Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements
*Yahli Gur, 17-year-old injured in last week’s Pardes Hanna terror ramming, dies of her wounds
Yahli Gur, a 17-year-old girl injured in a car ramming terror attack in northern Israel on Thursday, died of her wounds today.
MAY HER MEMORY BE A REVOLUTION
The teenage girl was taken to the hospital in critical condition after the attacker steered his car into a crowd of people at a bus stop near Pardes Hanna, injuring 13 people.
A 60-year-old man and a 19-year-old woman were seriously injured with head injuries, while an 18-year-old was moderately injured, the Magen David Adom emergency service said on Thursday. Six others were lightly wounded.
The perpetrator, a 53-year-old Palestinian from Jenin, was shot and killed by police after fleeing the scene.
Hostage Updates
To Be Buried in Nir Oz: Ohad Yahalomi Will Be Laid to Rest This Morning
On October 7, Ohad went out to defend his family, was injured, and saw them being abducted to Gaza separately from him. His wife and two daughters managed to escape the terrorists, while his son was returned after 52 days. The public is invited to attend the funeral and offer condolences.
Ohad Yahalomi will be laid to rest today (Wednesday) in Kibbutz Nir Oz, about a week after he was returned from the Gaza Strip in the final phase of the hostage release deal under Stage 1 of the agreement. The funeral procession will depart from Rishon LeZion and arrive at the cemetery in the kibbutz, where he will be buried. Eulogies will take place on the lawn near the dining hall. The family will sit shiva at the "Rishonim" hall in the Shefayim Hotel.
On October 7, Ohad left the safe room to prevent terrorists from entering and harming his family. He was shot and forced to watch as the terrorists abducted his wife and children before his eyes. The kidnappers took the family members on two motorcycles, one of which slipped in the fields, allowing his wife, Bat-Sheva, to escape with their two daughters. Their 12-year-old son, Eitan, was taken on the second motorcycle and was released as part of the deal after 52 days. Eitan recounted that during his captivity, the terrorists forced him to watch horrific videos.
The Tragic End of Ohad Yahalomi: A Family Man and Nature Enthusiast His son Eitan returned alive, but Ohad was brought back last week as a hostage killed in captivity.
Kibbutz Nir Oz eulogized him: "Ohad, 50 at the time of his death, was a devoted and loving family man. He was a sports enthusiast and a traveler at heart, familiar with every trail and path in the desert he so loved. For years, he worked at the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, dedicating his life to preserving nature. Out of his great love for the desert, he co-published a scorpion guide and was involved in educational initiatives within the Bedouin community." Ohad is survived by his wife, three children, and many family members and friends.
The Yahalomi family and the Hostage Families Headquarters have invited the public to participate in the funeral and to stand along the route with Israeli flags to accompany Ohad on his final journey.
His wife Batsheva eulogizes him.
“My Ohadi, 16 years of togetherness; 16 years you were an anchor, with support, love and courageous friendship; 16 years of joy and light, and the light has gone out now. And I walk in the shadows, groping. How do I move forward without you? Where am I going?” she says.
“Over the past year, we have missed you in every decision, in every way we have behaved. In every decision, I tried to think about whether you would approve. The children and I missed your laughter, your cooking, and in general, everything about you,” she says.
“All that time, we had enormous hope that you would return — because who can beat you? We were sure that if anyone could survive the difficult captivity, it would be you. Because there is no one stronger than you, both in body and spirit. We even imagined that your captors liked you, because of who you are.”
Former hostage Omer Wenkert thanks the crowd as he returns to his home in Gedera, March 4, 2025. (Jonathan Shaul/Flash90)
Captivity survivor Eliya Cohen leaves Petah Tikva’s Beilinson Hospital, 10 days after he was released by the Hamas terror group where he was held for 505 days.
The medical center says Cohen has undergone all the necessary examinations, and he will start a home rehabilitation process.
Omer Wenkert, who was freed on the same day as Cohen, was also discharged from the hospital today and returned to his home in Gedera, where he was welcomed by a cheering crowd of thousands.
Wenkert thanked the crowd and sang a song he said had kept his spirits up while in captivity. He then wrapped himself in an Israeli flag, kissed the mezuzah of his home, and entered his home where he embraced his family and close friends.
“I’ve dreamt about this day for more than 500 days. It has come. I’m happy I didn’t stop believing,” he said, adding that he will join the struggle to release the rest of the hostages, including his good friends Evyatar David and Guy Gilboa-Dalal.
People welcome former hostage Omer Wenkert as he returns to his home in Gedera, March 4, 2025. (Jonathan Shaul/Flash90)
Former hostage Omer Wenkert thanks the crowd as he returns to his home in Gedera, March 4, 2025. (Jonathan Shaul/Flash90)
Gaza and the South
In two stages, at a cost of $53 billion: Details of Egypt's plan to rehabilitate Gaza
The Arab League is convening for an emergency summit in Cairo, where the Egyptian plan will be presented • Arab media outlets have revealed details from the draft, stating that the rehabilitation will last at least 4.5 years • Hamas clarifies: They refuse any non-Palestinian rule or presence of foreign forces • The Palestinian Authority refuses to participate in the "day after" as long as Hamas is in control.
Destruction in Gaza
A month after U.S. President Donald Trump presented his plan to displace Gazans, Arab states are gathering Tuesday in Cairo for an emergency summit aimed at formulating a counter-proposal for the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip. According to reports in Arab media, the rehabilitation is expected to take at least four and a half years. The summit will present the plan formulated by Egypt for the Strip as an alternative to Trump's plan. The Palestinians are already signaling that they have their own principles and will not compromise on them.
**The Egyptian Plan**
Ahead of the summit, Arab media outlets published details from the draft of the Egyptian plan. According to Qatar's Al-Araby channel, the plan includes the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip at a cost of $53 billion and the establishment of a temporary committee to manage the Strip for six months, paving the way for the return of the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, the UN Security Council will consider deploying international forces in Gaza. The committee in Gaza will consist of independent individuals and will operate under the Palestinian government in Ramallah. Furthermore, seven areas in the Strip will be allocated to provide temporary housing for 1.5 million Palestinians.
Saudi Arabia's Al-Arabiya channel provided a more detailed breakdown of the Egyptian plan. The first stage of the Strip's rehabilitation is expected to last two years, costing approximately $20 billion. The second stage will last two and a half years, costing around $30 billion. Most of the funds are required for the rehabilitation of residents' homes. The temporary committee will work to secure the necessary support and funds for the rehabilitation, and an internationally supervised trust fund will be established to manage the funds.
According to the plan, $53 billion will be required for the rehabilitation. The ruins in northern Gaza Strip | Photo: Khalil Kahalot, Flash 90
It was also reported that the temporary committee managing the Strip will not include members from Palestinian terrorist organizations. Egypt and Jordan will provide training to the Palestinian police ahead of their deployment in Gaza. Additionally, the issue of armed groups in the Strip will be addressed through a political process.
The plan also includes a temporary ceasefire, during which "confidence-building measures" will be established. During the temporary ceasefire, direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will begin. The plan references a two-state solution, stating that the Palestinians have the right to an independent state alongside Israel. "The two-state solution will open the door to relations between regional states and Israel," it states.
In contrast to Trump's plan, the Egyptian plan asserts that there is no justification for displacing the residents of the Strip. It emphasizes that Gaza is an integral part of the Palestinian territories and cannot be separated from the West Bank. The draft states that the plan includes "condemnation of the killing and harm to civilians on both sides, as well as the unprecedented level of violence in Gaza."
"A collapse of the ceasefire will lead to catastrophic consequences, hindering humanitarian efforts and rehabilitation," it states. The Egyptian proposal also calls for an end to all settlement activities, land annexation, and the demolition of Palestinian homes. It emphasizes that the rehabilitation must be carried out by Palestinian hands "to alleviate the suffering of the population and ensure their continued presence on their land."
**Hamas' Refusal**
The head of Hamas' Shura Council, Mohammed Darwish, conveyed a message to Arab leaders over the weekend, stating that the terrorist organization is interested in completing the remaining stages of the ceasefire agreement—leading to a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire, a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the rehabilitation of the Strip, and the lifting of the blockade. He added that the "day after" the war in Gaza will be "entirely Palestinian." He stated that Hamas is willing to consider any solution that gains Palestinian consensus but rejects any non-Palestinian rule or presence of foreign forces in the Strip.
Armed Hamas terrorists during a show of force before the release of hostages (Photo: Reuters) "Resistance in all its forms will remain a legitimate right." Hamas terrorists in Gaza
Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem emphasized last week that "Hamas is committed to its resistance weapon as a legitimate tool, and there is no debate on this. Resistance in all its forms will remain a legitimate right for our people."
Hamas is focused on one goal—to remain the "master of the house" in Gaza in the next phase. It is willing to compromise on a body to manage the Strip, such as the Palestinian Authority, provided that it adheres to Hamas' demands and handles civilian affairs, allowing Hamas to focus on military rehabilitation while continuing to collect taxes on goods entering the Strip and rebuilding itself.
**The Palestinian Authority's Demand**
The Palestinian Authority, for its part, is unwilling to be involved in the civilian management of the Strip as long as Hamas remains in de facto control. It has been burned before and remembers well how its members were thrown from rooftops in Gaza in 2006 and is unwilling to suffer a similar blow again.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his associates are interested in being responsible for the committee managing the Strip in the "day after." However, they have one condition—Hamas must not be involved or pull the strings behind the scenes.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Photo: Reuters) Unwilling to suffer another blow.
Abbas will deliver a speech at the summit amid the developments and meet with several Arab leaders. He arrived in Cairo accompanied by a delegation of senior Palestinian officials—Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa, PLO Executive Committee Secretary Hussein al-Sheikh, his diplomatic advisor Majdi al-Khalidi, and the Palestinian ambassador to Cairo, Diab al-Louh.
A senior Palestinian Authority official told Qatar's Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper yesterday that "any decision coming out of the summit will not lead to any concrete steps, including financial support for the Palestinian Authority. The response to U.S. President Trump will not be helpful and cannot be relied upon."
**The Expected Summit Statement**
An Egyptian diplomatic source told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed yesterday that the statement from the Arab summit in Cairo is expected to include a rejection of the displacement of Palestinians and plans to annex the West Bank, the need to transfer aid to Gaza without restrictions, and the Egyptian plan for the rehabilitation of the Strip, without delving into its details.
Palestinian Authority chief welcomes Egyptian plan to rebuild Gaza, urges Trump to back it
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas says he welcomes an Egyptian plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip and urges US President Donald Trump to support such a plan, which would not involve displacing residents of the enclave.
