achieved over 90% destruction, as many of the rockets were still stored in depots and had not yet been dispersed. The third phase involved a ground maneuver, during which thousands of Hezbollah fighters would have mobilized, wearing vests equipped with communication devices that could be remotely detonated, effectively eliminating between 12,000 and 15,000 operatives in an instant. This would have led to the large-scale destruction of Hezbollah’s leadership, its arsenal and its fighting force.
From that moment, the situation would have been entirely different. Why? Because it would have created an opportunity to shorten the war. The IDF could have shifted divisions from the northern front to the south, allowing simultaneous operations in Khan Younis and Rafah alongside the fighting in Gaza City. There would have been no need to evacuate northern Israeli communities, and Hamas would have lost its entire strategic support—both physically and morally. All of this could have been achieved under near-ideal conditions: Hezbollah had already opened fire across the northern border and was issuing direct threats; the IDF had a fully mobilized reserve force, with three divisions deployed for defense in the north; all Iron Dome batteries were operational and fully stocked; international support was at an unprecedented level; and national unity was stronger than ever following the horrific October 7 massacre. On top of that, Israel had complete strategic surprise.
"I believe this was the most critical turning point of the war after October 7," Gallant says. "And we took the wrong path. We corrected it a year later."
Gallant recounts that the decision-making process began taking shape on October 10. He and those present understood that, due to the narrow operational window (of the Hezbollah leaders meeting), everything would come down to a final decision the next day. He did not sleep that night, instead holding a series of consultations with experts and military officials who were urgently summoned to the Kirya. At 8:00 a.m., the IDF General Staff presented him with operational plans for the strike. By 10:00 a.m., he met with the chief of staff. "It turned out that he had reached the same conclusion independently," Gallant says, meaning the operation was feasible with a high likelihood of success. At 11:00 a.m., the defense minister went to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu.
What Gallant describes from this point is a rare and unprecedented glimpse into Netanyahu’s decision-making circle—not regarding an event from many years ago, but less than 2 years ago.
"I told him, ‘Mr. Prime Minister, this is what needs to be done. I am convinced of it.’ As we spoke, Netanyahu brought more people into the discussion—Ron Dermer, Tzachi Hanegbi and then the military secretaries. And I realized that Netanyahu did not want to go through with it. I understood this not because he explicitly said so, but because he insisted that we needed to speak with the U.S. president and asked me to call National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan." Gallant made the call, with Dermer also on the line. "And right away, I heard opposition to the plan."
What was the nature of the opposition?
“He said that this would drag us into a regional war which was not the right course. Soon after, calls started coming in—also of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and others. I told the prime minister, ‘I am convinced we must do this.’"
This was clearly a way of inviting U.S. pressure, Prime Minister Netanyahu telling you to talk to Sullivan.
"I understood that from the very first second."
And what was the reason for the prime minister’s opposition?
"From day one, through the first weeks of the war—at least until the conclusion of the first hostage deal—the prime minister projected a deep sense of pessimism, which I did not share. Regarding the ground maneuver, he kept saying, ‘There will be thousands of casualties. Hamas will use the hostages as human shields, place them on rooftops and in doorways.’ And on this issue [war with Hezbollah], more than once he pointed out the window of his office at the Kirya and said, ‘Do you see all these buildings in Tel Aviv? They will be destroyed—nothing will remain—because of Hezbollah’s residual capabilities.’ In other words, ‘after we strike with all we have, they would bring everything crashing down on us.’ I strongly disagreed and told him that was not the case. I also urged him to convene the Cabinet as soon as possible."
After the initial consultations, and with no formal decision, Gallant returned to the Pit. Despite the uncertainty, preparations for what would have been the largest and most complex Israeli military operation since the Suez Canal crossing in the 1973 Yom Kippur War had to continue. As the Cabinet meeting approached, he tried to reach the prime minister by phone. According to his account, the Netanyahu was unreachable.
"We were only three and a half days past October 7. I sent representatives time and again to his office because I was trying to reach the prime minister by phone, but there was no response. This was a war, and I was the defense minister. I was calling from the Pit, I sent an envoy to his office, but he was not allowed in. Eventually, I returned to the prime minister’s office myself at the Kirya around 3:00 p.m. and found that I had arrived just as a coalition negotiation was concluding to bring Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot and Gideon Sa’ar into the government. From that point on, they were considered part of the Cabinet."
