π️Lonny's War Update- October 272, 2023 - July 4, 2024 π️
π️Day 272 that 120 of our hostages in Hamas captivity
**There is nothing more important than getting them home! NOTHING!**
“I’ve never met them,But I miss them. I’ve never met them,but I think of them every second. I’ve never met them,but they are my family. BRING THEM HOME NOW!!!”
There is no victory until all of the hostages are home!ΧΧΧ Χ Χ¦ΧΧΧ Χ’Χ Χ©ΧΧ ΧΧΧΧΧ€ΧΧ ΧΧΧΧͺ
Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements
*4:05pm last night - north - rockets Manara, Kiryat Shemona*4:10pm last night- south- rockets Gaza border communities -*4:15pm last night- south - rockets Kfar Maimon- 5 rockets hit in open areas- direct hit on home in Kfar Maimon by shoulder launched anti aircraft missile*5:00pm last night- north- rockets Shtula, Netua*5:30pm last night- north- rockets -Kfar Giladi, Beit Hillel, Misgav Am, Kiryat Shemona, Tel Hai*6:20pm last night- north-rockets-Kfar Giladi, Tel Hai, Odem, El ROM, Misgav AmHizbollah launched over 100 rockets in retaliation for the killing of a Hizbollah senior terrorist *6:40pm last night- north -rockets Kfar Szold * from 11:00am, over 200 rockets and 40 explosive UAVs launched against the north causing large fires in over 10 different locations11:10am - south - rockets Nahal Oz
** The army announced that the victim of the terror attack in Carmiel was a soldier-Sergeant Alexander Yakimonski, 19 from Nahariya. He managed to kill the terrorist before he succumbed to his stab wounds
The army announced the death of a soldier killed in battle in northern Gaza- Captain Ro'e Miller, 21 from Herzliya
May their memories forever be a blessing
Hostage Updates
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office says Hamas is continuing to insist in the hostage talks that a clause be included barring Israel from resuming fighting after phase one of the deal.
Israel sought to maintain a clause in its previous proposal that was written vaguely enough so as to allow it to resume fighting if it deems that Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement.
Already last month, two officials familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel that the primary issue complicating negotiations is that Hamas is demanding an Israeli guarantee up front that it will agree to a permanent ceasefire.
Hostage Updates
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office says Hamas is continuing to insist in the hostage talks that a clause be included barring Israel from resuming fighting after phase one of the deal.
Israel sought to maintain a clause in its previous proposal that was written vaguely enough so as to allow it to resume fighting if it deems that Hamas is not abiding by the terms of the agreement.
Already last month, two officials familiar with the matter told The Times of Israel that the primary issue complicating negotiations is that Hamas is demanding an Israeli guarantee up front that it will agree to a permanent ceasefire.
Israel says it’s studying latest Hamas response to Gaza ceasefire-hostage deal
Senior Israeli official says terror group’s updated proposal gives more room for a possible agreement but stresses gaps still significant, suggests Netanyahu’s office harming talks Israel said Wednesday evening that it had received Hamas’s response to the latest truce-hostage deal outline, and would evaluate the document before replying.
A statement from the Mossad distributed by the Prime Minister’s Office said that mediators “have conveyed” to Israel’s negotiators “Hamas’s remarks on the outline of the hostages deal.”
“Israel is evaluating the remarks and will convey its reply to the mediators,” the brief statement added. Hamas later confirmed that it had submitted its latest demands, issuing a statement that it is “eager to reach an agreement to stop the war, and our communication with the mediators continues.”
“We exchanged some ideas with the mediators with the goal of stopping the war and the full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip,” the terror group said, claiming that it is being flexible in its demands, while Israel is “trying to deceive and evade.” In a later statement, Hamas said its Qatar-based politburo leader Ismail Haniyeh had spoken with mediators in Qatar and Egypt regarding the ideas being discussed. It added that talks have also been held with Turkish officials regarding recent developments.
“The movement dealt in a positive spirit with the content of the ongoing deliberations,” it said.
More than six months of negotiations carried out by mediators including the US, Qatar and Egypt have time and again failed to advance toward a deal that would see the release of the 116 hostages kidnapped on October 7 who are believed to remain captive in Gaza, a truce or ceasefire in fighting in Gaza, and the release of hundreds of Palestinian security prisoners. Full article
Gaza
- **Israeli courtship of Gaza clans, who refuse to cooperate: "Hamas will take revenge on us"**
The Israeli plan for the day after the war includes integrating five clans into the civilian government that will be established in Gaza. At this stage, the move is encountering difficulties: Hamas is still on the ground, and influential families in Gaza refuse to "talk to the enemy": "We are not collaborators, Israel needs to stop playing games." Hamas threatens: "The response will be lethal"
The plan presented by Israel for the reality in Gaza after the war includes cooperation with influential local families, who will take part in managing the Strip. The contacts between Israel and the Gazan clans are currently encountering many difficulties: at this stage, Hamas is still operating in the Strip and taking a harsh and cruel approach, and family representatives don't want to be the ones "talking to the enemy." Israel is under pressure from Washington to end the war after almost nine months, but doesn't want Hamas to continue ruling the Strip even when the war ends. Israeli sources are trying to find the outline for the "day after," a central part of which is forming an alternative civilian government.
That government will include, according to statements by Israeli officials, Palestinian elements that are not part of the Hamas government and will be willing to cooperate with Israel. Israel's only potential partners in Gaza are the heads of the central clans. According to conversations Reuters had with five representatives of such families, at this stage the clans do not want to take part in the process. Tahani Mustafa, a senior Palestinian analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that Israel is looking for local families and tribes on the ground to cooperate with. "They refused," Mustafa emphasized, who is in contact with some of the families. "They don't want to be involved in this, partly because they fear revenge from Hamas."