Speaking at an Arab League summit that aims to counter Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” plan, Abbas — who has been ruling since winning the last Palestinian national elections in 2005 — also says he is ready to hold presidential and parliamentary elections if circumstances allow, asserting that the PA is the only legitimate governing and military force in the West Bank and Gaza. Numerous attempts have been made over the last decade to hold national Palestinian elections, but they were always called off.
Abbas says he will issue a general amnesty for all those dismissed from the Fatah movement which rules the West Bank.
Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria
IDF confirms Lebanon strike, says it killed senior Hezbollah commander who violated truce
The IDF confirms carrying out a drone strike in the Tyre area of Lebanon earlier today, saying it killed a Hezbollah commander involved in advancing attacks against Israel amid the ceasefire.
The commander, Haidar Hashem, was responsible for the naval forces in the terror group’s elite Radwan Force, according to the military.
The IDF says that as part of his role, he was involved in efforts to smuggle arms to Hezbollah via the sea, as well as planning naval attacks on Israel and Israeli civilians, including during the ongoing ceasefire.
“Hashem’s activities were a threat to the State of Israel and its citizens, and blatant violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon,” the military adds. video
IDF says it carried out drone strike against people loading weapons in south Lebanon
The IDF says it identified a group of suspects loading up vehicles with weapons in the Naqoura area of southern Lebanon earlier today.
One of the vehicles was targeted in a drone strike, the military says.
“The activity of the suspects is a violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon,” the IDF adds.
Lebanese media report that two people who were “collecting scrap metal” were wounded in the strike.
West Bank and Jerusalem and Terror attacks within Israel
Forces kill top Hamas terrorist in Jenin raid, Israel says
Weapons found by troops following an exchange of fire with Hamas gunmen in the West Bank city of Jenin, March 4, 2025. (Israel Police)
The head of a Hamas terror network in the West Bank city of Jenin was killed by undercover Border Police officers this morning, authorities say.
The incident comes as the IDF says it has expanded its ongoing counterterrorism raid in the northern West Bank to additional neighborhoods of Jenin. In a first, troops are using “Eitan” armored personnel carriers in Jenin amid the operation, which are more heavy duty than the APCs normally deployed in the West Bank.
This morning, as part of the expanded operation, Border Police officers along with IDF troops attempted to arrest the commander of Hamas’s terror network in Jenin, Issar Saadi, following information on his whereabouts provided by the Shin Bet.
Following an exchange of fire, Saadi and another gunman were killed, and three wanted Palestinians were detained, according to the IDF, police, and Shin Bet.
The troops found an assault rifle, handgun, and several other weapons during scans of the building where Saadi was holed up.
Another gunman was killed in a separate exchange of fire in the same area, the IDF adds.
IDF demolishes West Bank homes of 2 Palestinians who killed 7 in Tel Aviv attack
The house of a Palestinian man who carried out an attack against Israelis in October 2024 in Jaffa is blown up by Israeli security forces in Hebron in the West Bank on March 5, 2025. (HAZEM BADER / AFP)
During operations in the West Bank city of Hebron overnight and this morning, the IDF says it demolished the homes of two Palestinian terrorists who murdered seven people and wounded 15 in Tel Aviv in October.
The terrorists, Ahmed Himouni, 25, and Mohammad Mesek, 19, went on a shooting and stabbing spree at a light rail station in the Jaffa area of the city on October 1, just minutes before Iran launched a massive missile attack on Israel.
Mesek was shot dead by a municipal security officer, and Himouni was seriously wounded after being shot by armed civilians.
The seven civilians murdered in the attack were Victor Shimshon Green, 33; Revital Bronstein, 24; Shahar Goldman, 30; Inbar Segev Vigder, 33; Nadia Sokolenco, 40; Ilia Nozadze, 42, a Georgian citizen; and Jonas Chrosis, 26, a Greek citizen.
Members of the IDF’s elite Yahalom combat engineering unit and the Judea Regional Brigade demolished the homes of the two terrorists this morning.
As a matter of policy, Israel demolishes the homes of Palestinians accused of carrying out deadly terror attacks. linkThe demolition of terrorists' homes has been proven multiple times to not be a deterrent. It is quite the opposite, it creates exponentially more hatred towards Israel and produces more terror. It is collective punishment towards an entire family that may or may not have supported or even known about the attack before it happened. In the best case scenario, the family didn't support or know about the attack, but when their home is destroyed, it creates hatred by every single member of the family impacted directly by the home demolition and all those peripherally. This has been found in study after study, but we never learn. The home demolitions are more of revenge than they are deterrent which they are 'advertised' to be. Unfortunately, the courts that approve these demolitions do so almost automatically and are purposely ignorant of the studies and the reasons for the demolitions.
Politics and the War (general news)
Families of slain and captive troops berate IDF Southern Command chief Parents, brother of 4 soldiers accuse Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, who has announced he will resign, of abandoning their sons and failing to demand their early release
Families of soldiers who were abducted or killed on October 7, 2023, slammed the IDF Southern Command chief in a recent meeting, telling him to give up his pension for his failures during the Hamas onslaught and for failing since then to lobby for the captive troops’ release, Hebrew media reported.
In a recording played on Channel 12 Monday, the families of Cpl. Itay Chen, Staff Sgt. Yishai Fitoussi, Staff Sgt. Matan Angrest and Staff Sgt. Shimon Alroy Ben Shitrit can be heard berating Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman for failing to meet them up to that point. The recording was said to have been published with the families’ consent.
According to the network, the meeting was also attended by IDF Personnel Directorate chief Maj. Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa and colonels responsible for investigating what happened at the Nahal Oz military base, just north of Gaza. It was reportedly the families’ first meeting with the officers.
Ben Shitrit, of the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps, and Fitoussi, of the Golani infantry brigade, were killed in the battle at Nahal Oz and buried in Israel, while Chen and Angrest, of the 7th Armored Brigade, were kidnapped from their tank to Gaza, along with their commander, Capt. Daniel Perez. The IDF announced five months later that Perez and Chen, a dual American-Israeli citizen, had been killed in the attack.
Some 215 terrorists attacked the base, which was left largely unprotected during the Hamas onslaught, according to a probe published by the IDF last week. In all, 53 soldiers were killed at the base: 31 combat troops and 22 noncombat, including 16 female surveillance soldiers. Another 10 were abducted — seven female surveillance soldiers and the three tank soldiers.
Angrest is slated for release in the uncertain second phase of the Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal, which would see Hamas free 24 captives still thought to be alive, all of them young men. Chen’s body is slated to be returned in the deal’s potential third phase, which would see Hamas hand over the 35 captives confirmed dead by the IDF, among them the remains of Lt. Hadar Goldin, who was killed in the 2014 war in Gaza.
Hamas terrorists attack the IDF’s Nahal Oz base on October 7, 2023, as seen in footage released by the terror group. (Screenshot: Telegram)
Finkelman, who entered his position three months before the Hamas onslaught, announced in January that he would resign for his failure to protect the Western Negev. He did not give a precise date, saying he would stay on as long as needed.
The announcement came shortly after Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, the IDF chief of staff, announced he would resign on March 6, this Thursday.
In the meeting with Finkelman, said to have taken place in the past week, Angrest’s family accused the army of failing to ensure the early release of Matan and the other captive soldiers.
“How is he last on this damn list?” asked Angrest’s brother Ofir. “You as an army need to insist he be first, not last. This makes no sense… How long can I be shattered like this with my parents?”
Angrest’s mother Anat also assailed Finkelman, expressing disbelief that he had not been to the Knesset to lobby for the soldiers’ release.
“I’ve yet to hear a single military official fighting for our hostages not to be left behind. You’re my son’s top commander and the army is not fighting for him,” she said. “What have you done today and what do you plan to do after this meeting so that Matan, Itay and Daniel come home together?”
“It’s a shame you haven’t met me before now,” said the mother.
Finkelman answered: “It is painful to meet you. I embrace each and every one of you.”
On Monday, Angrest’s family published, for the first time, a picture of Matan in captivity, from a video received months ago. Matan, who was unconscious and seriously injured when kidnapped, appeared gaunt.
Hostage Matan Angrest in a first image released by his family from Hamas captivity, March 3, 2025. (Courtesy)
Speaking to Angrest’s family, Finkelman said it was the military’s “first mission” to bring home the hostages.
“It’s the most important because it’s the most urgent,” he said.
Matan’s father Hagai was incredulous: “How? How will you bring him back?”
Fitoussi’s father Itzik said abandoning soldiers was nothing new for Finkelman, who had served as head of the Gaza Brigade’s northern battalion during the 2014 war.
“Ten years ago [Finkelman] was Protective Edge commander,” said Itzik Fitoussi. “Till now he has left [Goldin] there. Why would he bring back our boys now?”
Lt. Hadar Goldin, whose body is being held in Gaza after he was killed fighting in the Strip on August 1, 2014. (courtesy)
Ben Shitrit’s father asked Finkelman, to audible applause: “Isn’t it time you demote yourself to the rank of private, give up your pension and go home?”
The general answered that “when this is over, we’ll think about what to do going forward.” There had been a “faulty security conception regarding Gaza,” he said.
Chen’s father Ruby expressed disappointment with the meeting.
“I expected there to be an investigation here, that there would be Intelligence Directorate folk here,” he said in the Channel 12 recording.
He also assailed the absence of Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar. “Can you explain to me why the Air Force chief wasn’t part of this discussion?” he said.
Ruby Chen holds a poster of his son, Itay Chen, during a protest near the Knesset in Jerusalem, on March 9, 2024. (Ohad Zwigenberg/AP)
Bar has reportedly said the Air Force was taken by surprise and “not effective enough” during the Hamas onslaught of October 7, 2023.
The IDF probe published last week found the Air Force had maintained its aircraft on standby according to protocol — even slightly more than usual — but that the standby aircraft numbers were ill-equipped to handle a wide-scale surprise attack.
Due to its fear of hitting civilians, there were numerous cases in which the Air Force refrained from striking terrorists, thousands of whom stormed southern Israel to kill some 1,200 people and take 251 hostages, sparking the war in Gaza.
“It’s been over 510 days,” Ruby Chen said to Finkelman. “I very much hope that the first thing you do when you get up in the morning is how you’ll bring back my son and the other hostages.”
Shin Bet’s Oct. 7 probe finds failures but largely shifts blame to other bodies
The Shin Bet security agency has published a summary of its investigations into its failures during the lead-up to the Hamas terror group’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, concluding that there were failures within the organization but mostly pointing to external elements such as an unclear division of responsibilities with the IDF, an overly defensive government policy regarding Gaza over the years, and the Shin Bet being unsuited to counter an army-like foe such as Hamas.
The security service says a broader investigation is needed — a likely hint at the perceived need for a state commission of inquiry, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to establish.