The Cabinet convened in the Pit that evening. "Keep in mind, this was a meeting happening late in the day with a strict time limit. By the time I briefed the Cabinet, it was already clear that the prime minister, Gantz and Eisenkot were opposed to the operation. And I understood that the U.S. president had been brought in to pressure against it. I have no criticism of the Cabinet members—after all, they were being asked to decide within an hour whether to expand the war to another front without having had the chance to review the details, what we could have done in the morning (when Gallant had initially requested the meeting hours earlier), was not possible by the evening.”
Gallant describes the discussion as rushed. "During the meeting, I ordered the chief of staff to have the fighter jets take off, because if we didn’t move quickly, even if the decision was ultimately in favor, the opportunity could slip away."
But Gantz, Eisenkot, Dermer and Netanyahu all opposed the move. "And that was the end of it. The defense minister, the chief of staff, the head of the Shin Bet, the Mossad director, the deputy chief of staff, the Northern Command chief, the head of Military Intelligence and the Air Force commander—all supported the operation. In the end, the issue was rejected it, and the Cabinet votes against the decision."
I recall the argument of former IDF chief of staff Eisenkot—who was dominant in this discussion—that it would have been a severe strategic mistake, shifting the war’s focus to the north and preventing us from properly handling Hamas. And I have to say as a journalist, given the massive intelligence failure just three days before, it is entirely understandable that the political leadership lacked confidence in the military.
“What’s for certain is that everyone is entrenched in their positions, even to this day. Throughout the war, every time something happened in the north, I reminded them (those who objected): ‘We are paying the price for not making the right decisions at the right time.’ Whether it was the evacuation of northern residents, rocket fire on Manara, Metula or Misgav, the answer was always the same—that Hezbollah would have leveled Tel Aviv with its missile arsenal, that we would have been drawn into an unending war with Iran, etc. But here, history allowed us to ask a question we usually cannot: What if?"
Looking back, Gallant says that much of the IDF’s planned operation was ultimately carried out a year later. By the end of it, Hezbollah did not demonstrate "residual capabilities"—meaning it no longer had the power to reshape Tel Aviv’s skyline. In his view, the dire warnings had proven unfounded, and in hindsight, his position was correct.
At this stage, Gallant had been labeled by the Americans as reckless. From their perspective, he was the number-one risk factor for what they saw as a worst-case scenario: an uncontrolled regional war with Iranian involvement. Over time, they learned to work with him. The former defense minister recounts a phone call he received from his U.S. counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in late July 2024. This also came just hours after the IDF had killed Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Fuad Shukr—also known as "Sayyed Mohsen"—in Beirut.
By this point, Gallant was deeply involved in every aspect of the war. He was at Mossad headquarters with its chief David Barnea for the final discussions before Mossad’s operation in Tehran. From there, he was called back to the Kirya for approval of Hezbollah’s chief of staff’s assassination. He had not informed the Americans about either of these operations in advance—"naturally", he says.
"Shortly after Haniyeh was eliminated, I got a call from Austin. He asked me, ‘What are you doing?’ I told him, ‘Mr. Secretary, let me remind you that two days ago, twelve children were killed in Majdal Shams (from a Hezbollah rocket, n.e). I gave the IDF the order to take out Mohsen, and the window of opportunity opened. This man was a terrorist responsible for the murder of hundreds. And I told you—anyone who acts against us, we will strike. This is not a minor matter.’ Then he asked, ‘But what about Haniyeh? Why Haniyeh in Tehran?’
I told him, ‘He was Hamas’ Bin Laden. He knew everything, was directly involved in the planning, the slaughter of civilians, children, women, soldiers and the kidnappings. And this was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. You either take it, or you don’t. We decided to take it, and we stand by that decision. Anyone who fights us will be hit hard.’"
Gallant then reminded Austin: "These people—Haniyeh, for example—are responsible for an operation that didn’t just kill 1,200 Israeli civilians. There were also dozens of Americans among the dead and American hostages as well."
In many ways, this marked a turning point in the entire war. Until July 2024, Israel seemed bogged down in Gaza, unable to secure a deal and internally divided over the concessions being considered. There was deep hesitation about taking action in the north. But then, events began shifting rapidly in a way that reshaped the Middle East—leading to the collapse of the Syrian regime, a new political reality in Lebanon and the dismantling of the so-called "axis of resistance."