Israel's goal is to collapse Hamas's rule, but members of the terrorist organization are still operating in the streets of Gaza, enforcing the terrorist organization's policies and terrorizing Gazans. When Ismail al-Thawabta, head of Hamas government's communications office, was asked what would happen to a family that cooperates with Israel, he said he expects the response to be "lethal." Reuters noted that in an interview last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the Defense Ministry tried to contact Gazan clans - but Hamas "eliminated them." He claimed that the Defense Ministry devised a new plan, which he did not detail, but emphasized that he would not return control in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. During his visit to Washington last week, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said: "The only solution for Gaza's future is governance by local Palestinians. It can't be Israel and it can't be Hamas." One plan that came up is the "bubbles" plan, but yesterday a source familiar with the details said it was a "fantastical" plan.
In Gaza, there are dozens of organized and influential clans, and many of them have no official connection to Hamas. These clans have gained their power through local businesses and the loyalty of hundreds, if not thousands, of family members. At the head of each clan is a leader called a mukhtar. During the British Mandate, the British relied on these mukhtars to control the area. When Hamas rose to power in Gaza, it reduced the influence of the clans, but they still enjoy a certain level of autonomy. One of the clan leaders in Gaza, who asked not to be named, told Reuters that Israeli sources have contacted several mukhtars in recent weeks (he was not among them, and has no connection to Hamas). He said the Israelis were looking for "respected and influential people" to help transfer aid to Palestinians in northern Gaza.
Reuters noted that in the last two weeks, sources from the Defense Ministry contacted two Gazan businessmen, senior figures in the food sector. These businessmen refused to hold the talks. "We are not collaborators, Israel needs to stop with these games," said a member of one of the clans. National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi said last week that the government authorized the IDF to search for "local leadership, willing to live alongside Israel and not dedicating their lives to murdering Israelis." He said the process began in northern Gaza, and practical results should come soon.
Besides establishing a new civilian government, the Israeli plan for Gaza's future also includes an external security force to maintain order. Arab countries whose support Israel needs have said they will not take part in the process if Israel does not agree to a timeline for establishing a Palestinian state - a move that Netanyahu emphasized he opposes.
During the war, Washington supports reforms aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority and preparing it to control Gaza, as it did before Hamas came to power. Netanyahu said he doesn't trust the Authority, but two American sources told Reuters that the Prime Minister may not have many choices - and the security issue will have to pass to the Authority. One of the sources referred to the expected confrontation between the sides on this issue and said: "It's going to be a battle, but for the short and medium term, there's no other option." link Netanyahu's refusals to have the Palestinian Authority take on the governing of Gaza as well as any discussions towards a Palestinian State are continuing to bring doom and disaster to our future as well as that of Gaza. These are the 2 critical elements to enable us to get out of Gaza and plan for a better future for the reason. Without these two, Hamas is guaranteed to continue its governance and military terror operations. Our security forces and Intelligence agencies understand this and know that everything else that Netanyahu and Galant are attempting to do are absolutely futile and destined to total failure. The plans to work with the clans has repeatedly failed over the last months for multiple reasons. Any one of them who has popped up with a hesitated agreement is terrorized and/or killed by Hamas. In addition, as the article explains, they have maintained a sort of autonomy from Hamas but they are all connected. Under a totalitarian government like Hamas, it is impossible to do anything without critical connections to the government. The clans were/are involved in smuggling and other criminal activities. None of them could happen for any period of time without cooperating with Hamas, so these clans either did day to day business with Hamas or were directly part of them. And, as I have written many times in the past, these clan leaders are equal to warlords and history has shown that putting warlords in positions of governance has always proven to be failures. The last case of the US doing this was in Afghanistan where hundreds of millions of dollars were given in cash to warlords along with major munitions only to find those same weapons used against US forces later on. Our only hope for an alternative to Hamas is the PA. And yes, Hamas will try to kill the PA people who will try to take over governance but the PA is prepared for this and will be backed up by joint security forces from a number of Arab States, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia just said they are willing, and others. This way, the fight to put down Hamas' military capabilities will be put in the hands of the Palestinians themselves and they know their future is not going to be with Hamas.
Hamas Day After Plan: A facade administration to conceal military control: Over the past few weeks, Hamas leaders have been engaged in talks with other Palestinian factions and select Arab states to find a formula for postwar governance in the Gaza Strip. Held mainly in Qatar and Egypt, the negotiations have not matured into a clear plan so far, but some forms of cooperation are emerging on the ground in parts of the embattled enclave.
Both the Hamas Executive Committee (based in Doha) and Yahya al-Sinwar’s circle of military leaders (currently hiding in Gaza tunnels) have apparently come to realise that the group cannot continue ruling Gaza on its own and must therefore look for partners. In particular, they fear that no foreign reconstruction funding will be forthcoming unless they help install a different type of administration nominally led by other Palestinian players. Yet they are also confident that they can deter Arab states and other foreign powers from sending forces to Gaza even if they are compelled to go underground indefinitely. In fact, senior Hamas officials such as Osama Hamdan are on record threatening to fight any non-Palestinian presence deployed to police or manage the Strip.
To balance these potentially conflicting objectives, Hamas officials have informed their interlocutors that they are willing to support the formation of either a “technocratic government” or one composed of factions that agree to Palestinian “reconciliation”. They have also insisted that security issues not be part of this government’s authority. In other words, Hamas is happy to let others shoulder civil responsibilities while it focuses on rebuilding its armed networks behind the scenes.
Intra-Palestinian Maneuvers
Hamas has held countless rounds of discussions with delegates from the rival Fatah movement over the past decade and a half, and none of them produced a viable compromise. The same is true for talks held during the current war by such disparate hosts as Algeria, China, Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar, and Russia. The conditions that Hamas has laid out for “national reconciliation” are clearly aimed at removing Fatah’s grip over the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization – namely, by establishing “unified leadership” over the PLO, forming a “consensus government” in the PA, and holding new presidential and general elections.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has rejected these demands so long as Hamas refuses to abide by the PLO’s commitment to the Oslo Accords with Israel. (Hamas’ charter does not recognize Israel and has explicitly called for its destruction.) Yet Jibril Rajoub and certain other influential members of the Fatah Central Committee have advocated for cooperating with Hamas on some issues while deferring controversial matters to a later phase. In turn, Hamas is trying to widen the fissures within Fatah and find more officials who may be willing to go along with its vision for postwar Gaza.