The investigations were carried out internally by each of the Shin Bet’s units and by an external team of former senior agency employees and other experts, who provided a series of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
Many of the findings remain classified, as they would reveal the Shin Bet’s intelligence secret tools and methods, the agency says.
The investigation has found that the Shin Bet failed to provide an alert for Hamas’s October 7 large-scale onslaught. Warning signs received by the Shin Bet on the night of October 6 did not result in major actions being taken.
While a small team of elite officers from the Shin Bet and police that were deployed to the Gaza border before the onslaught managed to contribute to the fighting, they were unable to prevent the massive Hamas attack.
The investigation points to several reasons, both related to professionalism and management, which contributed to the failures. “The organizational failures were thoroughly examined and the lessons were learned and continue to be learned,” the Shin Bet says.
Additionally, the investigation found that the Shin Bet did not underestimate Hamas, but rather the opposite, that the agency had “a deep understanding of the threat, and had initiatives and a desire to thwart the threat and especially [eliminate] the leaders of Hamas.”
Hamas terrorists attack the IDF’s Nahal Oz base on October 7, 2023, as seen in footage released by the terror group. (Screenshot: Telegram)
Several reasons are given as to why the Shin Bet provided no alert for Hamas’s mass onslaught:
Hamas’s ground invasion plans, which were obtained by the IDF in a document known as Jericho’s Walls, were not handled correctly over several years, and the plans were not turned into a scenario that the military and Shin Bet train for.
An unclear division of responsibility between the IDF and Shin Bet regarding which organization should provide a warning for war, amid a change of Hamas from a smaller terror group to a full military force.
The Shin Bet’s focus was on foiling terror attacks, and its methods were not applicable to an enemy that acted like an army.
During the night between October 6 and 7, there were gaps in the “handling of information and integration of intelligence,” as well as operations that did not follow the usual protocol, and a lack of “fusion” with the IDF’s intelligence.
There were gaps in the work of intelligence supervision mechanisms.
The assessment was that Hamas was trying to heat up the West Bank, and was not interested in doing so in the Gaza Strip.
The Shin Bet had an “incorrect understanding” of the strength of the Israeli border barrier with Gaza and the IDF’s ability to respond.
Hamas’s believed intentions were not challenged enough during assessments.
There was relatively little intelligence, including as a result of limited freedom of action in the Gaza Strip, especially independently by the Shin Bet.
Illustrative: Shin Bet head Ronen Bar (R) and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi (L) hold an assessment with senior officers in southern Gaza’s Khan Younis, December 11, 2023. (Israel Defense Forces)
The Shin Bet investigation also finds several reasons that enabled Hamas to build up its forces for the October 7 onslaught and decide to carry out the attack:
Israel’s policy vis-Γ -vis Gaza was to maintain periods of quiet, which enabled Hamas massive force build-up.
The flow of money from Qatar to Gaza and their delivery to Hamas’s military wing.
An ongoing erosion of Israel’s deterrence.
An attempt to deal with a terror organization based on intelligence and defensive measures, while avoiding offensive initiatives.
The catalysts to Hamas’s decision to carry out the onslaught included the cumulative weight of Israeli violations on the Temple Mount, the attitude toward Palestinian prisoners, and the perception that Israeli society was weakened.
In an accompanying statement, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar says the agency “did not prevent the October 7 massacre” and “as the head of the organization, I will bear this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life.”
He adds: “The investigation revealed that if the Shin Bet had acted differently, in the years leading up to the attack and during the night of the attack — both at the professional level and the managerial level — the massacre would have been avoided. This is not the standard we expected of ourselves, or that the public expected of us.
“The investigation shows that the Shin Bet didn’t underestimate our rival — on the contrary, it took the initiative, went on the offensive and tried to nip the threat in the bud — but despite all this, we failed.”
Bar adds that truly investigating the failures necessitates a broader probe that also encapsulates the contact and cooperation between security and political elements.
“The path to reparation, as is emphasized in the report, demands a broad process of clarity and truth,” he says. “So I asked the investigatory committee and the agency’s top command, to probe and to discuss not only the reasons why the service failed, but also to take a wide look at all the relevant work processes at the organization, as part of learning lessons and as an opportunity for a broad change. But it also demands readiness to change in the political-security interface, otherwise, the failures could come back in the future.”
“I believe this organization is strong, stable, humble and its values are even more professional than they were on the eve of the massacre,” he adds. link
From the Hebrew news:
**Hamas Was Not Perceived as an Army, the Raid Threat Was Not Treated as a Unique Threat | Shin Bet Investigation Revealed**
In the days leading up to the massacre, the Shin Bet believed Hamas was focused on escalating tensions in the West Bank and had not moved to the stage of breaching the border fence. On the night before, operational procedures did not follow combat doctrine, and there were issues with synchronizing information with the military. The activation of "Simim" (phone SIM cards) (Hamas' communication network) raised suspicions, the concept of maintaining quiet in Gaza collapsed under the attack, and the failure to effectively utilize agents in the closed-off Strip. What happened to the Shin Bet on October 7?
Over a year and a half has passed since the October 7 massacre, and it seems that the investigations, published one after another, are piecing together the puzzle and shedding light on the failures and misconceptions that led to the surprise attack. Today (Tuesday), as we first reported on N12, the Shin Bet is revealing its investigation into the failures of October 7, as presented to the organization's leadership. How did Hamas manage to prepare without Israel noticing? What lay behind the intelligence failure, and why was there no warning? N12 with all the details.
**Why Was There No Warning?**
- **The Raid Threat Was Not Treated as a Unique Threat:** Poor handling over the years of intelligence regarding the extensive raid plan known as "Jericho Wall."
- **From a Terror Organization to a Terror Army:** As Hamas built its strength, there was no clear division of responsibility between the IDF and the Shin Bet regarding war warnings.
- **Failures in the Integrated Counterterrorism Concept:** The concept was not suited to dealing with the threats posed by a terror organization behaving like an army. The Shin Bet, in their view, placed too much emphasis on counterterrorism measures (which were not suited to an enemy acting like an army).
- **The Night of October 6:** Gaps and issues in handling intelligence information, particularly in the oversight mechanisms of intelligence work. Additionally, work was not conducted according to combat doctrine, there were issues with synchronizing information with the military, and the warning model was not utilized.
- **Misjudgment:** The Shin Bet believed Hamas was focused on escalating tensions in the West Bank and had not moved to the stage of breaching the border fence.
The Shin Bet admits there was a misunderstanding of the strength of the barrier and the IDF's operational response in the sector, particularly on the night before the massacre. The investigation also noted that Hamas' intentions were not sufficiently challenged by competing assessments and that there was a policy of maintaining quiet in the sector. They emphasized that "the investigation did not find that the Shin Bet underestimated the enemy. On the contrary—there was a deep understanding of the threat, initiatives, and a desire to thwart the threat, especially targeting Hamas leaders."
**The Plan Arrived Twice—But Was Not Developed into a Unique Threat**
Hamas' plan for a large-scale attack reached the Shin Bet in two different iterations (in 2018 and 2022), but it was not developed into a unique threat and therefore was not presented as a scenario for a future campaign. It was also noted that a "sequence of weak warning signs" that began in the summer of 2023 was not linked to this threat. The Shin Bet concluded that all of the above harmed the intelligence collection guidance and the understanding of the accumulated intelligence.
**The Night Before the Massacre**
- **At 1:00 AM:** A summary intelligence picture of the southern sector was distributed, stating that there was a "sequence of signs indicating Hamas' preparation for an emergency." Alongside this, it was noted that "on the ground, there are indications of routine and restraint."
- **At 3:03 AM:** As the warning signs connected, an alert was issued stating: "From the information in our possession, there is an indication of the activation and activity of the 'Simim network' in several Hamas brigades. So far, we do not have information about the nature of the activity. However, we note that this is an unusual convergence, and given additional warning signs, it may indicate an offensive activity by Hamas."
- **On October 5, in the evening:** The first report was distributed to relevant IDF officials about an indication of the activation of Sim cards in the northern Gaza Strip.
- **By October 7 at 4:30 AM:** Approximately 45 Sim cards were gradually activated. For comparison, during the 2022 High Holidays, 38 Sim cards were activated, and during Ramadan 2023, 37 Sim cards were activated. On both occasions, Hamas did not carry out attacks or assaults.
- **On October 7 at 4:30 AM:** The Shin Bet director held a discussion with all sector heads, under the assumption that any campaign would be multi-sectoral.
During the night's situational assessment, several operational possibilities were raised, including a surprise attack in the form of a raid/kidnapping. The Shin Bet emphasizes that instructions were given for intelligence and operational readiness to thwart such an attack. In this context, a team of fighters sent to the south began preparing for possible infiltration points into Israeli territory, as a response to the possibility of an infiltration/kidnapping attack.
**"Decisions were based on incomplete information, both due to the absence of an attack plan on the decision-making table and due to coverage gaps that were not known."**
**Shin Bet Conclusions from the Night of October 7**
- Professional failures were found in the management of the intelligence/counterterrorism war room.
- The accumulated information was analyzed incorrectly, particularly in comparison to the activation of Sim cards during the 2022 High Holidays.
- The warning model, validated two months earlier as part of the preparations for the High Holidays, was not used.
- Sending a "Tekila" force as a response to a point raid scenario, overestimating the capabilities of the ground barrier and IDF forces on the border, and the nature of the dialogue with Southern Command during the night contributed to the decision-makers' sense that the correct actions had been taken to counter the threat.
Hamas breaking through the fence barrier
**The Intelligence Failure and Its Causes**
- **Restricted Operational Freedom:** The Shin Bet claims that intelligence collection was harmed due to restricted operational freedom in Gaza, which behaved as a closed-off area. However, the investigation revealed that a better intelligence picture could have been achieved by utilizing intelligence sensors obtained in hundreds of operations in recent years.
- **Gaps in Recruitment and Operation of Human Agents:** Lack of access to the area led to gaps in recruiting and operating human sources that could have indicated or warned of unusual activity in Gaza.
- **Division of Responsibility with the IDF:** Was not adapted to the changing threat: There was a need to clarify the relative advantage of both organizations, with the Shin Bet responsible for counterterrorism and warnings of terror attacks, and the IDF responsible for war warnings along the border.
- **Weak "Iffach Mesabre" (Alternative Analysis):** The investigation revealed a gap in creating competing assessments and examining whether deception tactics were being used. Additionally, there was a lack of presenting competing hypotheses to the leading assessment (that Hamas in Gaza was focused on escalating tensions in the West Bank). Furthermore, the service's oversight arm was weakened due to a gradual closure that spanned a decade.
- **Failures in Handling Accumulated Intelligence:** The handling of intelligence received in the days leading up to the massacre, particularly on the night before, was not conducted according to Shin Bet combat doctrine. Additionally, there were gaps in understanding the intelligence picture, particularly regarding collection gaps and the failure to fully utilize all the information available in the intelligence community that night.