This shift was no accident. The IDF and the security establishment had been gradually escalating their confrontation with Hezbollah. The military Operations Directorate, led by Gen. Oded Basiuk, alongside the Air Force and Military Intelligence—determined to redeem itself after the October 7 failure—had been planning a series of calculated strikes. "Operations designed to ensure that Israel would win a full-scale war—without Nasrallah even realizing that such a war was already underway," as a senior security official put it to me.
Following the targeted killings of Mohsen and Haniyeh, Hezbollah planned a large-scale rocket attack in retaliation. But on August 25, the IDF preempted it with Operation This Is the Moment—a concentrated strike involving around 100 aircraft that targeted hundreds of rocket launchers and thousands of missile sites in Lebanon.
Gallant and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin
(Photo: Defense Ministry)
By this point, months of stalled negotiations over a Gaza hostage deal had passed. The security establishment had been pushing for the Biden-Netanyahu proposal (details to come later) to secure the hostages’ return before shifting the war’s focus northward. But the talks collapsed, and Netanyahu remained unconvinced about a military confrontation with Hezbollah. Gallant took his case to the Cabinet: "I requested that we shift the center of gravity northward and declare that returning northern residents to their homes was a formal war objective. My request was denied."
On September 17, Israel launched the pager operation—triggered by concerns that its secret may have been compromised. "There were a few incidents surrounding it," Gallant recalls. "We suspected that someone in Hezbollah had caught on to the pager scheme. We found a pretext and took him out. But then Hezbollah started conducting extensive inspections of their equipment. At that point, we had no choice but to act—this was a critical operation with enormous value. We had been preparing it for a decade, and the results were dramatic: over 2,000 Hezbollah operatives were wounded—fingers, eyes, legs lost."
“But the primary walkie-talkie operation, which were far greater in number and explosive power, took place the next day when the bulk of these devices were still in storage. That’s where they detonated. Again, these were separate operations. The only time all of this was meant to be executed as part of a single, cohesive strategy was in the plan for October 11."
Three days later, a window of opportunity emerged. ”The head of the IDF Operations Directorate entered my office and told me, ‘The chief of staff is on a flight, so I’m coming to you directly. We have the entire Radwan leadership in our sights, including Ibrahim Aqil. But we have no Cabinet decision on whether we’re even in a position to escalate against Hezbollah.’ I told him, ‘Prepare for execution as quickly as possible, and we’ll work to secure approval. As soon as the chief of staff lands, have him call me.’ The chief of staff lands, receives an update, and tells me that he supported the strike.”
A phone consultation was held with the prime minister, and the decision to act was made. "When that happened, on Friday afternoon, I realized that we needed to accelerate three operations we planned: first, the destruction of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities; second, the assassination of Nasrallah; and third, the ground maneuver in Lebanon. We had already reached a slope of escalation. Each of these assassinations was an isolated action—there was no overarching plan. And in fact—if I take a step back—from the beginning of the war through October 11, I was the only one consistently pushing to ramp up pressure on Hezbollah. We could not allow them to pin down our divisions, strike homes and force evacuations without paying a price. If they could do that for the cost of a single rocket per day, they could keep it up forever."
Gallant asked the Air Force to present him with the plan to eliminate Hezbollah’s leader. "I asked, ‘What are the chances of success?’ The answer was 90%. Then I asked, ‘How many tons of bombs are you using?’ They told me 40 tons. I said, ‘Double it. Make it 99% certain that we succeed.’ And in the end, they increased it to 80 tons."
I asked, ‘How many tons of bombs are you using?’ They told me 40 tons. I said, ‘Double it': The scene of Hassan Nasrallah's assassination in Beirut
As preparations for the strike on Nasrallah were underway, Operation Northern Arrows—Israel’s official large-scale campaign in Lebanon—was launched. The Air Force carried out an unprecedented operation aimed at destroying the majority of Hezbollah’s launch capabilities and rocket stockpiles. "The results were astounding," Gallant said. "Out of 5,000 long-range missiles, they were left with only a few hundred."
Two days later, the Cabinet convened to discuss Nasrallah’s assassination. Gallant wanted the ministers to authorize the prime minister and defense minister to give the order when the operational window aligned. "It turned out that there was a majority of five to two in favor." Gallant called for a vote. But then, the same pattern from October 11 repeated itself.