On June 12, several ex-PLO and PA officials held an unprecedented meeting in Ramallah and signed an initiative calling for the inclusion of additional factions, meaning Hamas. The PA security services had blocked previous attempts to arrange such meetings in the West Bank. This time, Ahmed Ghneim and other veteran Fatah figures joined the challenge to President Abbas and were “encouraged” to retract their endorsement once their participation became known. Hamas also believes that many Fatah loyalists in Gaza – including thousands of former employees who still receive (reduced) salaries from the PA – may be willing to participate in a new system of governance there.
Toward that end, top Hamas figures have held intensive deliberations with former senior Fatah official Mohammad Dahlan’s “Reformist Democratic Current” since the war began, initially focusing on the coordination and distribution of aid in Gaza with financing from the United Arab Emirates. They have also established “Emergency Committees” in various parts of the Strip.
A former security chief in Gaza until 2007 and a long-reputed foe of Hamas, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah in 2011 and charged with playing a role in the claimed “assassination” of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. He now resides in Abu Dhabi and enjoys support from the Emirati ruling family. Although he has often declared that Gaza’s future should be “No Abbas, No Hamas,” the current war has seen him deploy trusted assistants to Egypt to orchestrate aid deliveries while empowering his top confidant in Gaza, Osama al-Fara, to keep in close touch with local Hamas commanders. Meanwhile, his ally Nasser al-Qudwa – a former PA foreign minister – maintains close contacts with Hamas in Qatar. Both Dahlan and Qudwa are now publicly arguing that the Gaza crisis cannot be solved without Hamas’ participation or, at least, consent. A similar stance has been attributed to Marwan Barghouti, the popular Fatah leader who is serving a life sentence in an Israeli jail and is a potential candidate for release if the parties reach a deal for swapping hostages and prisoners.
Former senior Fatah figure Mohammed Dahlan is offering limited cooperation with Hamas’ plans (Image: X/Twitter)
Nevertheless, Dahlan has remained evasive about openly partnering with Hamas once hostilities subside. He apparently believes it is still too early to commit himself despite pursuing limited humanitarian and civil cooperation with the group on the ground. For Hamas, a deal with Dahlan would carry the promise of major Emirati reconstruction funding given his ties with Abu Dhabi.
In the meantime, Hamas has already convinced certain smaller PLO factions to get on board with its postwar model. Under the Damascus-based Jamil Mazhar, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has turned into a de facto junior partner of Hamas in recent years, despite its secular left-wing doctrines. Other minor factions – such as the communist Palestinian People’s Party, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and al-Saeqah – have expressed support for a broad Gaza government with Hamas as its primary backer. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups that fight alongside Hamas have accepted this objective as well.
With generous help from Qatar, Hamas also started a campaign in March asking unaffiliated Palestinian activists from Arab countries and the diaspora to press for a collaborative Hamas role in postwar Gaza. Their main idea for promoting this plan is to convene a “Palestinian National Congress” with hundreds of delegates. Preparatory meetings have already been held in Britain, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Qatar, and more are planned for the United States, Spain, Belgium, Australia, and France. This month’s meeting in Doha was chaired by Azmi Bishara, a former Israeli parliamentarian who fled the country in 2007 due to fears that he would be prosecuted for providing information to Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon war. Now employed by a Qatari government research centre, he oversaw the meeting’s adoption of resolutions that called for replacing the current PLO leadership with a new unified command.
Naturally, the PLO has condemned these calls and accused Bishara and his colleagues of being “supported and funded by regional circles.” Yet no other faction echoed this condemnation aside from the tiny “Popular Struggle Front”, demonstrating Abbas’ isolation and the growing appeal of Hamas’ proposals.
Conclusion
With thousands of its fighters still alive, Hamas is feverishly searching for new ways to stay in charge once a ceasefire is in place. Behind the facade of a Palestinian alliance, it has offered to relinquish civilian control – but only for the sake of refreshing its military arsenal, rebuilding its tunnel networks, and recruiting fresh manpower.
If Palestinian factions not directly involved in the war agree to provide such cover by forming a new Hamas-backed administration, it would make Israel’s continued task of pursuing the group’s fighters much more complicated. Even if Hamas was not formally part of said government, the flow of international aid to such a body would still benefit Hamas’ armed “wing,” which has invented many methods to cull profits from the local economy over the years. For example, according to estimates by the author and other researchers, the group has already gleaned around A$180-300 million from taxing humanitarian convoys during the current war.
To prevent the implementation of this Hamas plan for the “day after”, the United States and other Western nations could advise Arab states, the PA, and other Palestinian actors not to lend a hand to the group’s political resurrection. The following measures may be particularly effective:
Donor states could warn any Fatah members who contemplate an arrangement with Hamas that cooperating with a designated terrorist organisation has consequences. The UAE is currently the largest Arab provider of aid to Gaza and has a long tradition of combating the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ ideological parent group. As such, it may be willing to pump the brakes on any deal between Dahlan and Hamas.
Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi should be put on notice that there will be a price to pay (e.g., regarding congressional oversight of annual US military assistance) if his intelligence services and army personnel keep facilitating weapons smuggling to Hamas through Rafah’s cross-border tunnels.
Qatar should be asked to condition its aid to Gaza on barring Hamas from any role in the territory’s postwar administration.
Israel should change its declared policy and accept that a “revitalised” PA, once ready, will necessarily be invited to take over Gaza. Jerusalem should also commit to help with the territory’s reconstruction.
In the wake of the October 7 massacre, the idea of Hamas playing a role in Gaza’s governance is intolerable. A firm Western statement to this effect would go a long way toward pouring cold water on the terrorist group’s aspirations to dominate the “day after”.
