π️Lonny's War Update- October 337, 2023 - September 7, 2024 π️
π️Day 337 that 101 of our hostages in Hamas captivity
**There is nothing more important than getting them home! NOTHING!**
“I’ve never met them,But I miss them. I’ve never met them,but I think of them every second. I’ve never met them,but they are my family. BRING THEM HOME NOW!!!”
We’re waiting for you, all of you.
A deal is the only way to bring
all the hostages home- the murdered for burial and the living for rehabilitation.
#BringThemHomeNow #TurnTheHorrorIntoHope
A deal is the only way to bring
all the hostages home- the murdered for burial and the living for rehabilitation.
#BringThemHomeNow #TurnTheHorrorIntoHope
There is no victory until all of the hostages are home!ΧΧΧ Χ Χ¦ΧΧΧ Χ’Χ Χ©ΧΧ ΧΧΧΧΧ€ΧΧ ΧΧΧΧͺ
Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements
*7:15pm yesterday- north - rockets - Ajar*6:05am - north - rockets - Meron Field School, Matat - over 30 rockets launched from Lebanon - no casaulties
*7:25am - north - hostile aircraft - Rosh Hanikra, Achziv, Batzet
*10:10am - north - hostile aircraft - Ayelet Hashahar
*12:50pm- north - rockets - Hanita, Gesher Haziv
*1:30pm - north - rockets - Birya, Safed - a barrage of 5 rockets were fired from leanon at the Safed area. They all struck open areas and no injuries were reported
From Gershon Baskin - Tomorrow (Sunday) Fareed Zakaria on CNN Ehud Olmert and Nasser Elkidwa will make public their joint proposal for lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. I am so pleased to initiate this agreement together with my friend and colleague Samer Sinjilawi.
*7:25am - north - hostile aircraft - Rosh Hanikra, Achziv, Batzet
*10:10am - north - hostile aircraft - Ayelet Hashahar
*12:50pm- north - rockets - Hanita, Gesher Haziv
*1:30pm - north - rockets - Birya, Safed - a barrage of 5 rockets were fired from leanon at the Safed area. They all struck open areas and no injuries were reported
Hostage Updates
- "The price to bring home these people will be high, but the price not to bring them home will be higher, because we will never recover as a people. We will no longer be a nation who can claim to value life" - Rachel Goldberg-Polin
Fmr.
Israeli Hostage Negotiator Gershon Baskin Slams Netanyahu for Blocking
Ceasefire Deal (starts at minute 28:25) video interview
Hostage Updates
- "The price to bring home these people will be high, but the price not to bring them home will be higher, because we will never recover as a people. We will no longer be a nation who can claim to value life" - Rachel Goldberg-Polin
Fmr. Israeli Hostage Negotiator Gershon Baskin Slams Netanyahu for Blocking Ceasefire Deal (starts at minute 28:25) video interview
Gaza
- CHALLENGING THE MYTHS AND THE LIES:THREE MYTHS AND LIES TO BEGIN WITH (MORE WILL COME LATER)Gershon Baskin, September 6, 2024
Myth and lie #1: If Israel doesn’t stay in Gaza, October 7th can happen again!The Truth #1: If there had been 15 tanks on the border and 3 attack helicopters in the air on October 7, it would not have happened. Israel is not facing the Russian army on the other side of the border, it is Hamas, and now Hamas’s military capabilities have been vastly demolished. The IDF was not on the border on October 7 and that is first and foremost the fault of the decision makers and the army and intelligence, but it also the result of two decades of transforming the Israeli Defense Force into the Israeli occupation police force in the West Bank. That is where the army was stationed on October 7, and not on Israel’s border. The Israeli army has the full ability to defend Israel’s borders from the Israeli side of those borders.