**"The Shin Bet's Research Division clearly warned about the deterrence deficit, which would lead various enemies, including Hamas, to increasing boldness."**
**The Path to October 7: How the Shin Bet Perceived Hamas Over the Years**
- **From Border Clashes to "Guardian of the Walls":** From July 2018 until "Guardian of the Walls" in May 2021, a policy was maintained toward Gaza that led to a "routine" reality, primarily aimed at restraining Hamas in exchange for Israel's agreement to a series of civilian and economic measures.
- This included transferring Qatari aid funds for cash payments to Hamas officials, transferring cash to families on a large scale, and supplying fuel for electricity.
- The fishing zone was extended to 15 miles, civilian projects in Gaza were initiated, and the entry of approximately 5,000 merchants was approved. Simultaneously, defensive measures were developed, primarily centered around the construction of the barrier and the solar wall.
- The Shin Bet viewed "Guardian of the Walls" as a clear "Hamas victory." The Shin Bet recommended a proactive policy and avoiding being dragged into rounds of fighting.
Hamas terrorists in Kfar Aza
**Hamas Grew Stronger—Thanks to Iran and Qatari Money**
The terror organization utilized the years to build its military strength, thanks to Iran's strategic support and Qatari money. In this context, Hamas established an organized, armed, fortified, and trained army consisting of five brigades, special forces, an intelligence apparatus, and special capabilities in the air, sea, and land.
**The Years Before the Massacre**
- **Starting in 2021:** Hamas dramatically increased its efforts to direct terror against Israel—including from the West Bank. The Shin Bet recommended preparing plans to counter terror from Gaza.
- **2023:** Was characterized by warnings issued by the Shin Bet. The warnings concerned the motivation of enemies to attack Israel amid the influence of social divisions, the unrest on the Temple Mount, and in prisons.
- **Ahead of the High Holidays:** The Shin Bet indicated that Israel was entering an unstable period. Accordingly, a readiness discussion for a campaign in Gaza was held, and several operational steps were taken in response.
**"The possibility that Hamas was conducting deception tactics, whether tactical or strategic, was not sufficiently discussed or presented as a real possibility. This was in the absence of an effective oversight body that would raise this possibility in real-time and present it as a real option over time."**
**The Morning of October 7: The Shin Bet's Actions in the First Hours of the Massacre**
- **Opened Centers:** Combat command posts, a dedicated command post for monitoring abductees, a situation room for identifying missing persons, a command post for locating infiltrating squads, a command post for targeting senior Hamas officials in Gaza and abroad, and a NILI situation room for locating and neutralizing attackers who took part in the massacre and returned to Gaza.
- **A Facility for Rapid Interrogation of Nukhba Terrorists:** The facility was quickly opened and reinforced with professionals. The interrogations yielded intelligence regarding abductees and allowed for the mapping of houses ahead of the ground operation and the identification of "sleeper cells."
- **The Shin Bet Sent a Dedicated Force to the North:** To prepare for a possible infiltration by the Radwan force. This force encountered terrorists, and Shin Bet personnel were also injured. Additionally, resources were allocated to the West Bank and Israel. The Shin Bet directed a rapid multi-sectoral organization that allowed for a transition to offense and the neutralization of risks from other sectors.
**Summary of Changes Made in Light of the Investigation's Lessons:**
- Establishment of an oversight mechanism for real-time intelligence alerts.
- In-depth examination, challenging of concepts, and implementation of changes in the Research Division.
- Establishment of a joint terror finance unit with the IDF.
- Creation of an investigative department to handle detainees from Gaza.
- Change in the deployment of HUMINT units in Gaza—transitioning to a geographical division (modeled after the West Bank).
- Development of warning models in every counterterrorism division.
- Clarification of the division of responsibility with the IDF in all sectors—in implementation.
- Extensive staff work to improve the information system, with an emphasis on integration with Unit 8200.
**Shin Bet Director:** "The Shin Bet did not prevent the October 7 massacre. As the head of the organization, I will carry this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life. The investigation shows that had the Shin Bet acted differently in the years leading up to the attack and on the night of the attack, both professionally and managerially, the massacre could have been prevented."
"This is not the standard we expected of ourselves or that the public expected of us. The investigation shows that the Shin Bet did not underestimate the enemy—on the contrary, there was initiative, a drive for engagement, and an attempt to cut off the threat in its infancy. Despite this, we failed. The path to correction, as emphasized in the investigation, requires a broad process of uncovering the truth. Therefore, I asked the investigation director and the Shin Bet leadership forum to examine and discuss not only the direct causes of the failure but also to take a broad look at all relevant organizational processes, as part of drawing lessons and as an opportunity for broad change. But it also requires a readiness for change in the security-political interface—otherwise, the failures may recur in the future."
"The Shin Bet investigation was written with bowed heads before those whose lives were taken, before those who were injured in body and soul, before those whose freedom was stolen, who were abducted and held cruelly, before the families and friends who carry the pain and difficulty, and before those who were forced to leave their homes. The heavy sense of responsibility and the moral debt we owe to the victims and all circles of the affected were before our eyes throughout the internal investigation process. We are committed to correcting what is necessary to prevent, as much as possible, the recurrence of further disasters." link
Investigation of the Battle at Nahal Oz: Failures in Preparedness, but the Heroism of the Fighters Stood Out on the Battlefield
The 53 soldiers who fell in the battle at Nahal Oz base on October 7, 2023
The investigation into the invasion of the Nahal Oz outpost has been completed and presented to the bereaved families and commanders. The investigation revealed failures in preparedness and the defense of the outpost. The invasion began at 06:29, and the battle continued until midday, with some forces fighting against hundreds of terrorists while outnumbered. The conclusions: flaws in the planning of fortifications and the protection of non-combat forces, damage to the command and control system, and recommendations for citations for some of the fighters. The full investigation.
Documenting the moments of the abduction of the observatories Photo: headquarters of the kidnapped families
The IDF has completed its operational investigation into the invasion and battle at the Nahal Oz outpost. The investigation was finalized and presented to the bereaved families, commanders, and soldiers who were at the outpost.
The investigation, led by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, was also presented to Defense Minister Israel Katz. In the attack on the base, 53 soldiers, officers, and female soldiers were killed, and 10 soldiers were abducted to the Gaza Strip. Three of them are still held captive by the terrorist organization Hamas.
The investigation reveals that the IDF failed to adequately protect the Nahal Oz base during the attack, highlighting the shortcomings in the IDF's and the base's preparedness for a large-scale ground attack, especially under rocket fire. However, the exceptional heroism of the soldiers, fighters, and officers from the Golani Brigade, the 7th Brigade, the "Sky Rider" unit, the observers, and the combat intelligence fighters stands out—they faced hundreds of terrorists with courage and determination.
The investigation outlines the sequence of events, the management of the battle, and the operational conduct of the security forces. Although operational failures were revealed during the battle, it also highlights the bravery of the fighters in a complex situation, facing numerical inferiority against a ruthless enemy.
Neglect of the Nahal Oz outpost
From the data published by the IDF on the attacks in the Nahal Oz area, a picture of the battle that took place at the outpost emerges. Starting at 07:47, the outpost was attacked 14 times using drones, alongside 6 attacks by combat helicopters and the firing of approximately 150 artillery shells.
One of the drone attacks even saved the lives of 11 female soldiers by driving away terrorists who tried to break into the room where they were hiding. In the entire Nahal Oz area, 77 drone attacks, 36 combat helicopter attacks, over 1,600 artillery shells, and 10 additional combat attacks were recorded. According to IDF estimates, about 60 terrorists were eliminated by the Air Force in the area.
**The Night Before the Attack on the Outpost** During the night before the attack on the Nahal Oz base, no unusual reports were received from the 13th Brigade or the intelligence forces. Only after 04:00 was an indication received from the fence system, leading to an order prohibiting movement to the nearby route. Shortly afterward, the event ended without further unusual indications. At 05:30, a situation assessment was conducted under the leadership of the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion, alongside the readiness of some forces in the sector. As part of this, a command post left the Nahal Oz base, accompanied by two patrol vehicles. Additionally, a standby force of a tank and an armored personnel carrier was established in the "Black Arrow" area. At 06:29, Hamas launched a massive rocket barrage toward all southern communities and the Israeli home front. The terrorists, who managed to breach the barrier in dozens of infiltration routes, penetrated deep into the communities and bases using vehicles, motorcycles, and even on foot. Within minutes, the battalion fighters, under a well-organized attack, found themselves in a severe numerical disadvantage against a powerful and organized enemy.
The Burnt Command Post at Nahal Oz | Photo: Channel 12 News
The Infiltration into the Outpost and the Intense Battles
Phase 1 - Terrorist Infiltration and Fighting in the Base (06:29-08:20) 06:29 - Observers reported enemy movement near the fence, and the sector commander declared a "complex event." 06:31 - Additional reports from the observers' command post about further infiltrations of terrorist squads into Israeli territory. The deputy battalion commander went out to the route to prevent infiltration into the communities. 06:45 - Enemy forces reached the base, and soldiers in positions exchanged fire with terrorists attempting to infiltrate the base. 06:55 - The deputy commander of the 13th Battalion was injured during the battle with the main terrorist force. 07:05 - Terrorists infiltrated the base, and a platoon commander ordered the fighters to go out and fight. 07:30 - The battle at the entrance position (Shin Gimel - main gate) ended with the terrorists overpowering the position and killing the fighters. 07:40 - A force from Company B entered the base and began fighting; the company commander was injured. 08:04 - Airstrikes saved the lives of 11 female soldiers who remained in shelters.
Phase 2 - Continued Fighting in the Base (08:20 - 12:00) 08:53 - A tank from the armored force was hit by two missiles and disabled. 09:00 - A tank crew identified a second wave of terrorists, engaged them, and the force was hit by an anti-tank missile. 09:02 - Another tank was hit by a missile, and the crew was injured. 10:00 - Abductions began, including the abduction of three soldiers from the disabled tank. 10:20 - Seven observers were abducted and taken to the Gaza Strip. 12:00 - Terrorists set fire to the command post where soldiers and officers were trapped; some managed to escape.
Phase 3 - Arrival of Rescue Forces and Until 20:00 12:00 - A command post force from the 890th Battalion arrived at the base, along with additional paratroopers and Yamam forces. 13:36 - The forces searched for and attacked the remaining terrorists in the base. 17:00 - A communication network report indicated that the Nahal Oz base was cleared of terrorists.
Conclusions **Gap in Preparedness:** The scale of the attack and the gap in the base's preparations for such a scenario led to a failure in its defense. No accurate reporting or planning was conducted for a ground attack of this magnitude.