Hamas Day After Plan: A facade administration to conceal military control: Over the past few weeks, Hamas leaders have been engaged in talks with other Palestinian factions and select Arab states to find a formula for postwar governance in the Gaza Strip. Held mainly in Qatar and Egypt, the negotiations have not matured into a clear plan so far, but some forms of cooperation are emerging on the ground in parts of the embattled enclave.
Both the Hamas Executive Committee (based in Doha) and Yahya al-Sinwar’s circle of military leaders (currently hiding in Gaza tunnels) have apparently come to realise that the group cannot continue ruling Gaza on its own and must therefore look for partners. In particular, they fear that no foreign reconstruction funding will be forthcoming unless they help install a different type of administration nominally led by other Palestinian players. Yet they are also confident that they can deter Arab states and other foreign powers from sending forces to Gaza even if they are compelled to go underground indefinitely. In fact, senior Hamas officials such as Osama Hamdan are on record threatening to fight any non-Palestinian presence deployed to police or manage the Strip.
To balance these potentially conflicting objectives, Hamas officials have informed their interlocutors that they are willing to support the formation of either a “technocratic government” or one composed of factions that agree to Palestinian “reconciliation”. They have also insisted that security issues not be part of this government’s authority. In other words, Hamas is happy to let others shoulder civil responsibilities while it focuses on rebuilding its armed networks behind the scenes.
Intra-Palestinian Maneuvers
Hamas has held countless rounds of discussions with delegates from the rival Fatah movement over the past decade and a half, and none of them produced a viable compromise. The same is true for talks held during the current war by such disparate hosts as Algeria, China, Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar, and Russia. The conditions that Hamas has laid out for “national reconciliation” are clearly aimed at removing Fatah’s grip over the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization – namely, by establishing “unified leadership” over the PLO, forming a “consensus government” in the PA, and holding new presidential and general elections.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has rejected these demands so long as Hamas refuses to abide by the PLO’s commitment to the Oslo Accords with Israel. (Hamas’ charter does not recognize Israel and has explicitly called for its destruction.) Yet Jibril Rajoub and certain other influential members of the Fatah Central Committee have advocated for cooperating with Hamas on some issues while deferring controversial matters to a later phase. In turn, Hamas is trying to widen the fissures within Fatah and find more officials who may be willing to go along with its vision for postwar Gaza.
On June 12, several ex-PLO and PA officials held an unprecedented meeting in Ramallah and signed an initiative calling for the inclusion of additional factions, meaning Hamas. The PA security services had blocked previous attempts to arrange such meetings in the West Bank. This time, Ahmed Ghneim and other veteran Fatah figures joined the challenge to President Abbas and were “encouraged” to retract their endorsement once their participation became known. Hamas also believes that many Fatah loyalists in Gaza – including thousands of former employees who still receive (reduced) salaries from the PA – may be willing to participate in a new system of governance there.
Toward that end, top Hamas figures have held intensive deliberations with former senior Fatah official Mohammad Dahlan’s “Reformist Democratic Current” since the war began, initially focusing on the coordination and distribution of aid in Gaza with financing from the United Arab Emirates. They have also established “Emergency Committees” in various parts of the Strip.
A former security chief in Gaza until 2007 and a long-reputed foe of Hamas, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah in 2011 and charged with playing a role in the claimed “assassination” of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. He now resides in Abu Dhabi and enjoys support from the Emirati ruling family. Although he has often declared that Gaza’s future should be “No Abbas, No Hamas,” the current war has seen him deploy trusted assistants to Egypt to orchestrate aid deliveries while empowering his top confidant in Gaza, Osama al-Fara, to keep in close touch with local Hamas commanders. Meanwhile, his ally Nasser al-Qudwa – a former PA foreign minister – maintains close contacts with Hamas in Qatar. Both Dahlan and Qudwa are now publicly arguing that the Gaza crisis cannot be solved without Hamas’ participation or, at least, consent. A similar stance has been attributed to Marwan Barghouti, the popular Fatah leader who is serving a life sentence in an Israeli jail and is a potential candidate for release if the parties reach a deal for swapping hostages and prisoners.
Former senior Fatah figure Mohammed Dahlan is offering limited cooperation with Hamas’ plans (Image: X/Twitter)
Nevertheless, Dahlan has remained evasive about openly partnering with Hamas once hostilities subside. He apparently believes it is still too early to commit himself despite pursuing limited humanitarian and civil cooperation with the group on the ground. For Hamas, a deal with Dahlan would carry the promise of major Emirati reconstruction funding given his ties with Abu Dhabi.
In the meantime, Hamas has already convinced certain smaller PLO factions to get on board with its postwar model. Under the Damascus-based Jamil Mazhar, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has turned into a de facto junior partner of Hamas in recent years, despite its secular left-wing doctrines. Other minor factions – such as the communist Palestinian People’s Party, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and al-Saeqah – have expressed support for a broad Gaza government with Hamas as its primary backer. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups that fight alongside Hamas have accepted this objective as well.
With generous help from Qatar, Hamas also started a campaign in March asking unaffiliated Palestinian activists from Arab countries and the diaspora to press for a collaborative Hamas role in postwar Gaza. Their main idea for promoting this plan is to convene a “Palestinian National Congress” with hundreds of delegates. Preparatory meetings have already been held in Britain, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Qatar, and more are planned for the United States, Spain, Belgium, Australia, and France. This month’s meeting in Doha was chaired by Azmi Bishara, a former Israeli parliamentarian who fled the country in 2007 due to fears that he would be prosecuted for providing information to Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon war. Now employed by a Qatari government research centre, he oversaw the meeting’s adoption of resolutions that called for replacing the current PLO leadership with a new unified command.
Naturally, the PLO has condemned these calls and accused Bishara and his colleagues of being “supported and funded by regional circles.” Yet no other faction echoed this condemnation aside from the tiny “Popular Struggle Front”, demonstrating Abbas’ isolation and the growing appeal of Hamas’ proposals.
Conclusion
With thousands of its fighters still alive, Hamas is feverishly searching for new ways to stay in charge once a ceasefire is in place. Behind the facade of a Palestinian alliance, it has offered to relinquish civilian control – but only for the sake of refreshing its military arsenal, rebuilding its tunnel networks, and recruiting fresh manpower.
