🎗️Lonny's War Update- October 511, 2023 - February 28, 2025 🎗️

  

🎗️Day 511 that 59 of our hostages in Hamas captivity
**There is nothing more important than getting them home! NOTHING!**

“I’ve never met them,

But I miss them. 

I’ve never met them,

but I think of them every second. 

I’ve never met them,

but they are my family. 

BRING THEM HOME NOW!!!”

We’re waiting for you, all of you.
A deal is the only way to bring
all the hostages home- the murdered for burial and the living for rehabilitation.

#BringThemHomeNow #TurnTheHorrorIntoHope

There is no victory until all of the hostages are home!

‎אין נצחון עד שכל החטופים בבית

Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements

*8 injured, one critically, in stabbing and car-ramming near Pardes Hanna

Seven people have been injured in a suspected stabbing and car-ramming attack at Karkur Junction, near Pardes Hanna.

At least one person is in critical condition, while four or five are designated as being in a moderate-to-serious state.

Police say they suspect the ramming was a terror attack and managed to arrest a suspect in his car shortly after the incident occurred.

The number of wounded in the ramming attack has risen to 13, medics say.

A police spokesman confirms the terrorist who carried out the car-ramming attack near Karkur Junction was killed.

The statement identifies the perpetrator as a 53-year-old Palestinian from Jenin, who had been residing in Israel without a permit while married to an Israeli citizen.

Hostage Updates 

• Danny Elgarat calls for public revolt after brother Itzik’s body returned from Gaza
  

  Illustrative: Danny Elgarat, brother of hostage Itzik Elgarat, speaks at a weekly hostages' families protest in Tel Aviv's Hostages Square on June 29, 2024. (Adar Eyal/Hostages and Missing Families Forum)
  

  

  After the body of his brother, hostage Itzik Elgarat was returned to Israel early Thursday morning, Danny Elgarat talks about his deep sense of anger and frustration toward the government and the public.
  
  In a statement published in the Haaretz daily, Elgarat calls for a public awakening, for real civil resistance, and not just symbolic protests
  He says the public could have saved lives had they acted earlier, criticizing citizens for emerging to the streets to pay their respects to those murdered, as witnessed on Wednesday, ahead of the Bibas funeral, instead of engaging in an ongoing struggle for change.
  Itzik Elgarat, 69, who was murdered in captivity, was taken hostage from Kibbutz Nir Oz, where he lived next door to the Bibas family.
  Another hostage family member, Yishai Lavi-Miran, whose husband Omri Miran is still held hostage, says that he was taken on October 7, 2023 with their neighbor, Tsahi Idan, whose body was returned to Israel early Thursday morning.
  “I so hoped for a different ending,” she says. “An ending where both families would sit together again, with Tsahi and Omri, talking. We know Omri is alive, I can feel it, but everything is fragile.”
  Lavi-Miran says that [most] of the four hostages whose bodies were returned Thursday could have been rescued if a deal had been made in time.
  Omri Miran, 48, is now the oldest living hostage still held by Hamas and with two young daughters at home, ages 2 and 3, says Lavi-Miran.
  “The only picture I see in my mind is Omri blowing out the candles with Alma on his birthday,” which falls in April, says Lavi-Miran, adding that she senses no movement toward phase 2 of the hostage deal. “We cannot have another birthday without a father. We must not stop. There are still 24 hostages alive, and there are fallen ones who must also be brought back.”
  She adds, “I truly, truly hope that in the coming days, we will receive news that the releases are continuing, that phase 2 is moving forward, that everyone is coming home, and that we will know exactly when the last hostage is returning. For us, for our children, for the future generation of Israel—so that our children can rebuild what our generation has destroyed.”
• ‘I’m sorry you came back in a coffin’: Funeral ceremony for slain hostage Tsahi Idan begins

  
  Mourners embrace at a public memorial ceremony for slain hostage Tsachi Idan, a fan of Hapoel Tel Aviv, who was killed in Hamas captivity in the Gaza Strip, at Bloomfield Stadium in Tel Aviv, Feb. 28, 2025. (AP/Leo Correa)

  
  

  At a ceremony at Bloomfield Stadium in Tel Aviv ahead of his funeral procession, family members of slain hostage Tsahi Idan ask to be forgiven for not being able to save him.

  “Our government made very difficult decisions with unbearable consequences,” says Noam, Tsahi’s sister, during the ceremony. “I’m sorry, from all of us, that you came back in a coffin, and not on your feet, as you left.”

  Noam says that in captivity, Tsahi endured “a situation that even the devil himself couldn’t write.”

  She says that the country “must bring back all of the hostages as quickly as possible,” calling it the “most important struggle we have.”

  After the Bloomfield ceremony, Tsahi’s coffin will proceed through several locations in central Israel before he will be buried in Kibbutz Einat next to his daughter, Maayan, who was murdered by Hamas on October 7 in front of him.

  
  
• Freed hostage whose wife and daughters were killed on Oct. 7 says he’s ‘not angry’
  

  Freed hostage Eli Sharabi says he became especially close with 24-year-old Alon Ohel while they and two other Israelis were held hostage in Gaza under cramped, painful conditions.

  “I adopted him from the first minute,” Sharabi says. “24/7 together. I know everything about him and his family.”

  Sharabi, 53, tells Channel 12’s “Uvda” investigative program the men were able to draw strength from one another. But Ohel took it very hard when he learned that Sharabi and the two others, Or Levy and Eliya Cohen, were being released.