**Flaws in Base Fortification and Planning:** The Nahal Oz base was not equipped to handle a ground attack. The fortifications were primarily designed to protect against missile fire and were not planned to counter terrorist infiltrations or ground attacks. The protected spaces were not capable of withstanding ground infiltration.
**Protection of the Command Post:** Although the command post was the closest and most threatened target, its fortification was designed based on the threat of missile fire and did not withstand the threats of a ground raid. No adjustments were made for ground attacks.
**Inadequate Readiness:** The base's readiness level was not aligned with the threat it faced, especially compared to the scenario of a mounted ground attack. The number of soldiers in guard positions did not match the size of the base and its location on the front line.
**Protection of Non-Combat Forces:** There was no clear defense plan for non-combat forces, such as the observers, and no training for an attack on the base. These gaps caused severe harm to non-combat forces and difficulties for the combat forces in defending the base.
**Damage to Command and Control:** The surprise attack led to the rapid death of some field commanders. Due to the damage to the command structure, the forces fought without order or clear instructions, harming coordination and the course of the battle.
**Positive Decisions and Performance Under Pressure:** The investigation team commended the commanders' decision to send available forces to fight in the kibbutzim and assist residents. The performance of the observers and the intelligence platoon commander was also praised for continuing to provide operational reports in an organized and calm manner during the attack.
**Recommendations for Citations:** The investigation team recommended awarding citations to soldiers, officers, and fighters from the Golani Brigade, the 7th Brigade, the 414th Battalion, the "Sky Rider" unit, and the Northern Brigade for their fearless performance, calm actions, and engagement under the surprise attack. link
Lone guard, breached fence, abandoned posts: IDF probe reveals Nahal Oz base’s glaring security lapses on October 7
On October 7, just one soldier guarded Nahal Oz base, a stone's throw from Gaza, as forces were thin, tank crews off standby and machine guns locked away; seized Hamas manual shows terror group knew base's security gaps, aiding 250 terrorists in its takeover
An IDF investigation report released Monday exposed a chain of systematic failures in military norms in the Nahal Oz base, which Hamas was able to exploit to deliver a well-coordinated blow on October 7.
The large military base, located a few hundred yards from the Gaza border, was not drilled for an attack; tank crews were told not to be on standby for their tanks; defense positions facing Shijaiyah were empty, and only one soldier, a sentry, was guarding the entire base—these are some of the disastrous initial conditions that contributed to the rapid collapse of the base.
Intelligence gathered from the Gaza Strip during the war revealed a Hamas attack manual for the Nahal Oz base. According to senior IDF officials, it wouldn’t be out of place in an elite unit’s operation file, detailing all the base's weaknesses and characteristics: the gaps in the fence through which 60 Nukhba terrorists infiltrated during the first wave, ultimately taking the base within half an hour; the holes in the western wall, which were used as firing slits for gunmen to shoot crossfire at the soldiers inside; a reckless IDF procedure that approved reducing combat forces by about half on weekends so soldiers could enjoy time off at home; precise locations of every room, command center, office, and building within the camp; daily life routines; the number of weapons; the exact location of the bomb shelters, and more.
Hamas knew it would be relatively easy to infiltrate the base. Its perimeter watch towers were not only empty and lacking machine guns (which were locked in storage), but the base also lacked significant trenches and obstacles. The investigation reveals that no military routine was maintained at the base, which housed several units, each in a different corner: no formations, no ceremonies, no daily briefings, and no posts. According to various testimonies, Hamas even built a model of Nahal Oz in Gaza to train for its conquest, understanding that if they took it and the other four battalion and brigade bases in the area, the way to murder and kidnap in southern Israeli towns would be quick and easy, as it turned out to be.
The result was the loss of 53 soldiers at the Nahal Oz base: 22 combat support soldiers, including 16 lookouts, 31 fighters, including 19 from the Golani Brigade, and 10 who were kidnapped to Gaza.
Every second was filmed, every angle documented
The investigation, conducted over ten months by a team led by Colonel A., the commander of the IDF’s 551 Paratroopers Reserve Brigade, uncovered strange contradictions in the after-action reports of the units that operated at the base that Saturday. To uncover the truth, he organized all the data, communications, and hours of recorded footage.
Colonel A.'s life was relatively easy, despite the differing testimonies of the survivors. He had almost every moment at the base captured on video. He received footage from Hamas terrorists’ GoPro cameras, drones used by the terrorist organization, armored vehicle cameras, and security cameras. One of the videos lasted an hour and 50 minutes, from when the attacker turned on the camera at 6:00 a.m. as he aimed his weapon in the Shijaiyah neighborhood until the attack ended and he returned to Gaza, along with about half of the Nukhba terrorists who had infiltrated the base.
The IDF said the investigation was harder for Colonel A. than any of the battles or experiences he went through in his 20 years of service with the IDF's Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, even harder than the moments when he lost 20 of his soldiers during the war. Unlike other investigators, and against a backdrop of poor command climate, Colonel A. recommended personal measures, possibly even dismissals, against the senior officers responsible for the Nahal Oz debacle.
His recommendations have not yet been accepted due to outgoing Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi's decision to leave the decisions to his successor, Major General Itzik Tzukrel. Even the commander of the northern brigade on October 7, Colonel Haim Cohen, who was responsible for the faulty operational management of the base before the war, remained in his position until recently, when he announced he would step down.
“The story of the fall of Nahal Oz could easily be linked to the long-standing failures that strengthened Hamas, the intelligence failure to provide warning, and the large-scale attack that included dozens of combat points,” said an IDF source. “But in reality, the events there revealed something else: a shift in operational culture in recent years.”
Hamas' goal: Capture in 15 minutes
On the morning of October 7, there were 162 soldiers at the Nahal Oz base—about half the usual number on weekdays—according to a policy implemented by the IDF General Staff five years ago to accommodate soldiers’ preferences, based on the assumption that terrorists would only strike on weekdays. Of these soldiers, 81 were fighters, 91 carried weapons, and the rest were combat support personnel, including spotters from the Northern Brigade, medics, drivers, and logistics and armament soldiers.
The night before the invasion, two separate breaches were detected in the security fence, just a few hundred yards from the base, which is one of the closest to the border. The update was sent at 4:00 a.m. to the Northern Brigade and the division, which were focused on nighttime assessments due to signs of an impending threat from the Gaza Strip. These signs, however, were not passed down to the Border Defense Battalions in order to avoid compromising intelligence sources. The breach in the fence was not fully analyzed, and according to the investigation team, it likely wasn’t linked to the upcoming invasion. However, it did lead to increased caution, and the forces were instructed to delay their morning patrol to verify no further infiltration at the border.
Hamas’s operational plan to capture the Nahal Oz base, found in a document in Jabalia, reveals the sources from which Hamas gathered information about the base. These included not only drones launched intermittently but also hundreds of photos and videos uploaded by soldiers to social media from within the base itself, as well as media reports by the IDF about frequent changes in defense strategies in the sector.
“Hamas knew where every commander slept, where the dining hall was, which sections of the agricultural roads leading from the fence to the base could slow them down, and determined in their plan that the Nukhba battalions attacking the base had to do so within 15 minutes to ensure its capture,” the investigation report states. “Hamas analyzed that it would take 15 minutes for a tank to reach Nahal Oz in case of an event. They monitored drills to determine how long it would take for nearby forces to reinforce. They understood they also had to neutralize the nearby Pega outpost, as it housed mortar positions supporting Nahal Oz, which they successfully did.”
Nahal Oz' charred operations room after the October 7 massacre
(Photo: Tal Shahar)
The base was divided in advance, with each Nukhba unit assigned to capture a specific area. The first wave, between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m., included 65 of Hamas' best fighters, and another 50 joined the second wave by 9:00 a.m. By 10:00 a.m., 100 more terrorists joined, completing the capture, killing, and kidnapping operations. At the height of the invasion, about 250 Hamas terrorists were inside the Nahal Oz base, which had a perimeter of only 1,200 meters.
The commander of the Nukhba platoon was killed early in the battle, but his force continued according to plan. Half of the infiltrating terrorists were killed, while the rest managed to return to Gaza. The Hamas force was well-equipped, and in addition to their numerical advantage, they had a deadly arsenal: while the IDF saw no need to regularly distribute fragmentation grenades or mortar grenades to its soldiers, and machine guns were locked away in storage, Hamas arrived with numerous RPGs, explosive devices of various types, Kalashnikov rifles, and more.
An investigation into the first Nukhba platoon’s conduct revealed further intelligence failures. The evening before, starting around 6:00 p.m., the Nukhba platoon had been briefed for the invasion plan. First, the commanders were briefed, followed by the terrorists. All of this occurred in Shijaiyah, an area that should have been covered by the IDF's Gaza Division’s Combat Intelligence Battalion. Yet, no one noticed the activity just one or two kilometers from the border. The second Nukhba platoon that infiltrated the base came from the Al-Furkan neighborhood, a bit deeper into Gaza City.
The investigation found that the entry of Golani's 13th Battalion into the area was relatively smooth. Four months before the massacre, a brigade-level drill had included scenarios such as a Nukhba platoon raiding the nearby Pega outpost and an attack on a combat team by a Hamas drone. However, the scenario of an attack on the base itself was never practiced, even though, as noted, the base was only a 15-minute jog from the hostile Shijaiyah neighborhood, less than a kilometer from the border, and fully exposed to Gaza due to the area's topography.
Despite the Nukhba raid scenarios discussed by the Gaza Division the year prior to the war, no one thought it necessary to drill Nahal Oz soldiers. Accordingly, as mentioned, the base was guarded by only one soldier at a sentry post and a few others guarding internal sections of the base, mainly to prevent theft, including a section with damaged observation balloons. The standby unit assigned to protect the entire base consisted of a platoon commander and three soldiers.
Control at Nahal Oz had been lax even before October 7, despite inspections that seemingly had no effect. It took Colonel A.’s team four full months to compile a basic unit roster of the soldiers at the base as of 6:29 a.m. This indicates just how far basic norms had deteriorated at this front-line, threatened base.
“This base is right across from the kibbutz, and the civilian atmosphere had a negative impact,” the investigators noted. “Golani’s battalion worked hard during this period, but was focused on the disturbances at the border. On Friday afternoon (October 6), it was once again stationed along the border, reinforced slightly by snipers from the Paratroopers’ reconnaissance unit and the counter-terrorism unit, but pulled back in the late afternoon because the border was unusually quiet and empty.”
(Photo: Eyal Eshel)
The shift in the IDF’s operational culture worsened with the change in standard operating procedures known to every soldier in the army until a decade or two ago in border areas: readiness at dawn. Under this procedure, all soldiers are expected to wake up and prepare to defend their post or sector, understanding that these are the most volatile hours, between the dark of night and the first light of dawn. This procedure, it turns out, was modified and contracted so that only the command posts and standby platoons performed it with the sector patrol.