"The prime minister requested a smaller consultation with the chief of staff and me. He paused the meeting. The chief of staff, Dermer and I stepped out with him. The head of Military Intelligence joined, maybe others. We went over everything again, reiterating our position. Military Intelligence explained, both in the full Cabinet and in the smaller forum, that there was a chance Nasrallah would flee his bunker—within a day or two, maybe even within two hours. It was hard to say. Then the prime minister returned to the room and said, ‘We are not making a decision. When I return on Sunday, we’ll discuss it again.’"
Return from where? From the United Nations. Netanyahu was scheduled to deliver a speech there. Summing up, Gallant says, "Essentially, Netanyahu left the country on Wednesday, with Nasrallah still in his bunker, no authorization granted, a majority in the Cabinet in favor of the strike, and Military Intelligence warning that Nasrallah could flee."
This is a major drama since “news broke the next morning about something I had been aware of but had not been involved in—and which, in my view, most ministers didn’t know about either: negotiations were underway between the prime minister and President Biden, conducted via Ron Dermer and Sullivan, for a cease-fire set to take effect the following morning. When this was reported, several ministers publicly said that they would not accept it. And then one of them even threatened to leave the government," says Gallant in a reference to Itamar Ben-Gvir.
Gallant refuses to speculate on why Netanyahu changed his mind. "Whether it was related to this threat or not, I don’t know," he says. "But on Thursday afternoon, we got a call from the prime minister. He said, ‘I just woke up, and I think you were right’—meaning the chief of staff and me—‘and we need to bring this to a decision as soon as possible.’"
A discussion was held, and the operation was approved. On Friday, Gallant met with the chief of staff and the Air Force commander to finalize Israel's most important strike during the war.
Gallant with the IDF chief of staff and Air Force commander in the IDF headquarters Pit
(Photo: Defense Ministry)
"At 4:00 p.m., in the presence of the chief of staff and senior IDF officers, I called the prime minister in the U.S. and told him, ‘Mr. Prime Minister, based on the authorization given to us, my recommendation to you—pending your approval—is to carry this out tonight at 6:00 p.m. That’s the last possible window for the Air Force’s flight schedule, and if we delay into the night, we might lose the target. The Air Force, given that they are flying extremely heavy aircrafts, each carrying seven tons of bombs in tight formations, preferred to execute at this time for operational reasons. Six o’clock is the last possible moment. Additionally, we want to provide advance warning to the religiously observant public in Israel before Shabbat begins, in case of rocket fire. I am asking for your approval.’ The prime minister responded, ‘Approved. But I request to delay it until 6:30 p.m. because, at 6:00, I will be on the podium at the UN.’ We reviewed the operational constraints again and settled on 6:20 p.m. At that moment, I was in the Air Force command center with the chief of staff, the Air Force commander, and others. In seven seconds—if I’m not mistaken—84 one-ton bombs fell with precise accuracy, and Nasrallah was eliminated."
A recurring claim in parts of the Israeli media is that the security establishment was not aggressive enough during this war - and that you and Chief of Staff Halevi were personally responsible.
"I was the one who carried the burden of the war and the offensive on my back throughout this entire war. Every major attack decision—those were my decisions. Except for one that wasn’t approved: October 11. Everything else went to the prime minister or the Cabinet, depending on the issue, and was approved. These were all my initiatives, actions that either came from me or from below me in the chain of command."
Regarding the shift in the war, he says, "The moment we eliminated Aqil, the Radwan commanders and then their missile capabilities, we left Hezbollah without real operational strength. It was a gradual accumulation of the full plan that could have been executed on October 11. Unfortunately, we didn’t do it. Now, this wasn’t the complete plan because it also included the physical elimination of 15,000 Hezbollah fighters using their own walkie-talkies. I would put it this way: We climbed onto the highway using a goat path, when we should have been driving straight onto it on October 11. But once we got on, the ones pushing forward the entire time were the defense minister, the chief of staff and the security establishment—throughout the entire war."
Did Netanyahu want a cease-fire in the north without defeating Hezbollah?
"The facts are that throughout the campaign, the prime minister, Dermer and others approached me in Cabinet meetings, asking to deescalate in the north. You can see that there were negotiations for a cease-fire before Nasrallah’s assassination. The French, the Americans and about ten other countries welcomed it. That news broke in the morning. Then our own ministers came out against it. What does that tell you?"