  Sharabi says that when he was released with Levy on February 8, Ohel grabbed him and refused to let go until their guard tore him away. He says there were “moments of hysteria” and it took about 15 minutes to calm him down.

  “It was a very hard moment,” he says. “He said he was happy for me. I promised him I won’t leave him there. I will fight for him.” Cohen was released two weeks later, leaving Ohel alone.

  
  Alon Ohel, taken captive by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023 from the Supernova rave. (Courtesy)

  Sharabi, who lost over 30 kilograms (66 pounds) in captivity, says terrorists held the four hostages in iron chains, and sometimes beat or humiliated them, and they subsisted for months on a single plate of pasta each day.

  He says that the hunger pains were unbearable and that getting his captors to give them a dried-out date or a quarter of a piece of bread felt like a victory.

  “You could know what happened in the news just from their conduct,” Sharabi says when asked if their captors were exposed to Israeli media, “and therefore… [Israeli leaders’] comments in the media have a lot of power.”

  “Any irresponsible remark, the first to suffer [the consequences] was us,” he continued. “[The captors] come to us and say, ‘They’re not giving our prisoners food, you won’t eat. They’re beating our prisoners, we’ll beat you. They don’t get a shower, you won’t get a shower.’ It’s all the time there.”

  
  Eli Sharabi is interview on Channel 12’s “Uvda” program, in a segment aired on February 27, 2025. (X screenshot, used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)

  Sharabi was abducted on October 7, 2023, from his home in Kibbutz Be’eri. Sharabi says he had no access to the news and only learned after his release that his wife and two daughters were killed in the Hamas-led attack, and that his brother was kidnapped that day and later died in captivity, with his body still held in Gaza.

  Despite the pain, he says that he feels lucky to be alive and fortunate for the time he spent with his wife Lianne, and daughters, Noiya and Yahel.

  “I’m not angry,” he says. “I was lucky I had Lianne for 30 years, I was lucky I had those amazing daughters for years.”

  
  
• Palestinian peace activist pays condolence visit to Bibas, Lifshitz families ‘to ask for forgiveness’
  
  

  Palestinian political activist Samer Sinjilawi (second from L) pays a condolence visit to Yarden Bibas (center) on February 28, 2025. (Courtesy Samer Sinjilawi)

  (L to R: Jimmy Miller (Shiri Bibas' cousin, Samer Sinjilawi, Yarden Bibas, Gershon Baskin, Lonny Baskin)

  Palestinian peace activist Samer Sinjilawi pays condolence visits to the families of slain hostages Shiri, Ariel and Kfir Bibas, and Oded Lifshitz.

  “As I gave [former hostage] Yarden [Bibas] and [Lifshitz’s daughter] Sharon my condolences, I struggled to hold back my tears, but when they hugged me I couldn’t stop the tears,” Sinjilawi writes on X.

  “Yarden told me how much it meant to him that a Palestinian had come to visit.”

  Sinjilawi adds: “I feel it is our duty as Palestinians to share the pain and grief of these families, to say loud and clear that we condemn these murders, and to apologize and ask for forgiveness.”

  “I think both Yarden and Sharon needed to hear these words from me. I can only hope I have done something, however small and fleeting, to ease their pain,” he continues.

  After spending several years in Israeli prison for violence committed as a teen during the Second Intifada, Sinjilawi has worked to advance reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. Over the past year, he has worked to advance a joint plan from former prime minister Ehud Olmert and former Palestinian Authority foreign minister Nasser al-Kidwa for a two-state solution. link

  
  
  
• "Every Moment is Critical": Gadi Moses Calls on Netanyahu to Expedite the Return of the Hostages  

  In his first statement since his release, Gadi Moses emphasizes the urgency of returning all the hostages, both living and deceased, and warns: "Every day that passes increases the risk of them not returning." Moses shares the horrors experienced by the captives and joins the struggle for their return. At the same time, he pledges to work toward the rehabilitation of Kibbutz Nir Oz: "To turn it from a burnt area into a flourishing garden."  

  
  

  Against the backdrop of the return of the four deceased hostages last night (between Wednesday and Thursday) and the uncertainty regarding the implementation of the next phase of the hostage deal, Gadi Moses issued his first statement this evening since his return from captivity. He called on Prime Minister Netanyahu to expedite the return of all the hostages, both living and deceased: "I turn to you, Mr. Prime Minister, every day is critical here!—critical for the survival of our remaining hostages, critical for our ability to bring our fallen to a grave in Israel."  

  
  

  To illustrate how urgent the return of the hostages is, Moses shared a glimpse of what they endure in captivity: "I saw all the horrors that our people are going through there. The urgency of their release is paramount. Anything can happen at any moment. I was released after 482 days, and fortunately, I returned alive. But for everyone who remains another day, the risk of not returning and dying increases."  

  

  
  

  "I Suffered Mental and Physical Abuse"  

  "I suffered there, I suffered greatly, all kinds of mental difficulties, mental and physical abuse. Recently, we accompanied our dear Oded, Ariel, Kfir, and Shiri. Today we learned that Itzik, Shlomo, Ohad, and Tzachi are also no longer among the living," Moses shared in pain.  

  
  

  Gadi thanked the people of Israel for their support in the struggle to return the hostages, the IDF soldiers, the bereaved families, and the wounded who risked their lives to rescue the hostages and defend the country. Moses emphasized that he is joining the struggle to return the hostages and, at the same time, the effort to rehabilitate Kibbutz Nir Oz.  

  
  

  "I want to congratulate the soldiers who returned, share in the grief of the families who lost their loved ones, and wish a speedy recovery to the wounded who risked their lives to save me, my friends, and all our people," he said.  