If Palestinian factions not directly involved in the war agree to provide such cover by forming a new Hamas-backed administration, it would make Israel’s continued task of pursuing the group’s fighters much more complicated. Even if Hamas was not formally part of said government, the flow of international aid to such a body would still benefit Hamas’ armed “wing,” which has invented many methods to cull profits from the local economy over the years. For example, according to estimates by the author and other researchers, the group has already gleaned around A$180-300 million from taxing humanitarian convoys during the current war.
To prevent the implementation of this Hamas plan for the “day after”, the United States and other Western nations could advise Arab states, the PA, and other Palestinian actors not to lend a hand to the group’s political resurrection. The following measures may be particularly effective:
Donor states could warn any Fatah members who contemplate an arrangement with Hamas that cooperating with a designated terrorist organisation has consequences. The UAE is currently the largest Arab provider of aid to Gaza and has a long tradition of combating the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ ideological parent group. As such, it may be willing to pump the brakes on any deal between Dahlan and Hamas.
Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi should be put on notice that there will be a price to pay (e.g., regarding congressional oversight of annual US military assistance) if his intelligence services and army personnel keep facilitating weapons smuggling to Hamas through Rafah’s cross-border tunnels.
Qatar should be asked to condition its aid to Gaza on barring Hamas from any role in the territory’s postwar administration.
Israel should change its declared policy and accept that a “revitalised” PA, once ready, will necessarily be invited to take over Gaza. Jerusalem should also commit to help with the territory’s reconstruction.
In the wake of the October 7 massacre, the idea of Hamas playing a role in Gaza’s governance is intolerable. A firm Western statement to this effect would go a long way toward pouring cold water on the terrorist group’s aspirations to dominate the “day after”.
Ehud Yaari is the Lafer International Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a Middle East commentator for Israel’s Channel 12 television. © Washington Institute (washingtoninstitute.org), reprinted by permission, all rights reserved. link
Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria
The Hezbollah terror group announces the death of a senior commander in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon earlier today.
Hezbollah in a statement says Muhammad Nimah Nasser, also known as Abu Nimah, from the south Lebanon town of Haddatha, was killed “on the road to Jerusalem,” the terror group’s term for Israeli strikes.
Nasser was killed in a strike in the coastal city of Tyre.
Hezbollah refers to Nasser as a commander. According to reports, Nasser commanded Hezbollah’s Aziz regional division in southern Lebanon.
The terror group rarely refers to its senior operatives slain in Israeli strikes as commanders.
The only other operatives referred to as commanders were Taleb Abdullah — the commander of the Nasr regional division — killed last month, and Wissam al-Tawil — the deputy head of the terror group’s elite Radwan unit — killed by Israel in January. In its statement, Hezbollah referred to Nasser as a commander, a designation the terror group rarely uses to refer to its senior operatives slain in Israeli strikes. The only other operatives referred to as commanders were Taleb Abdullah— the commander of the Nasr regional division — killed last month, and Wissam al-Tawil — the deputy head of the terror group’s elite Radwan unit — killed by Israel in January.
Several hours after the strike, the IDF confirmed that it had killed Nasser, who it said since 2016 commanded Hezbollah’s Aziz unit, one of three regional divisions in south Lebanon. The unit is responsible for Lebanon’s southwestern region, from the coast to the Bint Jbeil area, and has carried out hundreds of attacks against northern Israel’s upper and western Galilee amid the war. According to the IDF, he is the second most senior Hezbollah commander it has killed amid the ongoing fighting alongside fellow regional division head Abdullah. Nasser previously commanded Hezbollah special forces, and was involved in numerous attacks against Israel, including the 2006 cross-border kidnapping of soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. The killing of Abdullah in June sparked an escalation in drone and rocket attacks from Lebanon on northern towns and IDF bases in the days following the airstrike, including a barrage of 215 rockets.
The IDF expected Hezbollah to also respond with major attacks to Nasser’s killing. In the hours following the airstrike, at least 100 rockets were fired from Lebanon at Kiryat Shmona, other areas in the Galilee Panhandle, as well as at the northern Golan Heights, the military said. Full article
The IDF reports in an update that Hezbollah launched some 200 rockets and 20 drones from Lebanon at northern Israel in the terror group’s major attack earlier. It says that some of the rockets and drones were shot down by air defense and fighter jets.
In response, fighter jets struck several Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon’s Ramyeh and Houla, it adds. The IDF publishes footage of some of the strikes in Lebanon and some of the interceptions.
The Hezbollah terror group announces the death of a senior commander in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon earlier today.
Hezbollah in a statement says Muhammad Nimah Nasser, also known as Abu Nimah, from the south Lebanon town of Haddatha, was killed “on the road to Jerusalem,” the terror group’s term for Israeli strikes.
Nasser was killed in a strike in the coastal city of Tyre.
Hezbollah refers to Nasser as a commander. According to reports, Nasser commanded Hezbollah’s Aziz regional division in southern Lebanon.
The terror group rarely refers to its senior operatives slain in Israeli strikes as commanders.
The only other operatives referred to as commanders were Taleb Abdullah — the commander of the Nasr regional division — killed last month, and Wissam al-Tawil — the deputy head of the terror group’s elite Radwan unit — killed by Israel in January. In its statement, Hezbollah referred to Nasser as a commander, a designation the terror group rarely uses to refer to its senior operatives slain in Israeli strikes. The only other operatives referred to as commanders were Taleb Abdullah— the commander of the Nasr regional division — killed last month, and Wissam al-Tawil — the deputy head of the terror group’s elite Radwan unit — killed by Israel in January.