Here's what you told me: the prime minister didn’t want to enter Gaza, didn’t want the October 11 strike, hesitated on Nasrallah’s assassination and only agreed after coalition turmoil. Why do you avoid summing it up as a direct statement about Netanyahu’s role in the war?
"Because I am not willing to make evaluative statements. I only describe the facts as they occurred in the places where I was and where I made decisions. I never said he didn’t want to act. I said that, particularly in October and November, there was a tone of pessimism."
I think some people will read this interview and wonder—what’s the deal with Yoav Gallant? Why won’t he speak his mind about Prime Minister Netanyahu, who fired him twice?
"Look, I don’t want to frame this in the wrong way. I came here to talk about the war and present the facts. This isn’t about personal squabbles. And I’ll tell you the opposite: to implement all these decisions, you need both the defense minister and the prime minister. And everything I brought forward—except for October 11—was approved." link
The Region and the World
Personal Stories
Lookouts made to drink contaminated groundwater, Daniella was at death’s door'
In exclusive Ynet interview, Ran Gilboa calls his daughter a hero, revealing she outsmarted captors to access radio and TV, keeping informed while in Hamas captivity, Daniella still has shrapnel from wounds sustained on October 7 and requires surgery
"My daughter is a hero who returned from hell," Daniella Gilboa's father Ran said in his first exclusive interview with Ynet after her release from captivity. "We have a wonderful people who fight for each one of the hostages, and it is our duty to ensure they all return."
Ran, who had stayed out of the public eye during the long weeks since Daniella was abducted from her base during the Hamas massacre on October 7, said his daughter still had shrapnel in her foot and would require surgery.
Daniella Gilboa and her father after her release from Hamas captivity
(Photo: Yossi Zamir)
"We did not know what had happened to her on October 7. The last thing we knew was that she had heard gunfire and asked us to pray for her. For two days, we had no idea if she was dead or alive. Only after her friend analyzed video footage did we learn that she was lying at the bottom of a car carrying other IDF lookouts, on her way to Gaza."
"The terrorists shot their friends before their eyes and then separated them from the dead. They saw bodies being mutilated and other horrifying things," he said. "After being bound for hours, they were moved to a jeep, while we still thought they were on the base. We were naΓ―ve."
During her time in captivity, Hamas released a video falsely depicting Daniella as dead. "All I could see from that moment was black. Time stopped. After being held hostage for a year, enduring captivity, I thought she had been murdered. But later, we learned the clip was staged. They told her to lie down, covered her with sheets, applied makeup to her face and highlighted her tattoo. They did it on purpose, and at home, we were devastated. We were helpless."
Where was she held?
"She was kept in stifling tunnels where she couldn't stand, as well as in apartments. At one point, there was intense shelling nearby. There was no water, and Daniella and the other girls had to drink contaminated groundwater. It made her gravely ill, and for weeks, she was at death’s door. Some days, they were fed animal feed—inedible scraps of dirty vegetables and some kind of tough flour."
How were they moved around?
"She was with Karina Ariev, a close friend, the entire time. Without the terrorists realizing, she learned fluent Arabic, so they knew what was happening. At some point, Doron Steinbrecher joined them. Daniella was injured, and Doron, a veterinary nurse, dressed her wounds and helped her. All the girls had shrapnel in their bodies, and Doron cared for them as much as she could."
IDF lookouts during their release from Hamas captivity (Photo: Omar al Qattaa / AFP)
"Daniella is incredibly smart and managed to manipulate her captors into letting her listen to the radio and watch Al Jazeera and i24 on TV. She saw her mother, who fought like a lioness. She said that had the girls been freed two weeks earlier, they would have looked as emaciated as the three hostages who were freed last week. Their captors gave them more food in the days leading up to their release. They were only told they would be freed three days before it happened."
When the IDF lookouts faced the Gazan crowd during their release, they smiled and held up victory signs. "She told the girls to smile and hold their heads high. To be proud Israelis. She is an amazing girl. There are ups and downs, but she survived captivity. Now, she wants to embrace life fully. All of the hostages must be returned as quickly as possible." link
Dark Legacy - The Abandonment of October 7th Hostages
How Will I Tell my Son That It Was His Own Prime Minister, the One for Whom I voted,
Who Gave up on Him?
Einav Zangauker
Mother of Matan, who was kidnapped from his home in Nir Oz and is held captive by Hamas.