One of Golani’s platoon commanders, who waited at 5:30 a.m. at the base junction for a platoon from his unit to join in carrying out the procedure, angrily sent them back to base for being late. Another small unit didn’t wake up at all, according to the investigation. At 6:29 a.m., with the first barrage of fire, Golani company commander Maj. Shilo Har-Even, who was killed in action, shouted, “This is not a drill. We’re under fire. Iron Dome interceptions. Purple rain.”
“Purple rain” is a code used in IDF operations that originated during the security zone in southern Lebanon, instructing soldiers to take positions at a post, understanding that a barrage of mortar shells could signal the start of a ground assault. Purple rain in 2023 in the IDF was primarily a reference to the Red Alert system. A video from a soldier’s phone at 6:30 a.m. showed Golani fighters laughing inside a bomb shelter in a relatively calm atmosphere. Some were still in their sleepwear, and one officer, wearing only a vest, followed the unfolding events on his radio while waiting for orders. Later, that officer would be one of the heroes of the difficult battle. No one in the IDF had taught these soldiers the real meaning of “purple rain” or what to do in such a situation.
From this point onward, the investigation notes, the spotters maintained remarkable composure, providing detailed, life-saving reports over the radio and did not stop, even when they realized that dozens of terrorists who had just blown the fence were racing toward their base in trucks and on motorcycles.
Minute by minute: Fighting at Nahal Oz base
6:31 a.m.: A lookout spots the first Hamas cell before it breaches the fence and immediately reports it to the Golani force outside the base. The commander of the Nahal Oz sector, Golani 13th Battalion Deputy Commander Major N., informs all forces via radio: “This is a complex event. Purple rain and Turkish cavalry” (code names for infiltrating terrorists).
6:33 a.m.: Another lookout reports the first explosion at the newly constructed “formidable” border fence, which easily collapses, allowing a Nukhba unit to quickly enter the area in trucks and motorcycles, each carrying two terrorists. The platoon commander, Har-Aven, orders everyone to prepare: "This is definitely a complex event."
6:35 a.m.: Major Har-Aven joins a nearby company combat team in his armored patrol jeep. He quickly boards a heavily armored Namer APC attached to a tank. He forgets his mobile phone in the jeep.
6:36 a.m.: Two Golani soldiers run under mortar fire to reinforce their comrade, who is guarding the base's gate alone. The trio—Staff Sgt. Dor Lazimi, Staff Sgt. Ori Karmi, and Staff Sgt. Adir Bogale—will fight heroically at their position against dozens of Hamas terrorists until they fall in battle.
6:37 a.m.: Two active-duty soldiers from the northern battalion stationed at the base leave in a jeep as part of a military protocol, despite their comrade, tracker Warrant Officer Ibrahim Kharuba, urging them to stay and defend the camp. Investigators viewed their actions negatively, but like other soldiers in rare instances who did not seek contact, they were hard to judge. The two remained in the sector, found themselves in another battle zone, and fought until they were injured.
Warrant Officer Ibrahim Kharuba
(Photo: IDF)
6:38 a.m.: A third lookout in the Nahal Oz command post identifies and reports a new breach in the fence and a large-scale infiltration of terrorists about a kilometer from the base. She and her colleagues try to contact the Pega outpost to request mortar fire on the breach area, but communication problems and ongoing fighting at Pega prevent this.
6:42 a.m.: Cpt. Shir Eilat, the lookout platoon commander, constructs a full situational picture for all forces, detailing enemy positions and IDF units. Based on this, the brigade reserves are activated towards Nahal Oz.
6:43 a.m.: Major N., stationed at the observation post, observes a new breach where dozens of Hamas terrorists are heading toward Route 25, which leads to the Sa'ad junction and then to the entire Gaza envelope. He rushes to the base junction to block the infiltration, becoming the first Nahal Oz commander to encounter terrorists. At this point, the commander of a nearby Golani company orders his soldiers to spread out in the base’s fortified perimeter positions.
6:46 a.m.: As commanders fighting in the base area shout over the radio, “Where are the tanks?!” two tank crews, who had not been put on relevant standby, mount their tanks, crush 3-4 terrorists, and fire a shell, killing another five in the base’s southwest corner, where about 40 terrorists are concentrated. The tank crews do not see the remaining terrorists and continue toward a position near the border, following their training protocol to reach the fence as quickly as possible, “because the enemy is in Gaza.”
6:49 a.m.: Major Har-Aven realizes he is in command of the sector alone and divides his limited forces—one tank and one Namer APC—into two fighting hubs. A mortar section commander from a nearby force requests permission to fire. The debrief describes this as another example of the significant cognitive gap among the soldiers, as they were trained this way, despite the fact that the event had been ongoing for 20 minutes.
6:50 a.m.: A tank arriving from the outpost towards Major Har-Aven receives orders from him to head to the Kfar Aza. However, the arriving force struggles to understand what’s happening in the settlement, takes a position outside, and becomes ineffective. Meanwhile, Major N., continuing to fight desperately at the base entrance, is hit by a bullet to his head and severely injured. His soldiers try to stabilize him under fire, but the already-weak human defense line collapses after about ten minutes, and the terrorists breach the base.
6:51 a.m.: The number of soldiers at the base when the attack began, 18, steadily decreases due to numerous casualties. The terrorists exploit gaps in the outpost fence and holes in the western wall, intended for lifting concrete panels, to fire crossfire from outside into the soldiers.
7:00 a.m.: Major Har-Aven receives orders from the brigade commander to command the battalion. The remaining armed personnel in the base focus on protecting the fortified rooms, where dozens of unarmed and frightened soldiers are sheltering. Major Har-Aven receives another report about the dire situation in Kfar Aza and sends his reconnaissance force with two jeeps, but they do not enter the settlement, likely due to fear, and head north instead. Later, they will testify: “We saw an RPG missile flying near us, so we didn’t enter Kfar Aza and continued to the outposts, then to Sderot.” The debrief viewed their conduct negatively, but they did not flee or hide, instead reaching the Sderot checkpoint and engaging in heavy fighting with the terrorists there.
7:08 a.m.: More than 40 terrorists breach the weakened defense line at the base and begin firing at its buildings. Cpt. Shir Eilat, the lookout officer, hears them approaching the command post door and physically raises her orders according to the "position abandonment procedure." 4-5 staff officers from the Golani 13th Battalion stay with the lookouts and do not exit to fight.
7:30 a.m.: Major B., commander of Company B, is occupied with blocking a Nukhba unit attempting to infiltrate the Nahal Oz kibbutz. Major Har-Aven returns to the base with his Namer APC and sprays terrorists in his path with a MAG machine gun. At this point, an anti-tank missile is fired at him, severing his hand almost completely.
7:41 a.m.: The first airstrike, by a UAV, disrupts the movement of terrorists in a field adjacent to the base.
7:55 a.m.: Major Har-Aven retreats slightly due to his injury and meets his friend, Major B., the second-in-command, at the gatehouse to receive help with the kibbutz sector. The two plan an assault on the captured base with two tanks and a Namer APC. Major B. tells his injured friend, still on his feet: “Let’s go, it’s just you and me against the world.”
7:56 a.m.: In these minutes, moments of heroic valor are seen in the fortified rooms. Captain Eden Nimri, commander of a Sky Rider team, manages firefights with terrorists surrounding the shelter alongside four of her soldiers. Female soldiers throw back two grenades thrown at them; the third explodes and injures them. The chaos is used by 11 other female soldiers to escape to another shelter. The terrorists follow them, but a UAV strikes nearby as they are at the door, forcing the terrorists to flee, and the 11 soldiers survive.
Captain Eden Nimri
8:00 a.m.: Major Har-Aven begins fighting inside the outpost with the tank but realizes it is ineffective compared to the Namer APC. He decides to exit because the terrorists flee whenever they see the armored vehicles, while they continue slaughtering the rear-echelon soldiers in the camp. It is difficult for his three Namer soldiers to exit into the hellish scene, but he urges them: “This is why we enlisted, this is what we swore to.” They go out with him into the battle for their lives, as their commander bleeds and has his hand severed. Few against many, they charge and kill terrorists, but deadly fire from four directions hits them. Major Har-Aven and two soldiers are killed. The radio operator, Soldier S., takes a bullet to his weapon but continues to fight.
8:54 a.m.: Nahal Oz base is finally overrun. The two tanks inside attempt to evacuate casualties, including Major Har-Aven and his soldiers. Eventually, they make the difficult decision to exit towards the border to block the continuing invasion. At this point, around 200 terrorists flood the base. The small armored team, along with a platoon sergeant from Golani, takes position in a field between the base and the border, facing 60 terrorists of the third wave rushing toward them. The soldiers charge forward, absorbing anti-tank missiles and heavy fire, killing terrorists until they, too, are overrun.
9:00 a.m.- 12:00 p.m.: The toughest hours at Nahal Oz base. Terrorists move from shelter to shelter, from room to room, including killing soldiers from the Balloon Observation Unit. Air support struggles to assess the situation due to the chaos, smoke, and fires, but succeeds in some disruption strikes around 11:00 a.m. Combat helicopter pilots identify a Humvee stolen by terrorists from the base but suspect it may contain kidnapped soldiers, so they refrain from attacking it. Tracker Ibrahim Kharuba from the village of Marar, raised in the Paratroopers Brigade, guards with two other soldiers the room where the lookouts are hiding. The northern brigade commander instructs him: “Act according to your judgment, you’re the commander there now.” The terrorists call on him in Arabic to surrender. He calls his family to say goodbye, telling the female soldiers, “It has been an honor to die for the country and for you.” He goes to charge and is shot dead.
12:00 p.m.: The command post and adjacent room where 22 soldiers, including lookouts and five staff officers from Golani, are sheltering, are set on fire. Most die from the flames or suffocate from the smoke, but some manage to escape by crawling out through a small window. Investigators struggled to assign blame to those present in the situation, who were simply trying to survive, but concluded, “In the IDF, an officer should leave after a soldier, and a female soldier after a female soldier.” Senior fire investigators who examined the scene found no evidence of harmful chemicals or accelerants used.
1:30 p.m.: The first reinforcements from Shayetet 13 and the YAMAM counterterrorism unit begin arriving and find only one or two terrorist cells that hadn’t managed to retreat back to Gaza. Nahal Oz base is mostly in ruins, with bodies, fire, and smoke.
Conclusions, lessons and recommendations
Lt. Col. Tomer Greenberg, commander of Golani Brigade's 13th Battalion, who later fell in combat in Gaza, had conducted numerous drills for his forces from Nahal Oz, including one just before the massacre, emphasizing the need to be prepared for a surprise attack. However, no exercises simulated an attack on the base itself, which was not organic and included forces from different units that did not know each other—this proved detrimental on the morning of October 7:
The collection battalion’s forces, including the lookouts and the Balloon Unit, were too dispersed across bases in Orim, Re’im and Nahal Oz, contributing to the loss of control and operational confusion in real time.