Myth and lie#2: Israeli control over the Philidelphi corridor is essential for Israel’s security!The Truth #2: Alon Ben David, military correspondent for Israel Channel 13 reported this week, along with others, that the Israeli army has not located one tunnel that penetrates the Philidelphi corridor line to Egypt. Prior to the coup in Egypt in which Abed el Fatah A-Sisi became President of Egypt, there were hundreds of smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt that smuggling everything, including weapons and materials to make weapons and machinery to dig tunnels. There was even an official Hamas Ministry responsible for Tunnel Affairs from which it was possible to lease tunnels for private use of businesses. Egypt under Sisi claimed that they closed down all of the tunnels. That appears to be true. There is information that a lot of smuggling through bribery did take place at the Rafah crossing. The Philidelphi corridor must be secured and sealed hermetically and that can be done on the Egyptian side of the line. If Israel does not trust the Egyptians to do it, I believe that in a negotiation with Egypt there can be an agreement to station US personnel on the corridor to verify the sealing of the corridor. Israeli troops stationed along the corridor will be sitting ducks for Hamas armed insurgency.
Myth and lie #3: Hamas can be defeated militarilyThe Truth #3: Hamas is a lot more than a military force and a governmental structure. Hamas is an idea and an ideology and Hamas has been embedded within Palestinian society as part of the resistance to Israeli occupation and control. Ideas and ideologies in general cannot be defeated militarily. Furthermore, there is no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor has there ever been a military solution to it. The way to defeat an ideology and an idea is to make better ideologies and ideas real to the public that believes them. The better idea to defeat Hamas is freedom, liberation, dignity, and self-determination for the Palestinian people. Here it is important to also remember that if Palestinian don’t have freedom, liberation, dignity, and self-determination, Israel will not have security. And Palestinians need to understand that if Israel does not have security, Palestinians will not have freedom, liberation, dignity, and self-determination. We all need security – including the Palestinians.
In a summary of its activities over the past week, the IDF says it struck more than 40 sites belonging to terror groups in the Gaza Strip, killed over 100 operatives, and located several tunnel shafts.
The sites in Gaza included command and control centers embedded within schools and other civilian sites, according to the IDF.
In the north, the military says some 50 airstrikes were carried out against Hezbollah sites in Lebanon over the past week, including weapon depots. Dozens of rocket launchers in Lebanon were also struck, the IDF says. In the West Bank, more than 35 gunmen were killed and some 45 were detained amid an operation in the Jenin, Tulkarem and Far’a area, according to the military.
Also in the West Bank, dozens of firearms were seized, dozens of explosive devices were neutralized and three bomb-making labs were destroyed, the IDF adds.
IDF says airstrike targets Hamas command center in Gaza school
The IDF says it carried out an airstrike against a group of Hamas operatives at a command room embedded within a former school in Gaza City.
According to the military, Hamas was using the Halima al-Sadia School in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood to plan and carry out attacks against troops and Israel.
Palestinian media report several casualties in the strike.
To mitigate harm to civilians in the strike, the IDF says it carried out “many steps,” including using precision munitions, aerial surveillance, and other intelligence.
“The Hamas terror organization systematically violates international law, brutally exploiting civilian institutions and the population as a human shield for terror activity,” the military adds.
In recent months, dozens of airstrikes have been carried out against Hamas sites embedded within schools and other sites used as shelters for civilians, according to the IDF. link
The Painful Reality on the Ground Complicating Hostage Rescue Efforts
Ironically, the tactical success of the IDF and the military pressure policy have become a threat to the safety of the hostages. Continued Israeli insistence could turn into a security vulnerability. Furthermore, it's not just about Philadelphi – Israel needs to block all Hamas’s routes of reinforcement. Major General (Res.) Tamir Hayman offers a special analysis column for N12 Magazine.
The horrific and painful event that occurred last weekend, where Hamas terrorists brutally executed our loved ones, raises difficult moral and professional questions, including the effectiveness of military pressure and what Israel should do now. In other words, what is the best way to bring the hostages back alive, and to what extent is the Philadelphi Route a top security interest, as recently presented?