Several hours after the strike, the IDF confirmed that it had killed Nasser, who it said since 2016 commanded Hezbollah’s Aziz unit, one of three regional divisions in south Lebanon. The unit is responsible for Lebanon’s southwestern region, from the coast to the Bint Jbeil area, and has carried out hundreds of attacks against northern Israel’s upper and western Galilee amid the war. According to the IDF, he is the second most senior Hezbollah commander it has killed amid the ongoing fighting alongside fellow regional division head Abdullah. Nasser previously commanded Hezbollah special forces, and was involved in numerous attacks against Israel, including the 2006 cross-border kidnapping of soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. The killing of Abdullah in June sparked an escalation in drone and rocket attacks from Lebanon on northern towns and IDF bases in the days following the airstrike, including a barrage of 215 rockets.
The IDF expected Hezbollah to also respond with major attacks to Nasser’s killing. In the hours following the airstrike, at least 100 rockets were fired from Lebanon at Kiryat Shmona, other areas in the Galilee Panhandle, as well as at the northern Golan Heights, the military said. Full article
The IDF reports in an update that Hezbollah launched some 200 rockets and 20 drones from Lebanon at northern Israel in the terror group’s major attack earlier. It says that some of the rockets and drones were shot down by air defense and fighter jets.
In response, fighter jets struck several Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon’s Ramyeh and Houla, it adds. The IDF publishes footage of some of the strikes in Lebanon and some of the interceptions.
West Bank and Jerusalem
- Settlers attack security forces evacuating illegal outpost in West Bank: Extremist settler activists violently attacked Civil Administration and Border Police personnel on Wednesday as they worked to evacuate and demolish the illegal West Bank outpost of Tzur Harel, which the Civil Administration said was built on private Palestinian land.
Some 500 Border Police officers were dispatched to the outpost, near the Givat Assaf settlement in the Benjamin Region, following indications there would be violent resistance to the evacuation efforts. The decision to evacuate the outpost was made “in accordance with the IDF’s decision and with the Civil Administration,” the Border Police said in a statement. Rioters threw Molotov cocktails at the forces, the Civil Administration said, after having burnt tires and set a vehicle on fire at the entrance to the outpost when the forces arrived to evacuate the site.
Settler activists also stuck their legs in concrete as part of their efforts to resist evacuation.
Following the demolition of six makeshift buildings at Tzur Harel during the operation, masked rioters threw rocks at passing vehicles driving on a nearby road, including those of security personnel. Rioters threw Molotov cocktails at the forces, the Civil Administration said, after having burnt tires and set a vehicle on fire at the entrance to the outpost when the forces arrived to evacuate the site. One rock hit the car of a Civil Administration official, smashing his windscreen.
Three of the buildings had been built in the last year, and two of them had only been built within the last few weeks, according to the Ynet news site.
The outpost is named for Captain (res.) Harel Sharvit, a reservist who was killed in fighting in the northern Gaza Strip in January. It is next to the older outpost of Oz Zion, which was illegally established in 2012 and has since been evacuated and repopulated several times.
According to sources familiar with the situation at Tzur Harel, the outpost has been a source of violent nationalistic activity, which led Civil Administration head Brig. Gen. Hisham Ibrahim to conduct a swift operation, approved by the “political echelon,” to remove the outpost.
National Unity party leader Benny Gantz condemned the settlers’ actions, saying in a statement, “Throwing stones and injuring our security forces — [that is] a red line.” Gantz called on all cabinet ministers to condemn the incident and for the rioters to be prosecuted. link These are the extremist followers of Ben Gvir and Smotrich and the very same criminals that Ben Gvir's police doesn't prosecute. These are the same types of incidents that has brought sanctions by many of our western allies because our government does absolutely nothing to stop them even when the are attacking our security forces.
Some 500 Border Police officers were dispatched to the outpost, near the Givat Assaf settlement in the Benjamin Region, following indications there would be violent resistance to the evacuation efforts. The decision to evacuate the outpost was made “in accordance with the IDF’s decision and with the Civil Administration,” the Border Police said in a statement. Rioters threw Molotov cocktails at the forces, the Civil Administration said, after having burnt tires and set a vehicle on fire at the entrance to the outpost when the forces arrived to evacuate the site.
Settler activists also stuck their legs in concrete as part of their efforts to resist evacuation.
Following the demolition of six makeshift buildings at Tzur Harel during the operation, masked rioters threw rocks at passing vehicles driving on a nearby road, including those of security personnel. Rioters threw Molotov cocktails at the forces, the Civil Administration said, after having burnt tires and set a vehicle on fire at the entrance to the outpost when the forces arrived to evacuate the site. One rock hit the car of a Civil Administration official, smashing his windscreen.
Three of the buildings had been built in the last year, and two of them had only been built within the last few weeks, according to the Ynet news site.
The outpost is named for Captain (res.) Harel Sharvit, a reservist who was killed in fighting in the northern Gaza Strip in January. It is next to the older outpost of Oz Zion, which was illegally established in 2012 and has since been evacuated and repopulated several times.
According to sources familiar with the situation at Tzur Harel, the outpost has been a source of violent nationalistic activity, which led Civil Administration head Brig. Gen. Hisham Ibrahim to conduct a swift operation, approved by the “political echelon,” to remove the outpost.
National Unity party leader Benny Gantz condemned the settlers’ actions, saying in a statement, “Throwing stones and injuring our security forces — [that is] a red line.” Gantz called on all cabinet ministers to condemn the incident and for the rioters to be prosecuted. link These are the extremist followers of Ben Gvir and Smotrich and the very same criminals that Ben Gvir's police doesn't prosecute. These are the same types of incidents that has brought sanctions by many of our western allies because our government does absolutely nothing to stop them even when the are attacking our security forces.
Politics
- No holds barred: The coalition's offensive against the IDF and the Shin Bet
Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot resigned from the emergency war cabinet on June 9. During their time on the panel, especially during the later months, the two were subjected to repeated attacks by far-right ministers of the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties. Likud members also saw their presence in the war cabinet — Gantz as a full member; Eisenkot as an observer — as a convenient political target.
The two National Unity party leaders were seen as something of a left-wing element within the government, a pair of ministers who put freeing the remaining hostages taken by Hamas on October 7 at the top of their priorities, and as such as legitimate targets. They were eventually joined by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who often agreed with Gantz and Eisenkot’s strategic positions. So he, too, has become a sitting target, even for ministers and MKs from his own Likud party.