I always taught Matan that in Israel, unlike other countries, if you fall in the street, everyone will rush to give you a hand. How can I tell him when he returns that it was his own
Prime Minister, the one for whom I voted, who gave up on him? That he decided to abandon him and the other hostages? Since the beginning of the war, he briefed us that the issue of the hostages would be addressed after the war would come to an end. But how much longer will the war last, when in reality it is what keeps him in power and distances him from the State Inquiry Committee and from being held accountable for this failure?
The one who funded and nurtured Hamas for years does not want to destroy it. If Netanyahu wanted to destroy Hamas, he would have promoted a plan for an alternative government in Gaza on October 8th, but instead, a day after the massacre, when the residents of the south were still hiding in shelters and bushes, Netanyahu met with his media advisors. That was what was important. How can a Prime Minister, whose hostages, soldiers, and people are of no interest to him, continue to manage such a failing war?
During the months of the war, every time a hostage deal was discussed, anonymous briefings against the deal were released. The prime minister himself insisted on provoking Hamas and threatened to destroy it completely. These actions pierced my heart, as Matan's mother, and clarified my understanding of the ongoing policy of abandonment.
If I knew that only Hamas was the obstacle to the deal, it would be "easier" for me. But the knowledge that Netanyahu is the main obstacle, because he refuses to end the war in exchange for a deal that would bring all the hostages back, presents another front of daily psychological terror that I must deal with.
I feel betrayed by our leadership. The illusion Netanyahu has built in recent years has shattered, and I am collecting the pieces to try and fix that which they have broken. With a large segment of the public joining us, the families of the hostages, we bring a new, different, message - a message of caring, solidarity, brotherhood, friendship, and hope.
We, the Israeli public, must not continue to accept Netanyahu as our prime minister. As a people, our duty to the hostages held by Hamas, is to get rid of him and replace him with true leaders who will bring them home. For Matan to return to me, for all the hostages to return, and for Israeli society to heal, we must remove our prime minister from office.
Acronyms and Glossary
COGAT - Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague
IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague
IPS - Israel Prison System
MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp
PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen
PMO- Prime Minister's Office
UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission
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Freed hostage Sasha Troufanov, center, with his mother Yelena, left, and his girlfriend Sapir Cohen in an Israeli Air Force helicopter on the way from the Gaza border area to Sheba-Tel Hashomer Medical Center near Tel Aviv, February 15, 2025. (IDF)
The Israeli Air Force struck a vehicle carrying a Hezbollah terrorist in southern Lebanon 
There is no immediate comment from the IDF on the strike.
'Every word she said was etched in my heart': Yoav Gallant meeting Reuma Kedem in Kibbutz Nir Oz
Kedem saw the defense minister and made no effort to contain her grief and anger. Dressed in black as usual, Gallant listened in silence while the entire encounter was captured by a TV crew. “What is this? How is it possible? My daughter and my three grandchildren…One phone call the night before and Tamar would have been out of there. I have no heart left. My heart is burnt,” Reuma Kedem told him. “This is how you abandoned us… there is a God in heaven! How long will we stay silent? What? A lousy government—what are you doing?!"Gallant was caught off-guard. He simply looked at the grieving mother and grandmother, and remained silent—displaying a behavior foreign to the government of which he was a member, and essentially to that of the current political culture.“Look,” he says. “My meeting with Reuma Kedem ranks among the hardest, most moving and saddening in my whole life. I stood in front of her for minutes. It wasn’t planned. I heard her, listening intently. Every word she said was etched in my heart. The most forceful thing she said was why didn’t you tell us? Why wasn’t the IDF here? Why didn’t the IDF show up?”This is the first interview the former defense minister has given since October 7—and, in essence, since the start of the judicial overhaul two years ago, a time that now feels like a lifetime ago.Our conversation offers a detailed account of 13 turbulent months in Israel and the Middle East, as seen through the eyes of its defense minister. In January 2023, Yoav Gallant was sworn in, finally reaching the role he had spent his entire career working toward. Within months, he was at the center of an unprecedented political crisis with profound security implications. Nine months later, he was leading a war unlike any in Israel’s history.
As defense minister, Gallant wielded immense influence, drawing on his military experience to unify the defense establishment. With few exceptions, he shaped Israel’s strategy—from the initial response to Hamas’ October 7 massacres to containing the attack and confronting Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance.” His tenure came to an abrupt end on the morning of Donald Trump’s re-election, with a terse letter of dismissal from Netanyahu.