Lt. Col. Tomer Greenberg
Although the command post was closest to enemy territory, it wasn’t designated as a defensive target and was only prepared against rocket and mortar threats, with only a fire extinguisher assigned in case of fire.
The division didn’t rehearse scenarios with the brigade, which didn’t train the Nahal Oz battalion, and so on for an attack scenario on the base.
The lack of coverage for the base’s western positions was a critical and dangerous failure.
Base staff officers were sleeping with their weapons not at hand, despite being only 15 minutes from the Gaza Strip.
The debrief concluded:
Operational norms were lacking.
A minimum number of forces must be assigned to the outpost at all times.
Multi-unit bases should be discontinued.
Command climate was deficient.
The battle at the base represents a profound and painful systemic failure that touches upon the core values of the IDF. While there were moments of heroic valor and exceptional resourcefulness from soldiers and officers, there were also soldiers and commanders who did not seek contact.
The investigation did not examine the lookout warnings prior to the war and how the commanders responded to them, but they clearly warned about the threat. This needs to be investigated separately. Also, the way the IDF handled the bereaved families from the base after October 7 should be reviewed.link
At trial, Netanyahu says heads of Mossad and Shin Bet working against him
Earlier today, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly accused heads of Mossad and Shin Bet of working against him during a hearing of his criminal trial in the Tel Aviv District Court, and claimed they were part of a “junta” against him.
Netanyahu’s defense attorney Amit Hadad was asking the prime minister about negative media articles against him on the Walla news website, ahead of the 2015 elections, including an opinion article by a former head of the Shin Bet.
“It’s not new that heads of the Shin Ben and Mossad are against me, they’re all part of the same word that begins with [the Hebrew letter] Heth,” the prime minister said, as cited by Ynet. He later clarified that he was referring to the word “junta.”
He also said those he was accusing of acting against him were “not only former officials,” indicating he believed current position-holders were part of such efforts as well.
Netanyahu has in the past claimed the “deep state” is persecuting him, including officials in the judicial system, law enforcement agencies and the media. He claimed today at the Knesset that the “deep state” was conspiring to form a biased investigative committee of the October 7 disaster. linkNetanyahu creates these conspiracy theories to get his base up in arms and in order to destroy the credibility of the most respected government security bodies just as he has done with the judicial system. And no one should forget that it was Netanyahu who appointed Dede Barnea the Mossad Chief as well as others such as outgoing Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy who have spoken about the shirking of responsibility by the political leaders, meaning specifically Netanyahu. Netanyahu's hatred of Ronen Bar reached a peak 2 weeks ago when it was announced that the Shin Bet was opening an investigation into the Prime Minister's office personnel who are involved in 'Qatar-gate', persons in his office who were simultaneously employed by Qatar to give Qatar a good name throughout the war. It is widely assumed that Netanyahu's hand was very involved either directly or indirectly. We have seen a very long history of people who have said things against Netanyahu becoming his targets and the same is going on here.
Alongside Halevi and Zamir, president calls for state inquiry into October 7
Hosting the outgoing IDF chief of staff and his replacement, President Isaac Herzog calls for a state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks.
“I completely agree with you,” he tells Lt. Gen. (res.) Herzi Halevi, who stepped down today, “a state commission of inquiry must be established in order to learn, draw lessons, know how to improve, and how to prevent such disasters in the future.”
Halevi stressed the need for such a commission in his farewell speech. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adamantly opposes such an inquiry, arguing it would be partisan and biased. FULL ARTICLEThe majority of the Israeli public, almost 80%. and all of the politicians except for Netanyahu and his cronies, and all of the heads of the security forces are all calling for a State Commission of Inquiry. Amongst the politicians and security heads are people who know that they will also be implicated in some degree for what led up to October 7, yet some, if not all of their integrity remains and they want what is best for the state and our future. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about Netanyahu or his cronies. They all lack integrity and are firstly focused on their own self interests above those of the state and the people
The Region and the World
US formally redesignates Yemen’s Houthis as foreign terrorist organization
Houthi supporters hold posters showing slain Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during an anti-Israel and anti-American rally in Sanaa, Yemen, August 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman,File)
The United States formally redesignates Yemen’s Houthi movement as a “foreign terrorist organization,” according to a statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The announcement is in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s announcement three days after entering office last month.
The move imposes harsher economic penalties than Joe Biden’s administration had applied to the Iran-aligned group, known formally as Ansar Allah, in response to its attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and against US warships defending the critical maritime chokepoint.
At the start of his presidential term in 2021, Biden had dropped the terrorist designation that was applied by Trump during his first term, aiming to address humanitarian concerns inside Yemen. Confronted with the Red Sea attacks, Biden last year designated the group as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organization. But his administration held off on applying the harsher foreign terrorist organization designation.
**Bribery, Gas, Al-Jazeera, and Billions: How Qatar Extends Its Reach Across the Globe**
Qatar's attempt to influence policy in Israel through the Prime Minister's spokesperson aligns with the emirate's modus operandi—similar investigations have been launched in the U.S., France, and the European Parliament. Alongside bribery payments, Qatar leverages its vast gas reserves and its popular media network to sway global decision-makers. "Qatar infiltrates every crack and corner it can," explains Dr. Yoel Guzansky.
In recent weeks, it has been revealed how Qatar uses its immense wealth to try to influence the Prime Minister's inner circle and other policymakers in Israel. However, a broader look at Qatar's activities shows that Israel is not alone: Qatar's influence network, which includes paying key figures to shape policy, massive investments in powerful countries, operating the Al-Jazeera network, and using natural gas as a powerful lever, reaches nearly every corner of the globe.
### Qatar's Method: How the Tiny Nation Extends Its Reach Worldwide
The Qatari pattern of influence exposed in Israel has allegedly been repeated in the U.S., France, and the European Parliament. In 2022, the "Qatargate" scandal came to light, where Qatar allegedly bribed a sitting and a former member of the European Parliament to influence votes in Qatar's favor. In a similar case in France, the emirate paid several figures, including a journalist and a former parliament member, to promote its interests in the country, allegedly in violation of French law.
In the U.S., Senator Bob Menendez was convicted just a month ago after accepting bribes from Qatar in exchange for advancing the interests of the Qatari royal family. "They act cunningly, using their deep pockets," explains Dr. Yoel Guzansky, head of the Gulf Research Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
### Bribery, Gas, and Investments: Qatar's Tools of Influence
Bribing key figures is just one tool in Qatar's arsenal—the tiny emirate is also one of the world's largest gas exporters. Most of its exports go to countries in the East, such as China, South Korea, and India, but European countries also rely on it, especially since the war in Ukraine began. "Qatar's gas gives it enormous influence. Europe needs Qatari gas, and the world has become more dependent on it after the Russian supply was cut off," Guzansky explains.
Another lever Qatar uses is its massive investments in countries where it seeks to gain influence, through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). For example, in recent years, Qatar has announced investments of $45 billion in the U.S., $10 billion in France, and $25 billion in Germany. Simultaneously, Qatar acquires key assets in these countries, such as Barclays Bank and Heathrow Airport in the U.K., and Deutsche Bank and Volkswagen in Germany.
A fourth tool used by the Al Thani family, which rules Qatar, is the Al-Jazeera media network. Funded by the Qatari government, the network wields enormous influence in the Arab world, broadcasting messages that serve Qatar's interests to hundreds of millions of viewers in over 100 countries.
"Al-Jazeera is more than just a TV network; it's an entire media apparatus that gives Qatar a lot of power," Guzansky elaborates. "There isn't a home in the Arab world where Al-Jazeera isn't present. Beyond its anti-Israel stance, it promotes many messages against Arab countries and in favor of Qatar. It also airs a lot of content against the West."
### Qatar's Special Focus on the U.S.
Guzansky explains that Qatar places particular emphasis on the U.S.: "Qatar's relationship with Washington is one of its most important priorities, and it pours a lot of money into the U.S. Qatar is important to the U.S. in three ways—its weight in the energy market, its ability to mediate between the U.S. and hostile countries or organizations, and its permission for the U.S. to use military bases on its soil."
### "Infiltration into Every Crack to Increase Its Influence"
Qatar does not pursue influence in countries around the world just for the sake of influence, but as a means to safeguard its security, Guzansky explains: "In Qatar's foreign policy, the pragmatic-opportunistic component carries more weight than the ideological-religious one, although both exist. Qatar chases influence and status, infiltrating every crack and corner it can to enhance its influence. The more influential and involved it becomes, the more its national security is bolstered. Influence is a means to achieve its security goals."
The Qatari money invested in Hamas—approximately $30 million per month for years, with Israeli approval—is just one part of its broader strategy to gain influence. "Qatar sees Hamas and the Palestinian issue as a gateway to extraordinary influence in the Arab world, positioning itself as a country that protects the weak and vulnerable," Guzansky explains.
### A Small, Bold, and Contradictory Nation
"Qatar is a very small country sandwiched between Iran and Saudi Arabia. That's why it spreads money everywhere and mitigates its risks. It is a misunderstood, audacious, and contradictory nation," he concludes.
In recent weeks, it was reported in *Hamahadura Hamekori (Central Broadcast News)* that Eli Peldstein, former military spokesperson for Prime Minister Netanyahu, led extensive media efforts to promote Qatar's image in Israel after being employed by an internationally funded Qatari company. In another investigation published in the program, it was revealed that during the war, Qatar tried to reach out to the families of hostages to improve the emirate's problematic image. link
Personal Stories
59 Hostages Remain in Gaza - Their Stories (5 a day)
Inbar Hyman, z"l
Age 27, Petah Tikva
Inbar, z"l, was kidnapped from the Nova festival in Re'im and was seen in a video being taken unconscious by terrorists into Gaza. Inbar was at the Nova festival with friends, volunteering as a "trip sitter" to help partygoers in distress. She fled with two Israelis—Priel Biton and Rom Dahari—and was pursued by two terrorists for three hours. Around 1:00 PM, the terrorists caught up with them. One of them overpowered Inbar. A motorcycle arriving from Kibbutz Be'eri, carrying armed terrorists, murdered and kidnapped Inbar to Gaza. Inbar was a visual communications student and the partner of Alon. The two studied together at WIZO Haifa, and she was supposed to start her fourth year. She was a graffiti artist who worked in Israel and abroad under her signature tag, "Pink." Since her abduction, graffiti artists in Israel and around the world have taken to the streets, spraying "Free Pink." On December 15, her family was informed that Inbar had been murdered in Hamas captivity, and her body is being held by the terrorist organization.