Gantz and Eisenkot left the government, but Gallant stayed. And now the chiefs of the Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet are under fire, alongside the defense minister. No matter what they do or say, there will always be an attack from somewhere on the right. The general strategy is exemplified by firebrand Likud MK Tally Gotlieb, who is known to be close to National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. This week she repeated her contentious claim that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar is involved in planning a military coup against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, together with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, after Gaza’s Shifa Hospital director Mohammad Abu Salmiya, who is suspected of collaboration with Hamas, was released from Israeli custody.
Far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich and especially Ben Gvir took their gloves off and took on the Shin Bet. Ben Gvir even claimed that Bar was threatening to release more Palestinian security prisoners.
The Shin Bet responded that it had been warning for a year that there were not enough prison cells to hold suspects, and said that Ben Gvir had ignored its concerns, knowing full well that the result would be many Palestinian detainees walking free to make room for other inmates. This bickering between Ben Gvir and the Shin Bet continued on Tuesday, with no holds barred. I’ve never seen such a public political spat between ministers and the secret services, even in the most serious of crises.
Even after prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, ministers didn’t come out against the Shin Bet so blatantly over the security failures. Even in the years when Gilad Shalit was held hostage by Hamas — when there was harsh criticism in the cabinet of the Shin Bet, which for a long time refused to sign off on releasing Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for Shalit — qualms were generally aired in private, behind closed doors. On Tuesday, the far-right ministers found a new cause to attack the defense minister and the military chiefs. This time, about connecting a desalination plant in the Gaza Strip to the Israeli power grid.
About a month ago, The Times of Israel’s Hebrew sister site, Zman Yisrael, revealed that there has been direct Israeli-Palestinian cooperation throughout the war to resume the water supply from Israel to the Strip — including the restoration of pumping facilities in the Strip that were rendered inoperative during the fighting, under heavy IDF security.
On Tuesday, the IDF explained that the work also has sanitation implications — it protects Israeli troops operating in Gaza, as well as Palestinians, from the spread of disease. It seems that the discussion at the world courts in The Hague played a role here, and of course it’s common sense that an epidemic in the Strip would overflow into Israel.
But Smotrich and Ben Gvir were not convinced. “We’ve completely lost our minds,” Smotrich wrote. “We’re rehabilitating Gaza before it has been demilitarized. Mr. Prime Minister, stop this madness. this time it will be impossible to say we didn’t know.” By now, this has become a standard knee-jerk reaction against the military. As right-wing agitators before they entered the government, Smotrich and Ben Gvir spent decades clashing with the IDF, the police and the Shin Bet, so it’s only natural that they’re keeping up the dissent.
On Tuesday I tried to challenge them both, from a different perspective. I told them that connecting Gaza’s power to the Israeli grid was actually aligned with their goals — after all, they aspire to full Israeli sovereignty in Gaza and want to establish Jewish communities in the Strip after the war with Hamas. Hooking Gaza up to the Israeli grid would be essential to provide electricity to these “old-new” settlements. Smotrich didn’t buy it. “The defense minister is making decisions by himself, without consulting with the cabinet,” he told me. “If it was part of a plan to establish a military regime in Gaza, I’d be in favor. This is half-assed. Hamas will take control of the electricity just like it steals humanitarian aid. This is a grave mistake that we can’t afford to make.”
Ben Gvir also shot down my challenge. Apparently the offensive against Gallant, the Shin Bet and the IDF chief of staff is more important to him. Keep in mind that the insurrection of Smotrich and Ben Gvir, currently on the rise, is a direct continuation of attacks by Likud ministers on the heads of the IDF, Shin Bet and military intelligence — especially coming from David Amsalem and Miri Regev in the security cabinet. Netanyahu didn’t stop them — perhaps even the opposite — and now he’s not stopping Smotrich and Ben Gvir, who are spoiling for their next fight.
As ever, the only voice of reason in this cacophony is Interior Minister Moshe Arbel of Shas, who on Tuesday appealed to the prime minister to “prevent ministers from slandering the head of the Shin Bet.”
Netanyahu did not stop anything, of course. And today there will probably be a new attack on the target — the what and the why being irrelevant. link These are not new incidents or new methods. They are just more of the many examples of a totally dysfunctional government with a weak Prime Minister at the helm. And because Netanyahu is so weak and his only real goal is to remain prime minister, he allows this to go on at the very high expense to the State of Israel.
- No holds barred: The coalition's offensive against the IDF and the Shin Bet
Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot resigned from the emergency war cabinet on June 9. During their time on the panel, especially during the later months, the two were subjected to repeated attacks by far-right ministers of the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties. Likud members also saw their presence in the war cabinet — Gantz as a full member; Eisenkot as an observer — as a convenient political target.
The two National Unity party leaders were seen as something of a left-wing element within the government, a pair of ministers who put freeing the remaining hostages taken by Hamas on October 7 at the top of their priorities, and as such as legitimate targets. They were eventually joined by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who often agreed with Gantz and Eisenkot’s strategic positions. So he, too, has become a sitting target, even for ministers and MKs from his own Likud party.
Gantz and Eisenkot left the government, but Gallant stayed. And now the chiefs of the Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet are under fire, alongside the defense minister. No matter what they do or say, there will always be an attack from somewhere on the right. The general strategy is exemplified by firebrand Likud MK Tally Gotlieb, who is known to be close to National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. This week she repeated her contentious claim that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar is involved in planning a military coup against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, together with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, after Gaza’s Shifa Hospital director Mohammad Abu Salmiya, who is suspected of collaboration with Hamas, was released from Israeli custody.
Far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich and especially Ben Gvir took their gloves off and took on the Shin Bet. Ben Gvir even claimed that Bar was threatening to release more Palestinian security prisoners.