I reminded Gallant of his dramatic meeting at Nir Oz and how we talked about responsibility – his own responsibility, for Israel's worst security failure ever. His answer: Israel needs a state commission of inquiry. “Everything Reuma Kedem said is correct. Sadly, we can’t turn back the clock. She’s right, from her perspective, for sure. The pain here is immense. That wasn’t my first visit to Nir Oz, nor was it my last. I made sure to get myself to all of the places - Be’eri, Kfar Azza and Nir Oz as well as all of the other communities – Sufa, Kerem Shalom, Holit, Netiv Ha’Asara, and obviously the Nova party massacre site. I met residents and went to see all such sites. I was dealing with stuff from the very first day.”You were fired by Netanyahu, and then you resigned from Knesset. But it doesn’t seem like you decided your political career had to come to an end as a result of assuming responsibility for October 7.
“I’m not absolving myself of any responsibility. As far as I’m concerned, looking ahead, I think we have to examine what happened, how it happened and why. What happened in the preceding decade. What brought us to this. And all this will happen when there’s a state commission of inquiry.”When you hear that Gallant visited every massacre site and everywhere Israeli blood was spilled, repeatedly, what you’re not hearing is the subtext of his message about Netanyahu. Gallant is making it clear that he represents everything Netanyahu does not. While Netanyahu has traveled to Washington twice since the war broke out, he has still not found the time to visit the destroyed kibbutz of Nir Oz.The fired defense minister is calling for a state commission of inquiry—something Netanyahu is actively resisting, with the full support of the Likud party in parliament. Gallant believes Israel needs a universal draft for all its citizens, while Netanyahu has been working on legislation that would essentially allow the Haredi exemption from mandatory army service to continue.And yet, throughout our conversation, Yoav Gallant firmly refrains from providing an opinion regarding Netanyahu in the war, gauging his abilities or judging his performance. He stresses his desire to speak, “in facts, rather than interpretations or assessments.” And we certainly talked about facts. The first in this story, concerns that bitter morning that changed the Middle East.
Part One
Where were you at around 6:30 in the morning, October 7, 2023?
“I was at home, getting ready for a bike ride. At 6:30 a.m., I got a phone call from my daughter (an Air Force officer), telling me there were sirens in Tel Aviv. I immediately hung up, and a minute later, I spoke with the chief of staff. He said, ‘It’s from Gaza. It’s not just rockets. There’s also a ground incursion. I’ll do a situation assessment and then update you.’ I put on my black clothes (Gallant's black attire became his signature during the war) and drove to the Kirya (IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv). I didn’t return home at all for the next three months. For me, this was the beginning of the war.”I can imagine you all were in complete shock. It exceeded any possible scenario.
“It was a complete surprise, for me obviously, more than others. They (the IDF generals) didn’t even wake me up in the night for any stage of their consultation. It found me as it was at 6:30 in the morning. On my way to the Kirya, I tried talking to everyone I could: municipal leaders, people I know. It was very hard to directly get reports from the army or the military secretariat. They were all busy addressing the Hamas attack. When I got to the Kirya, I went into the Pit (the IDF command bunker). I think the most striking thing was that people didn’t know what was going on. The picture wasn’t clear and neither was the scope. It was hard to build a situation report of such a wide-scale attack in such a short space of time.”
Gallant and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (Photo: Defense Ministry)
Gallant with the IDF chief of staff and Air Force commander in the IDF headquarters Pit (Photo: Defense Ministry)
Daniella Gilboa and her father after her release from Hamas captivity (Photo: Yossi Zamir)
IDF lookouts during their release from Hamas captivity (Photo: Omar al Qattaa / AFP)
"Daniella is incredibly smart and managed to manipulate her captors into letting her listen to the radio and watch Al Jazeera and i24 on TV. She saw her mother, who fought like a lioness. She said that had the girls been freed two weeks earlier, they would have looked as emaciated as the three hostages who were freed last week. Their captors gave them more food in the days leading up to their release. They were only told they would be freed three days before it happened."
When the IDF lookouts faced the Gazan crowd during their release, they smiled and held up victory signs. "She told the girls to smile and hold their heads high. To be proud Israelis. She is an amazing girl. There are ups and downs, but she survived captivity. Now, she wants to embrace life fully. All of the hostages must be returned as quickly as possible." link
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