  
  

  Moses added: "I hereby commit to joining the struggle for the release of the hostages, until the last one of them, and with all my strength, to join the teams rehabilitating the Nir Oz community and turn Nir Oz back from a burnt area into a flourishing and thriving garden."  link
  
  
  

Gaza and the South

•  What Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’s Political Bureau, said last night is not new (that Hamas has agreed to withdraw from governance and administrative arrangements in the Gaza Strip). However, they have yet to declare what will be done with their weapons and armed forces—which is, in fact, the central issue. I am aware that discussions on this matter are ongoing within Hamas’s leadership abroad, and opinions are divided.  
  
  
  Meanwhile, a joint position is taking shape among Arab states—including Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—that Hamas cannot continue to rule Gaza or maintain an armed militia. Jordan is even prepared to train a new Palestinian security force. Thus, discussions about the "day after" are underway in the region—though it is regrettable that Israel is not engaging in substantive deliberations on the issue.  
  
  
  The war will truly end only when no hostages remain in Gaza and Hamas no longer governs it, both administratively or militarily. This objective can only be achieved through a political solution and regional cooperation, bolstered by U.S. support under the leadership of [Donald] Trump.  
  
  
  (Gershon Baskin, February 27, 2025)

Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria

• IDF carries out drone strike on Hezbollah observation post in south Lebanon
  

  The IDF says it carried out a drone strike against a Hezbollah observation post in southern Lebanon’s Aynata after identifying activity there.

  “This observation post is a violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon,” the military adds.

• IDF drone strike in north Lebanon kills Hezbollah weapons operative, says military
  

  An IDF drone strike yesterday in northern Lebanon’s Hermel District killed a Hezbollah operative involved in procuring weapons for the terror group amid the ongoing ceasefire, the military says.

  According to the IDF, Mohammed Mahdi Ali Shaheen was “coordinating terrorist transactions for the purchase of weapons on the Syria-Lebanon border, since the understandings between Israel and Lebanon came into effect.”

  Shaheen is described by the IDF as a prominent member of Hezbollah’s regional division in the Beqaa Valley area, involved in smuggling weapons from Syria to Lebanon. As part of his role, Shaheen was responsible for making procurement deals with smugglers and suppliers, mediating the arrival of shipments, and distributing them to various Hezbollah units, the military says.

  The IDF says his actions “posed a threat to Israel and its citizens, and constitutes a blatant violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”

  On Wednesday, a separate IDF drone strike in northeastern Lebanon killed Mahran Ali Nasser al-Din, a prominent member of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which is responsible for smuggling weapons into Lebanon.

  
  

West Bank and Jerusalem and Terror attacks within Israel

• 
  
  

Politics and the War (general news)

• Hamas urges international community to pressure Israel to move to next ceasefire phase
  

  Hamas urges the international community to pressure Israel to enter the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire “without delay,” a day before the first phase is set to expire.

  “We call on the international community to pressure the Zionist occupation to fully adhere to its obligations under the agreement and to immediately enter the second phase of the agreement without any delay or evasion,” Hamas says in a statement.

  
  
• Egyptian security sources: Israel seeking six-week extension of ceasefire’s first phase
  

  Two Egyptian security sources say that the Israeli delegation in Cairo is trying to reach a deal to extend the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire deal for an additional 42 days.

  Hamas disagrees with the plan to extend and wants to proceed with the second phase as agreed, the sources tell Reuters.



• IDF Investigations - The Failure of October 7: How Israel's Security Concept Collapsed Against Hamas  

Yahya Sinwar identified the gaps in Israel's security concept after "Operation Protective Edge" (2014) and began planning the attack. The IDF and Military Intelligence (Aman) held onto a flawed assumption that Hamas was deterred and committed to maintaining calm. Intelligence failed to understand that Hamas' military buildup, particularly the Nukhba forces, was aimed at a large-scale attack. The "Jericho Wall" plan, which detailed Hamas' attack strategy, was dismissed as a "future idea" despite being a ready operational plan. These are some of the findings from the IDF's investigation into the conceptual failures that led to the October 7 disaster.  

The IDF's investigations into the failures of October 7, published this afternoon (Thursday), describe step by step how the security concept that collapsed at 6:29 AM was built over the years. For years, the IDF and the defense establishment developed a concept based on flawed assumptions, allowing Hamas to gradually build the infrastructure that enabled the surprise attack. The investigations reveal that the failure began long before October 7, in the period following "Operation Protective Edge" in 2014.  

Key Findings from the Conceptual Investigation  

The investigation describes how Yahya Sinwar, who rose to power in 2017, led a strategic shift in the terrorist organization—from relying on underground warfare to planning a large-scale ground attack—while Israel's defense establishment remained "stuck" in old paradigms. The investigations published by the IDF are internal and do not include personal conclusions. A state commission of inquiry, if established, would be an independent external body capable of investigating the IDF and publishing personal conclusions.  

How Israel's Security Concept Collapsed  

For many years, Israel's security concept regarding Gaza was based on a central assumption: Hamas is a rational organization that is "deterred and committed to maintaining calm." Even after Sinwar's rise to power in 2017, Aman's research division continued to describe Hamas as a "realistic movement" interested in "quiet" in the Strip for civilian development. The IDF investigations reveal that "there was a system of flawed assumptions over the years."  