The Shin Bet responded that it had been warning for a year that there were not enough prison cells to hold suspects, and said that Ben Gvir had ignored its concerns, knowing full well that the result would be many Palestinian detainees walking free to make room for other inmates. This bickering between Ben Gvir and the Shin Bet continued on Tuesday, with no holds barred. I’ve never seen such a public political spat between ministers and the secret services, even in the most serious of crises.
Even after prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, ministers didn’t come out against the Shin Bet so blatantly over the security failures. Even in the years when Gilad Shalit was held hostage by Hamas — when there was harsh criticism in the cabinet of the Shin Bet, which for a long time refused to sign off on releasing Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for Shalit — qualms were generally aired in private, behind closed doors. On Tuesday, the far-right ministers found a new cause to attack the defense minister and the military chiefs. This time, about connecting a desalination plant in the Gaza Strip to the Israeli power grid.
About a month ago, The Times of Israel’s Hebrew sister site, Zman Yisrael, revealed that there has been direct Israeli-Palestinian cooperation throughout the war to resume the water supply from Israel to the Strip — including the restoration of pumping facilities in the Strip that were rendered inoperative during the fighting, under heavy IDF security.
On Tuesday, the IDF explained that the work also has sanitation implications — it protects Israeli troops operating in Gaza, as well as Palestinians, from the spread of disease. It seems that the discussion at the world courts in The Hague played a role here, and of course it’s common sense that an epidemic in the Strip would overflow into Israel.
But Smotrich and Ben Gvir were not convinced. “We’ve completely lost our minds,” Smotrich wrote. “We’re rehabilitating Gaza before it has been demilitarized. Mr. Prime Minister, stop this madness. this time it will be impossible to say we didn’t know.” By now, this has become a standard knee-jerk reaction against the military. As right-wing agitators before they entered the government, Smotrich and Ben Gvir spent decades clashing with the IDF, the police and the Shin Bet, so it’s only natural that they’re keeping up the dissent.
On Tuesday I tried to challenge them both, from a different perspective. I told them that connecting Gaza’s power to the Israeli grid was actually aligned with their goals — after all, they aspire to full Israeli sovereignty in Gaza and want to establish Jewish communities in the Strip after the war with Hamas. Hooking Gaza up to the Israeli grid would be essential to provide electricity to these “old-new” settlements. Smotrich didn’t buy it. “The defense minister is making decisions by himself, without consulting with the cabinet,” he told me. “If it was part of a plan to establish a military regime in Gaza, I’d be in favor. This is half-assed. Hamas will take control of the electricity just like it steals humanitarian aid. This is a grave mistake that we can’t afford to make.”
Ben Gvir also shot down my challenge. Apparently the offensive against Gallant, the Shin Bet and the IDF chief of staff is more important to him. Keep in mind that the insurrection of Smotrich and Ben Gvir, currently on the rise, is a direct continuation of attacks by Likud ministers on the heads of the IDF, Shin Bet and military intelligence — especially coming from David Amsalem and Miri Regev in the security cabinet. Netanyahu didn’t stop them — perhaps even the opposite — and now he’s not stopping Smotrich and Ben Gvir, who are spoiling for their next fight.
As ever, the only voice of reason in this cacophony is Interior Minister Moshe Arbel of Shas, who on Tuesday appealed to the prime minister to “prevent ministers from slandering the head of the Shin Bet.”
Netanyahu did not stop anything, of course. And today there will probably be a new attack on the target — the what and the why being irrelevant. link These are not new incidents or new methods. They are just more of the many examples of a totally dysfunctional government with a weak Prime Minister at the helm. And because Netanyahu is so weak and his only real goal is to remain prime minister, he allows this to go on at the very high expense to the State of Israel.
The Region and the World - Iranian general says itching to carry out another direct missile attack on Israel: Revolutionary Guard aerospace chief Amir Ali Hajizadeh says he doesn’t know how many rockets would be used, but is ‘hopeful’ for opportunity to follow up April barrage of hundreds
A senior Iranian military commander said that the country is waiting for a chance to launch another direct attack on Israel as a follow-up to a barrage of hundreds of missiles and drones it fired in April, Iranian media reported Tuesday.
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh made the remarks the day before in Tehran when he met with family members of people killed in the Gaza Strip during the ongoing war there between Israel and the terror group Hamas. It was not clear from the report if the families he met were themselves from Gaza.
“We are hopeful of the arrival of the opportunity for [conducting] Operation True Promise 2,” Hajizadeh said, according to the Mehr News Agency, referring to the title of the April attack. Hajizadeh said he did not know how many missiles would be used in a second attack.
In other quotes reported by the Tasnim news agency, Hajizadeh said, “As it is obvious from the weapons of our dear ones in Palestine, Lebanon and elsewhere, it has now become clear that they are in fact being helped and supplied by Iran.”
He also boasted of Iranian attacks on US interests in the region, including shooting down surveillance drones and a 2020 barrage of rockets it fired at US bases in Iraq as revenge for the assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani in a US drone strike. full article
A senior Iranian military commander said that the country is waiting for a chance to launch another direct attack on Israel as a follow-up to a barrage of hundreds of missiles and drones it fired in April, Iranian media reported Tuesday.
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh made the remarks the day before in Tehran when he met with family members of people killed in the Gaza Strip during the ongoing war there between Israel and the terror group Hamas. It was not clear from the report if the families he met were themselves from Gaza.
“We are hopeful of the arrival of the opportunity for [conducting] Operation True Promise 2,” Hajizadeh said, according to the Mehr News Agency, referring to the title of the April attack. Hajizadeh said he did not know how many missiles would be used in a second attack.
In other quotes reported by the Tasnim news agency, Hajizadeh said, “As it is obvious from the weapons of our dear ones in Palestine, Lebanon and elsewhere, it has now become clear that they are in fact being helped and supplied by Iran.”
He also boasted of Iranian attacks on US interests in the region, including shooting down surveillance drones and a 2020 barrage of rockets it fired at US bases in Iraq as revenge for the assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani in a US drone strike. full article
Personal Stories
Acronyms and Glossary
ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague
IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague
MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp
PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen
PMO- Prime Minister's Office
UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission
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