Effectiveness of Operational Pressure
Recent events show that operational pressure without accompanying diplomatic actions has run its course. While military operations have successfully returned eight hostages home, Hamas has adapted and "changed the instructions." Achieving these successes has now become more challenging. Moreover, due to the operational friction inherent in the fighting, unfortunately, more hostages have been killed than released. Military pressure serves as a negotiation tool, and as seen in the operation in Rafah, it managed to shift Hamas's stance on one of the most critical components — stopping the war. Hamas is now willing to make a deal where the initial phase of a hostage agreement is not contingent on an Israeli commitment to cease the war. This turning point occurred at the end of May, when Hamas agreed to a framework that was presented to the public a few days later by President Biden at the beginning of June.
Although this agreement still left unresolved disputes — such as the veto mechanism, the order of prisoner releases, the scope of Palestinian prisoners to be released, and their remaining sentences — the current insistence on maintaining a permanent IDF presence on the Philadelphi Route presents an obstacle likely to frustrate the chances of reaching a deal.
Importance of the Philadelphi Route - "The Southern Seal"
Closing Gaza to arms smuggling is critically important. Without this closure, Hamas will succeed in rebuilding its strength. However, this does not necessitate a permanent military presence along the Philadelphi Route. To understand how Hamas has built its power and to prevent its buildup, it is essential to address all five routes through which Hamas has built its destructive power:
Underground: The underground area between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (beneath the Philadelphi Route) must be blocked. This can be achieved by building a subterranean barrier and a sensor array capable of alerting to tunnel construction, with the IDF being notified. A mechanism must be established to address these alerts, including a military force that destroys or blocks the new tunnels or destroys them with their occupants. Ideally, this force would be based on an Egyptian force with Israeli/American involvement.
Rafah Crossing: Prevent the smuggling of weapons through the Rafah Crossing by implementing a more stringent inspection mechanism that can be realized by enhancing the inspection and screening components of goods at the crossing, along with an independent inspection and monitoring force, such as a private security company funded by an Arab state. A condition for building a new and modern Rafah Crossing with such oversight is cooperation with the Gulf states and Egypt, which insist on the presence of the Palestinian Authority at the crossing.
Kerem Shalom Crossing: Stop the import of dual-use materials that are used in Hamas’s production network. These materials, primarily used for civilian needs, are also used in military manufacturing — metal plates, pipes, fertilizers, and more. These materials enter the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing after being legally imported via Ashdod Port, and most of the raw materials for rocket production have arrived this way. This route requires stricter supervision of the lists of permitted imports into Gaza, and in the post-war period, it would be appropriate to minimize these imports as part of the general trend of disconnecting Israeli responsibility for the Gaza Strip.
Unexploded Ordnance: Standard explosives for the warheads of rockets mainly come from unexploded bombs from the Air Force, which are abundant throughout Gaza. Hamas collects bombs that have not detonated, extracts the explosives, and reuses them. Only by continuing to weaken Hamas and preventing its functioning as a military entity, and transferring civilian authority over Gaza from Hamas to another entity, can this be addressed. For example, an alternative civilian governmental authority to Hamas, dealing with administrative matters in Gaza, should also handle the clearance of unexploded ordnance to prevent it from falling into Hamas’s hands, as is currently happening, such as a local Palestinian civilian authority (the Palestinian Authority in Gaza under international supervision).
Finances: Salaries of Hamas operatives, as well as procurement of raw materials and weapons, depend on funding for Hamas's military wing. This money enters Gaza through a sophisticated exchange mechanism, and in recent years also directly through "money suitcases." This must be stopped and the economic warfare mechanism against Hamas improved. It is worth remembering that Qatar is a central funding source beyond Iran.
Bottom Line:
From a security standpoint, a good response can be planned and implemented for the Philadelphi Route, assuming it is a security issue and not a political one. If holding the Philadelphi Route is a political issue, it essentially represents the first step toward restoring Israeli sovereignty over Gaza. In this case, visible Israeli control of the Philadelphi Route is part of asserting sovereignty. It is a first step towards full control over the Gaza Strip, which requires public debate and an update of the IDF’s objectives in the war. This is not the IDF’s goal; the army is not prepared for this, and it has severe negative implications in terms of economic, international, legal, and internal aspects.