Ofra Kedem, z"l
Age 70, Be'eri
Ofra, z"l, was kidnapped from Be'eri. She went for a walk in the kibbutz, and her trail disappeared at 6:30 AM when she was abducted. Her husband, Sami, who suffered from Parkinson's and was confined to a couch, was murdered. Their daughter, Yael, who has a mild intellectual disability, was alone in the safe room when the explosions began. She realized something was wrong, entered the safe room, and called her brothers and aunt for help. With incredible strength, after the terrorists set the house on fire, she decided to leave the safe room and bravely called for help. Miraculously, a convoy of soldiers passing by heard her and saved her life. Ofra worked for twenty years in the calf nursery, and after it closed, she moved to work in the petting zoo, where she still worked. Her afternoons were always dedicated to her grandchildren. On December 1, 2023, her family was informed that Ofra had been murdered in Hamas captivity.
Sahar Baruch, z"l
Age 25, Be'eri
Sahar, z"l, was registered to study at Ben-Gurion University and was supposed to start electrical engineering this year but never got the chance. The week after October 7, he planned to travel to Be'er Sheva to choose an apartment. A month before the cursed Sabbath, he returned from a long trip to South America and had also completed parts of the Israel National Trail. He was an excellent chess player, loved anime and sci-fi movies, and was sharp, intelligent, and realistic. His family describes him as having a silly and kind sense of humor. He was the second of four brothers, born to parents Tami and Roni. On October 7, he was at his mother's house with his brother, Idan. Early in the morning, grenades were thrown into the house, and Idan was injured by shrapnel. Sahar cared for Idan throughout the ordeal. They entered the safe room and tried to lock it from the inside but failed, so they barricaded themselves using a closet. The terrorists set the house on fire, and despite understanding the danger outside, they decided to jump out. Sahar told his mother, "Dying in a fire is more painful." Idan likely jumped first, and Sahar stayed behind to look for Idan's inhaler. Contact with them was lost around 12:00 PM. A few days later, the family was informed of Idan's confirmed death, having been shot in the head. Sahar was considered missing until about three weeks after October 7, when the family was informed he had been kidnapped. No further details were known about him. Sahar's grandmother, Gola Bachar, z"l, was also murdered in the kibbutz. Sahar was killed during a rescue attempt on December 7, and Kibbutz Be'eri announced his murder two days after the operation. At this time, it is unclear whether he was killed by IDF fire or Hamas terrorists. His body remains in Gaza.
Col. Asaf Hamami, z"l
Age 41, Kiryat Ono
Col. Asaf Hamami, z"l, served as the commander of the Southern Brigade of the Gaza Division. On October 7, he fell in battle. His body was kidnapped to Gaza along with the bodies of Sgt. Maj. Tomer Yaakov Ahimas, his communications officer, and Sgt. Kirill Brodsky, a soldier in his command post. Hamami, 41, a resident of Kiryat Ono, is survived by his wife and three children. Before serving as the Southern Brigade commander, he also commanded the Negev Brigade and previously served as the commander of the Commando Brigade's training base and as the commander of the Tzabar Battalion in the Givati Brigade. On December 2, 2023, 57 days after Black Saturday, the IDF permitted the announcement of his death.
Guy Illouz, z"l
Age 26, Ra'anana
Guy, z"l, left the Nova festival in Re'im with ten friends when the rocket fire began. In body camera footage from the terrorists, they are seen arriving at Guy's jeep and killing everyone inside. At the edge of the frame, someone is seen fleeing—likely Guy. Guy called MDA (Magen David Adon) and reported that there was a terrorist cell and that he was hiding behind a tree, injured and bleeding, requesting a helicopter. The MDA dispatcher connected him to his father, Michel, and Guy said, "Dad, I just wanted to tell you I love you." Michel got in his car and raced to the area, searching for Guy among a pile of bodies. Two days later, he located the jeep in the field, shot up and covered in blood. Military representatives told his father they had evidence that Guy had been taken to Gaza. Guy was a musician, a guitarist, and worked as a sound engineer with artists like Mati Caspi, Shalom Hanoch, and the band HaYehudim. His family was informed on November 30, 2023, that he had been murdered, and his body is being held by Hamas.
Acronyms and Glossary
COGAT - Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague
IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague
IPS - Israel Prison System
MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp
PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen
PMO- Prime Minister's Office
UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission
Join my Whatsapp update group https://chat.whatsapp.com/IQ3OtwE6ydxBeBAxWNziB0 Twitter - @LonnyB58
People welcome former hostage Omer Wenkert as he returns to his home in Gedera, March 4, 2025. (Jonathan Shaul/Flash90)
Former hostage Omer Wenkert thanks the crowd as he returns to his home in Gedera, March 4, 2025. (Jonathan Shaul/Flash90)
Destruction in Gaza
According to the plan, $53 billion will be required for the rehabilitation. The ruins in northern Gaza Strip | Photo: Khalil Kahalot, Flash 90 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Photo: Reuters) Unwilling to suffer another blow. 
Hamas terrorists attack the IDF’s Nahal Oz base on October 7, 2023, as seen in footage released by the terror group. (Screenshot: Telegram)
Hostage Matan Angrest in a first image released by his family from Hamas captivity, March 3, 2025. (Courtesy)
Lt. Hadar Goldin, whose body is being held in Gaza after he was killed fighting in the Strip on August 1, 2014. (courtesy)
Ruby Chen holds a poster of his son, Itay Chen, during a protest near the Knesset in Jerusalem, on March 9, 2024. (Ohad Zwigenberg/AP)
Hamas terrorists attack the IDF’s Nahal Oz base on October 7, 2023, as seen in footage released by the terror group. (Screenshot: Telegram)
Illustrative: Shin Bet head Ronen Bar (R) and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi (L) hold an assessment with senior officers in southern Gaza’s Khan Younis, December 11, 2023. (Israel Defense Forces)
Hamas breaking through the fence barrier
Hamas terrorists in Kfar Aza
Inbar, z"l, was kidnapped from the Nova festival in Re'im and was seen in a video being taken unconscious by terrorists into Gaza. Inbar was at the Nova festival with friends, volunteering as a "trip sitter" to help partygoers in distress. She fled with two Israelis—Priel Biton and Rom Dahari—and was pursued by two terrorists for three hours. Around 1:00 PM, the terrorists caught up with them. One of them overpowered Inbar. A motorcycle arriving from Kibbutz Be'eri, carrying armed terrorists, murdered and kidnapped Inbar to Gaza. Inbar was a visual communications student and the partner of Alon. The two studied together at WIZO Haifa, and she was supposed to start her fourth year. She was a graffiti artist who worked in Israel and abroad under her signature tag, "Pink." Since her abduction, graffiti artists in Israel and around the world have taken to the streets, spraying "Free Pink." On December 15, her family was informed that Inbar had been murdered in Hamas captivity, and her body is being held by the terrorist organization.
Ofra, z"l, was kidnapped from Be'eri. She went for a walk in the kibbutz, and her trail disappeared at 6:30 AM when she was abducted. Her husband, Sami, who suffered from Parkinson's and was confined to a couch, was murdered. Their daughter, Yael, who has a mild intellectual disability, was alone in the safe room when the explosions began. She realized something was wrong, entered the safe room, and called her brothers and aunt for help. With incredible strength, after the terrorists set the house on fire, she decided to leave the safe room and bravely called for help. Miraculously, a convoy of soldiers passing by heard her and saved her life. Ofra worked for twenty years in the calf nursery, and after it closed, she moved to work in the petting zoo, where she still worked. Her afternoons were always dedicated to her grandchildren. On December 1, 2023, her family was informed that Ofra had been murdered in Hamas captivity.
Sahar, z"l, was registered to study at Ben-Gurion University and was supposed to start electrical engineering this year but never got the chance. The week after October 7, he planned to travel to Be'er Sheva to choose an apartment. A month before the cursed Sabbath, he returned from a long trip to South America and had also completed parts of the Israel National Trail. He was an excellent chess player, loved anime and sci-fi movies, and was sharp, intelligent, and realistic. His family describes him as having a silly and kind sense of humor. He was the second of four brothers, born to parents Tami and Roni. On October 7, he was at his mother's house with his brother, Idan. Early in the morning, grenades were thrown into the house, and Idan was injured by shrapnel. Sahar cared for Idan throughout the ordeal. They entered the safe room and tried to lock it from the inside but failed, so they barricaded themselves using a closet. The terrorists set the house on fire, and despite understanding the danger outside, they decided to jump out. Sahar told his mother, "Dying in a fire is more painful." Idan likely jumped first, and Sahar stayed behind to look for Idan's inhaler. Contact with them was lost around 12:00 PM. A few days later, the family was informed of Idan's confirmed death, having been shot in the head. Sahar was considered missing until about three weeks after October 7, when the family was informed he had been kidnapped. No further details were known about him. Sahar's grandmother, Gola Bachar, z"l, was also murdered in the kibbutz. Sahar was killed during a rescue attempt on December 7, and Kibbutz Be'eri announced his murder two days after the operation. At this time, it is unclear whether he was killed by IDF fire or Hamas terrorists. His body remains in Gaza.
Col. Asaf Hamami, z"l, served as the commander of the Southern Brigade of the Gaza Division. On October 7, he fell in battle. His body was kidnapped to Gaza along with the bodies of Sgt. Maj. Tomer Yaakov Ahimas, his communications officer, and Sgt. Kirill Brodsky, a soldier in his command post. Hamami, 41, a resident of Kiryat Ono, is survived by his wife and three children. Before serving as the Southern Brigade commander, he also commanded the Negev Brigade and previously served as the commander of the Commando Brigade's training base and as the commander of the Tzabar Battalion in the Givati Brigade. On December 2, 2023, 57 days after Black Saturday, the IDF permitted the announcement of his death.
Guy, z"l, left the Nova festival in Re'im with ten friends when the rocket fire began. In body camera footage from the terrorists, they are seen arriving at Guy's jeep and killing everyone inside. At the edge of the frame, someone is seen fleeing—likely Guy. Guy called MDA (Magen David Adon) and reported that there was a terrorist cell and that he was hiding behind a tree, injured and bleeding, requesting a helicopter. The MDA dispatcher connected him to his father, Michel, and Guy said, "Dad, I just wanted to tell you I love you." Michel got in his car and raced to the area, searching for Guy among a pile of bodies. Two days later, he located the jeep in the field, shot up and covered in blood. Military representatives told his father they had evidence that Guy had been taken to Gaza. Guy was a musician, a guitarist, and worked as a sound engineer with artists like Mati Caspi, Shalom Hanoch, and the band HaYehudim. His family was informed on November 30, 2023, that he had been murdered, and his body is being held by Hamas.
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