According to the investigation, the threat from Gaza was not perceived as the greatest threat, while there was a gap in understanding Hamas' willingness to realize its vision of "liberating Palestine." It turns out that shortly after "Operation Protective Edge," Hamas established a structured military body with an "operational headquarters" led by Raad Saad. Under his command, Hamas began planning the "big project"—a plan for a large-scale attack on Israel, involving a ground incursion by thousands of terrorists. All this while Aman's research division continued to assess that Hamas was focused on building underground tunnels.  

The investigation reveals that Israel's security concept was significantly shaped after "Operation Guardian of the Walls" in 2021. Contrary to Hamas' assessment, which saw the operation as a "victory" due to the rocket fire on Jerusalem and the understanding that it could advance a multi-front campaign against Israel with Hezbollah, Israel viewed it as "achieving deterrence" and determined that it had dealt a blow to Hamas' underground infrastructure. Israel's conclusion was based on "an overly optimistic assessment of the achievements of Guardian of the Walls," the investigation states. Indeed, the ground forces that entered Gaza exposed hundreds of kilometers of tunnels, complex and deep underground systems, some with living spaces, command rooms, and even areas where vehicles could move. Some of these tunnels held Israeli hostages.  

"Jericho Wall": The Plan Dismissed as a "Future Idea"  

One of the alarming revelations in the investigation concerns the "Jericho Wall" document—Hamas' attack plan, which reached Israel as early as 2022. Despite the document accurately describing Hamas' intentions to breach the Gaza Division's defense system with 4,000 terrorists and reach cities deep inside Israel, it was dismissed as a "future idea" aimed at military buildup rather than an immediate threat. The document was presented to the head of Aman and the Southern Command in May 2022, but it was noted that they did not know whether it was a concrete plan or merely a conceptual outline by Raad Saad.  

A key turning point came in November 2022, during a seminar titled "Portrait of a Campaign," where "Jericho Wall" was discussed as a future scenario. The military's assessment at the time was that Hamas was capable of launching a raid with up to two companies and around 70 terrorists—while in reality, on October 7, approximately 5,600 terrorists participated in the attack.  

Neglect of Defense Systems and Overreliance on the Barrier  

The investigation points to another systemic failure: the allocation of resources and attention to other fronts, primarily the West Bank and the northern border, at the expense of Gaza. Data presented in the investigation shows that while the number of battalions and companies assigned to the Gaza Division remained stable over the years (with a slight increase during the construction of the barrier), the number of forces in the West Bank grew by 40% during the same period, following "Operation Break the Wave."  

One of the central mistakes was overreliance on the barrier, whose construction was completed in July 2021. The barrier was not designed to handle a large-scale surprise attack. Its purpose was to control mass protest events and disrupt limited infiltrations. Nevertheless, an excessive sense of confidence in its capabilities developed, even as the forces along the border were reduced due to resource constraints in the IDF.  

The IDF lacked a systemic awareness of surprise warfare, with the worst-case assumption being a round of fighting or a large-scale operation at most. The investigation found that the Gaza Division primarily dealt with defense concepts, while Southern Command was less involved. A particularly serious point is that tactical levels did not consistently prepare for escalation without prior warning, as expected.  

Strategic Deception: How Hamas Concealed the Plan  

The IDF investigations describe how Hamas misled Israel through a sophisticated deception process. The IDF assesses that there was a "deception effort" in which Hamas avoided escalations with Israel that could jeopardize its plans. According to the investigation, Hamas realized it had invested too much in underground infrastructure and changed its operational plan.  

One of the deception tactics was Hamas' refusal to join the Islamic Jihad's rounds of fighting during 2022-2023. What Israel perceived as "deterrence" and "commitment to calm" was actually part of the process of maturing the attack plan. The investigation notes that Hamas instructed Islamic Jihad with a clear directive—don't ruin this for us—to prevent rounds of escalation that could disrupt the large-scale attack plan. In the military, they say that the protests along the fence in the month before the attack "could also be part of the deception," though they cannot say this with certainty. On the other hand, it was noted that there was significant compartmentalization regarding "Hour S" (the attack time) within Hamas' ranks.  

A key turning point that Israeli intelligence failed to identify was the establishment of Hamas' specialized Nukhba battalions. The investigation into the path to war notes that after "Operation Protective Edge," Raad Saad marked the Nukhba battalions' goal as attacking IDF battalion and company outposts, with the aim of capturing those inside. This was to be achieved through a barrage of fire and five battalions (3,000 terrorists). This is precisely the scenario that unfolded on October 7, with adjustments. However, contrary to Israel's assessment, Hamas developed the plan continuously from 2019, with the ultimate goal being the "crushing of the State of Israel" in the event that the axis (Hezbollah and Iran) joined the fighting.  

By September 2022, according to the investigation, Hamas was already at 80% operational readiness and considered activating the plan during the Tishrei holidays that year. It is unclear why the activation was postponed then, but in May 2023, the decision was made to activate the plan during the Tishrei holidays of that year—a decision that ultimately materialized on October 7, 2023.  

The investigation also refers to another dimension of the attack: Hamas' attempt to recruit the Iran-led axis for a combined attack. The investigation notes that based on this understanding, Hamas began advancing the plan, and it accelerated. Hamas even began producing a TV series—"Fist of the Free"—that demonstrated the plan step by step.  

Failures of Aman's Research Division: Not Hubris, but Practical Issues  

The investigation into Aman's research division points to a deep systemic failure. The duty to warn was not fulfilled, and there was a significant and ongoing gap in understanding reality. The investigation rejects the claim that this was a "black swan"—an unpredictable event that could not have been foreseen.  

The investigation identified at least ten "signals" over the years that could have indicated the flawed assumptions, but they were missed. Among these signals: Sinwar's rise to power in 2017, the war plan, "Operation Guardian of the Walls," and Hamas' refusal to participate in rounds of fighting with Islamic Jihad. Despite all this, Israeli intelligence continued to hold onto its assumption that Hamas was "committed to calm."  

The investigation links this to a problematic "intelligence culture" based on the assumption that "we know," rather than questioning whether there is a gap in understanding. In the military, they say that the term "hubris" (arrogance) is not enough to describe the problem. According to them, the issue is a practical one—how discussions are conducted, how presentations are made, and what people are promoted for.  

Initial Lessons from the Investigations  

The IDF investigations point to initial lessons. First and foremost, changing the intelligence culture and developing a defensive culture at all levels. The investigation states that every level of defense must prepare for adequate defense, while performing "reverse reasoning"—critically examining basic assumptions.  

The investigation also emphasizes the need to update the threat assessment and defense concept to include attack scenarios, not to attribute to enemies an awareness of their inferiority, and to be prepared for scenarios that intelligence "could not even imagine," such as Hamas capturing territory. The investigation concludes with a serious warning that is hard to ignore: these are not lessons that can be fixed by replacing a branch or department—a deep and fundamental change in the IDF's intelligence culture is required.  link There are a number of problems with this investigation and it's summary. The first major issue is that the army conducted this investigation on itself. That wasn't not the plan of the Chief of General Staff Halevy. He wanted an external independent military commission to investigate the IDF and for it to be headed by former Chief of General Staff and former Minister Shaul Mofaz who brought in 5 other former generals to head up the investigations. The political echelon led by the prime minister refused to allow this commission to come together and do the investigation. It was cancelled before it was initiated. Netanyahu and his cronies hated Mofaz due to political history and refused to allow him to take this role and Netanyahu didn't want any investigation that he couldn't control. The other major fault of this investigation is that it doesn't draw any personnel conclusions or make recommendations. It doesn't place direct responsibility or blame on anyone or recommend that specific officers at any level should leave the IDF. There are no concrete recommendations to make sure that October 7 cannot happen again and catch the IDF sleeping. 

This investigation and it's important missing elements are more reasons that an Official Independent State Commission of Inquiry must occur and as soon as possible. 

 

• The Investigations Are Comprehensive and Honest – But They Are the Prelude to the Next Failure  

Despite the effort invested in the IDF's investigations into the events of October 7, they fail in their primary mission: to lead to systemic change that will prevent another disaster. When the military focuses only on "what happened" and not on "why it happened," and the political echelon evades responsibility, the investigations become historical documents with no real impact. In the current public atmosphere, it is doubtful whether the real lessons will be learned and implemented.  
The IDF investigations presented this week fall into two categories: four systemic investigations (the concepts that preceded the Hamas attack, intelligence, intelligence and decision-making on the night of October 6-7, and the functioning of systems in the first hours and days of the attack) and 41 specific battle reports. No one can say the IDF whitewashed the events: the investigations are lengthy and detailed, conducted by military investigators not directly involved in the events, and based on a wide range of documents and interviews. At the same time, they repeatedly clarify why the IDF struggles so much to learn lessons and change—and why, without fundamental change, the next failure is inevitable.  
The battle reports can be described, without diminishing their significance, as "stories." They are the lines and colors of the most heartbreaking picture in the history of the State of Israel: tens of thousands of people, in kibbutzim, moshavim, and urban communities, in IDF bases and at the nature party in Re'im, left to their fate for endless hours, helplessly waiting in safe rooms and hiding in wadis, with no one to save them.  
Their importance lies mainly in addressing the bereaved families and survivors, who experienced firsthand the terrible breach of trust in the state and its army. They deserve to have every detail explained, every question answered, and someone to bow their head and say, "I am guilty." Not "I am responsible," a phrase that has lost all meaning in the past year and a half, but "I am guilty. I abandoned you." It is hard to know if even the most sincere admission will restore any of the lost trust, but this is an act that should have happened long ago, and it is important that it is happening now.  
This is especially important because, a year and a half into the war, there has not been a single act of command responsibility being taken and implemented. Some people announced they were taking responsibility and resigning (some, like Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, did so too late to make a difference). Others remain in their positions to this day. This situation has further exacerbated the crisis of trust, which the presentation of the battle reports is supposed to begin to address and repair.  

Seeing the Trees, Ignoring the Forest  
The systemic investigations also focus on what happened, but that is not their main purpose. They are supposed to form the basis for learning, which might prevent the next failure. However, after reviewing them and speaking with some of those who led them, there is concern that this will not happen, and they too will end up as stories: a kind of "once upon a time" tale that, once told, allows everyone to move on after a few organizational adjustments.  
An example from the past illustrates this point. After the Yom Kippur War, investigations into the intelligence failure focused on the damage caused by "groupthink." The lesson was that "devil's advocacy" needed to be institutionalized—someone whose role would be to challenge what everyone else thought. But in the absence of a genuine culture of debate and skepticism, "devil's advocacy" became a technicality, something everyone knew was supposed to oppose the consensus, and thus it no longer caused real discomfort. On the contrary: it allowed people to think that by appointing someone to say the opposite, the problem was solved. No wonder that exactly fifty years later, there was no such discomfort in the rooms before October 7.  
The IDF investigations all focus on "what happened?" and not on "why did it happen?" For example, they repeatedly state that everyone was misled by the belief that Hamas was deterred and did not believe the organization was capable of carrying out a systemic attack. Examples are given of discussions with the political echelon based on these flawed assumptions. But there is no real inquiry into why the discussions with the political echelon unfolded as they did. There is no real acknowledgment that a political comfort zone exists between the echelons, skewing the discussion to a place that is convenient for everyone and absolving them of responsibility for policy changes. There is no understanding that this is the nature of the discussion, and unless it is actively fought, including stepping out of the comfort zone that endangers the speakers' status, it will always return to the same place and the same mistake.  
Therefore, even the systemic investigations are nothing more than stories. And the nature of stories that end badly is that they conclude that someone made a mistake, not that something is fundamentally wrong. This is how to understand the words of the outgoing commander of Unit 8200, Brig. Gen. Yossi Sariel, at a conference where the Chief of Staff presented the investigations to the senior command this week (and which were published in *Yedioth Ahronoth*). Sariel complained that when there was success, for example against Hezbollah, "everyone won together," but when we were defeated, "suddenly it's not the group. It's all because of two players."  
In stories, there is no real soul-searching. There is always the individual, the person or the action, that if they had behaved or acted differently, everything would have been fine. No wonder the atmosphere in the military leadership is that October 7 was indeed a "glitch," but it was quickly fixed, and after a few days everything was fine, and later even glorious.  
Outside the military, things are, of course, much more shameful. The Prime Minister does not even acknowledge responsibility. The then-Defense Minister not only did not resign or internalize that he should bow his head and disappear from the public stage, but he is busy with a political rehabilitation campaign in which he does not truly take responsibility for anything. This week, this was reflected in another round of the disgraceful debate over the unhatched egg of the strike in Lebanon on October 11.  
When the military only knows how to tell stories, in detail and honestly but without the ability to truly learn; when the political echelon denies all responsibility and the public is consumed by grief, despair, and political division, the investigations will not only fail to help—they may even become a band-aid covering the wound. Anyone who truly wants to prevent the next failure must start from the root. In the current atmosphere in the military and Israeli society, it is doubtful whether this will happen.  
 **Ofer Shelah** is the head of the National Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).  link

• Following News 12's Exposé: The Attorney General Decides to Open an Investigation into Ties Between Qatar and Netanyahu's Office  

In a discussion held before the Attorney General, the State Attorney, and other senior officials, information was presented regarding the connection between individuals operating in the Prime Minister's Office and entities linked to Qatar. At the end of the discussion, it was decided to open a criminal investigation, which will be conducted by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the Israel Police.  
During a discussion held today (Thursday) before the Attorney General and the State Attorney, with the participation of the head of the Investigations and Intelligence Division of the Israel Police and professional officials from the Shin Bet, information was presented regarding the connection between individuals operating in the Prime Minister's Office and entities linked to the State of Qatar. At the end of the discussion, it was decided to open a criminal investigation. The investigation will be conducted by the Shin Bet and the Israel Police.  
About two and a half weeks ago, we revealed on *News 12*'s "Main Edition" that during Eli Feldstein's tenure as a military spokesman in the Prime Minister's Office, he was employed by an international company funded by Qatar with the aim of improving Qatar's image regarding the negotiations for the return of hostages. This was at a time when Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly criticized Qatar, claiming that it "serves Hamas."  
As part of his activities, Feldstein held conversations with several journalists in which he presented Qatar's positive involvement in the negotiations. According to one journalist, this was a "pumping" of information that repeated itself in several conversations regarding Qatar's contribution to the talks. The international company that employed Feldstein worked to promote the connection between the families of the hostages and Qatari officials. The engagement ended with the explosion of the classified documents affair.  
Additional testimonies from media figures indicated that Eli Feldstein provided public relations services to Qatar by emphasizing its role in the negotiations for the return of the hostages. Netanyahu's military spokesman offered journalists interviews with senior Qatari officials, conveyed official messages on behalf of Doha, and integrated messages about Qatar's positive involvement in regional processes.  
A journalist reported that Feldstein offered him an interview with a senior Qatari official. Although the promise was not fulfilled, he discovered a similar interview in another media outlet a week later, which, according to him, was unrelated to Feldstein.  
Several senior journalists shared conversations and correspondences they allegedly had with him in his capacity as a military spokesman in Netanyahu's office. The correspondences included content and messages related to Qatar, including official Qatari statements. It is important to note that the messages were sent by the spokesman during his routine work in the office, creating the impression that they were messages originating from the office itself.  link I can't say that the investigation will find information of proof that Netanyahu was involved or had direct knowledge of what was happening because he and his cronies work very hard to keep him legally insulated from so many things that happen on his behalf. With that said, I believe that I am not alone in the belief that Netanyahu knew exactly what was happening and either approved it or even directed it to happen. This is not a conspiracy theory, this is just educated assumptions based on past factual occurrences. 

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The Region and the World

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Personal Stories

 

Pessi Cohen reburied in Kibbutz Be’eri 16 months after she was killed

Pessi Cohen, who was slain in Kibbutz Be’eri on October 7, is being reburied in Be’eri today, 16 months after she was laid to rest in Hod Hasharon.

Pessi, 68, was killed alongside three visiting family members — her sister, Hani Sitton, brother-in-law Zizi Sitton and nephew Tal Sitton.

At the time, all four were buried in Hod Hasharon as security restrictions didn’t allow any funerals in Be’eri, huge swaths of which were destroyed in the Hamas onslaught.

Pessi’s home in Be’eri was the site of a standoff between Hamas terrorists who holed up inside with 14 Israeli hostages, and IDF forces who gathered outside. Only one of the hostages ultimately survived.

An IDF probe of the incident found that troops fired light tank shells at the home before engaging the Hamas captors in a gunfight, and that most of the hostages “were likely murdered by the terrorists.”

‘A bigger fight than anything imagined’: Edan Alexander’s mom battles for hostage son

Yael Alexander, mother of soldier with dual US-Israeli citizenship, lives between realities of Israel, their New Jersey home and DC: ‘Since October 7, I feel like I’m on the edge of falling’ Yael Alexander, the mother of Edan Alexander, a soldier taken hostage by Hamas terrorists from the Gaza border on October 7, 2023, sank down on her parents’ living room couch, as she read a news report on her phone.

“Wow, he mentioned Edan by name,” said Alexander, repeating a CBS News article quoting US special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

When asked about the release of the Tenafly, New Jersey native, believed to be the last living American hostage, Witkoff said to CBS, “He’s front and center. We’re going to be successful in getting Edan home.”

It is comments like these that keep Yael Alexander in a constant state of adrenaline rush.

“It’s like a rollercoaster,” she told The Times of Israel. “I feel like I’m on the edge of falling since October 7. I live on 100% adrenaline all day, but this is how you feel when your son is in captivity in Hamas tunnels and you need to get him out, and fast.”

Every day since that day has held this same sense of urgency for Yael and Adi Alexander, who were born and raised in Israel and have lived with their three children in the US for the last 20 years.

Yael Alexander holds a poster of her son, Edan, who was taken hostage by Hamas on October 7, 2023, during a weekly rally for families of hostages held in the Gaza Strip and their supporters, in Tel Aviv, February 22, 2025. (AP Photo/ Maya Alleruzzo)

This week, however, carries an additional layer of urgency, said Alexander, as the first phase of the current hostage deal with Hamas is drawing to a close, and the second phase, which would hopefully include Edan Alexander and the other 62 remaining hostages, has not yet been negotiated.

“It’s a very critical moment,” said Alexander, a custom cake designer and artist who has not worked since her son was taken hostage. “This fight is bigger than anything I could have ever imagined.”

She described a sense of action with US President Donald Trump that she felt was not present in the previous administration.

“Trump tweets, he speaks about it, he feels passionate about it and wants it,” said Alexander. “Maybe he speaks the Middle Eastern language?”

Varda Ben Baruch and Yael Alexander, grandmother and mother of hostage Edan Alexander, in Tel Aviv, on February 23, 2025. (Jessica Steinberg/Times of Israel)

For the last 16-plus months, Alexander and her husband have commuted between Israel, their Tenafly home, and Washington, DC, for a combination of meetings, interviews, and rallies. Only their youngest, Roy, now 13, is still living at home. His older sister, Mika, is away at college.

“It’s very tough to fight for your beautiful boy and to have a normal family life,” said Alexander. “We are all over the place and I’m always feeling that it’s not enough.”

When Alexander and her husband are in Israel, they lean on their family, including Yael’s parents and four siblings, three of whom live in the same Tel Aviv building where Yael’s father has lived for his entire life.

Varda Ben Baruch, Yael’s mother, is present at every Hostages Square rally and often at Shift 101 sit-ins, a now-familiar sight in her fedora and bright lipstick, a poster of Edan held high.

Varda Ben Baruch, grandmother of Idan Alexander who is held hostage by Hamas in Gaza, holds a sign as she standing outside the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, January 23, 2025. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

“I’m the matriarch of the family,” said Ben Baruch in her living room, which is decorated with the many bronze sculptures she has crafted over the years, an impressive collection of silver Judaica, and portraits of Edan, who has his own room at his grandparents’ apartment. “I have to save my strength for everyone, for my husband, for my kids, for my grandkids, and for Edan.”

Ben Baruch said that she and her husband were like “secondary parents” to Edan when he became a soldier, doing his laundry, and tending his cuts and bruises as he underwent basic training.

She said she was shocked when the government did not bring home all the hostages in the days after October 7.

“I was sure that after five days, the government would bring us our kids,” said Ben Baruch. “The war didn’t start right away,” she said, referring to the Gaza ground operation.

“I’m not angry,” said Ben Baruch. “I ask and I demand, because anger won’t do anything. It’s abuse to humans to have hostages there. They have to think about the families and the hostages.”

Her daughter, Yael, the third of her five children, happened to be in Israel on October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked the Gaza border communities and towns. The Alexanders had planned to be in Israel about once a month while Edan was serving in the army.

Edan had been home in the US for August 2023, and once the Jewish high holidays had passed, Yael Alexander traveled to Israel to spend part of Sukkot with Edan and the rest of her family, before he went back to his base for the end of the holiday.

Edan Alexander was taken captive by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023. (Courtesy)

She spoke to him at 7 a.m. on October 7, soon after the Hamas attack began, and minutes before he was taken captive by Hamas terrorists. The rest of the Alexanders — Adi, Mika and Roy — flew to Israel to join her, and it was on October 12 that the family found out that Edan was taken hostage.

“When they arrived on October 9, I cried like a little girl,” she said. “I didn’t have answers because we didn’t know where Edan was. I still see that moment in my life, I had never cried like that. Maybe I’ll cry like that when I see Edan.”

The family has received several signs of life of Edan, from hostages who were freed in November 2023 and had met him, handcuffed in the tunnels. He told them he was an American-Israeli soldier, was hugged by one hostage and was given water to drink with the help of another hostage.

In November 2024, Alexander was seen again in a Hamas propaganda video, his face thin and wan, with dark circles under his eyes.

Edan Alexander, 20, held hostage by Hamas, is seen in a propaganda video by the terror group that was released on November 30, 2024. (Video screenshot)

Yael Alexander was in Israel that week, wanting to be geographically closer to Edan on his favorite American holiday, Thanksgiving.

The American-Israeli soldier is now the last known American hostage taken by Hamas terrorists on October 7 who is believed to still be alive.

In the first months after October 7, there were eight dual citizen American-Israelis. whose family members formed a group.

It consisted of the Alexanders, along with Rachel Goldberg and Jon Polin, the parents of Hersh Goldberg-Polin who was killed in captivity at the end of August; Orna and Ronen Neutra, the parents of Omer Neutra, another dual citizen soldier who was eventually discovered to have been killed on October 7 and his body taken captive; Iris Weinstein Haggai, daughter of Judy Weinstein Haggai, an American-Canadian-Israeli who was killed with her husband, Gadi Haggai, on October 7 and their bodies taken captive; and Ruby and Hagit Chen, the parents of Itay Chen, an Israeli soldier with dual American citizenship who was killed and his body taken hostage.

Adi and Yael Alexander, first and second from left, along with other families of hostages in Gaza, speak with reporters following their meeting with President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, at the White House in Washington, July 25, 2024. (AP Photo/Stephanie Scarbrough)

Two hostages, Sagui Dekel-Chen, an Israeli with American citizenship, and Keith Siegel, an American who immigrated to Israel decades ago, were released from captivity in the last few weeks.

“It’s different now because the group is much smaller,” said Alexander. “Some have had terrible news, some have had happy endings, but it’s very tough. At the starting point, almost everyone was alive, and suddenly you get bad news, bad news, the worst news.”

The last week has brought its own set of painful challenges, as the bodies of Oded Lifshitz, Shiri Bibas, and the two little Bibas boys were brought back in coffins, followed by the release of another Hamas video, this one of two hostages, Evyatar David and Guy Gilboa-Dalal, forced by their captors to watch the release of Saturday’s captives.

“It’s a sick, sick game,” said Alexander. “It’s the cruelest thing to see. We need to save them, and I hope Trump sees that video.”

For now, said Alexander, they are waiting for some decisions on phase two of the deal, hoping that her son is on the list.

She worries about the horrific conditions in the Gaza tunnels, knowing that Edan is most probably kept in a similar state as other hostages have been, in the thin air of the tunnels, without sunlight, in filth and torturous conditions.

“Edan has to stay strong,” she said. “I want him to know that we’re coming nonstop to be here, near him, and we’ll be here when he’s released.” link

59 Hostages Remain in Gaza - Their Stories (5 a day)

Avitar David

Age 24, Kfar Saba

Avitar was abducted from the party in Re'im along with his childhood friend Guy Gilboa Dalal. They were at the party with Idan Hermati and Ron Tzfati, who were murdered. On the morning of the attack, Avitar told his mother on the phone that there was rocket fire, and since then, there has been no contact with him. That same day, he was seen in a Hamas video on Telegram, lying on the floor, terrified, as someone shined a flashlight in his face. Later in the day, another video showed him being led with his hands tied by a terrorist who had one hand on his shoulder and carried a rifle in the other. Avitar is a talented musician who plays acoustic and classical guitar. He is the son of Galia and Avishai, the middle brother to 26-year-old Eli and 18-year-old Ya'ela. On February 22, 2025, Hamas released a particularly cruel "proof of life" video of Avitar and Guy. In the video, they are seen watching the release ceremony of hostages Eliyah Cohen, Omer Shem Tov, and Omer Wenkert.

**Tamir Nimrodi**  

Age 20, Nirit  

Tamir was kidnapped from the Gaza border area. Among his personal belongings was a small note in his handwriting listing moral goals for himself: "To succeed in helping many people, to create a close social circle, not to harm." On November 15, he celebrated his 19th birthday in captivity.

**Alon Ohel**  

Age 24, Lavon  

Alon was kidnapped from the party in Re'im. About a month before the party, he returned from a six-month trip to the East. He arrived at the party with four friends at 5:30 in the morning, shortly before the attack began. According to testimonies, when the shooting started, they got into a car and drove to hide in a shelter, where the terrorists threw grenades. Alon and others threw the grenades back outside to prevent them from exploding, but the terrorists entered and pulled him and two others into a car. Later, he was also identified in a Hamas video. Two of his friends were murdered. Alon is a musician and a gifted pianist who studied music. Music is an inseparable part of his life.

**Guy Gelbo-Dalal**  

Age 23, Kfar Saba  

Guy went to the party with his friend Avitar David, who was also kidnapped. Later, a video of Guy in Gaza was seen, showing him bound. Guy had planned to go on a post-army trip to Japan in two months and had already started learning Japanese. On February 22, 2025, Hamas published a particularly cruel sign of life from the two friends—Guy and Avitar. In the published video, they are seen watching the release ceremony of hostages Eliyahu Cohen, Omer Shem Tov, and Omer Wenkert.

**Nimrod Cohen**  

Age 20, Rehovot  

Nimrod, an armored corps soldier, was kidnapped from the tank he was fighting in. All his tank crew members were killed. His family began reviewing Hamas videos and identified him in one of them. His mother, Vicky, describes him as a sensitive, introverted, and quiet young man with a big heart who avoids conflicts and is deeply loved by his friends.

Acronyms and Glossary

COGAT - Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories

ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague

IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague

IPS - Israel Prison System

MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp

PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen

PMO- Prime Minister's Office

UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission

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