The Implications of Failing to Change the Operational Strategy:
The decision to maintain a permanent presence on the Philadelphi Route, which means continued fighting in Gaza, presents a serious problem. Continued insistence on operational pressure in Gaza endangers Israel’s vital national security interests:
Focus on Gaza prevents changing the reality on the northern border. Whether the solution in the north will come from an agreement stemming from a military threat and increased attacks there, or from an agreement after a limited war, both scenarios are complex challenges requiring the full attention of the security system. It is a pressing need of the security system. Continued northern reality as it stands erodes Israeli deterrence and creates a situation where we lose sovereignty and governance over a region.
Current operational pressure endangers the lives of the hostages and prevents achieving the war’s objectives. Apart from the fact that as time passes without a deal, the hostages languish and die, continued maneuvering in areas not yet thoroughly handled by the IDF directly endangers the hostages. In these areas are the remnants of the Hamas military, alongside the hostages. The clear separation that was previously possible no longer exists, limiting Israel’s freedom of action. For example, what is happening now in Rafah — the IDF is systematically monitoring and destroying the underground. All the underground there is connected between offensive and smuggling tunnels that are systematically scanned to strategic tunnels deep in the built-up area. Ironically, this tactical success, which we have long awaited, and the successful IDF maneuver underground, now severely endangers the hostages as their possible locations have been dramatically reduced, limiting flexibility.
Continuous erosion of Israel’s international standing. As long as Israel does not present a clear outline for ending the war in Gaza, global public criticism accumulates, risking international isolation. The world is now much more focused on the damage and harm to Gaza’s civilians than on Hamas’s atrocities. Even if we complain about hypocrisy and unfairness, it will not help. The harsh images from Gaza need to be balanced with a clear outline to end the war. Without it, the international community interprets that Israel does not intend to end the war but hides its true war objective. The fear is that Israel’s true intention is the occupation of Gaza, settlement, and expulsion of the Palestinian population. Moreover, creative proposals for relocating the population from northern Gaza and starving the remaining population do not help in the battle for international legitimacy and Israel’s status.
Weakening social resilience and cohesion in Israel. Everything has become political in Israel, and even the war has become so. History shows that when politics and the blood of soldiers intertwine, the political struggle can tear society apart in a way that is irreparable. This is not just about differing opinions; it is about sacrificing soldiers in what is considered by some of the public as futile and motivated by political considerations. This is a very serious situation and somewhat reminiscent of the criticism of the First Lebanon War, but mainly the American entanglement in Vietnam. We must not reach this level of division given the significant external threats.
Conclusion:
Weapons smuggling into Gaza must be blocked, but the solution is not a permanent presence above ground on the Philadelphi Route, a presence that would be a security vulnerability rather than a security asset. If indeed such a concession improves the chance for a hostage deal, it is morally imperative. And if we are wrong? It is not an irreversible step. The IDF repeatedly returns for raids in Gaza unhindered. Even if we are wrong and the alternative security response proposed here is not feasible, the situation can be relatively easily restored.
More importantly, we have reached the "strategic exhaustion point" in Gaza. This exhaustion point is an operational state in the war, after which, once achieved, the strategy must change; otherwise, the marginal benefit of military operations diminishes to futility, failure, and damage to achieving the objectives. In other words, continued insistence on the current method in the Gaza Strip worsens our situation. The IDF has succeeded in achieving an operational state that allows for a hostage deal, but operational achievements, however great, do not guarantee the deal. At this point, it's worth trying a different strategy.
Major General (Res.) Tamir Hayman is the former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate (Military Intelligence) and currently the head of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). link
In a summary of its activities over the past week, the IDF says it struck more than 40 sites belonging to terror groups in the Gaza Strip, killed over 100 operatives, and located several tunnel shafts.
The sites in Gaza included command and control centers embedded within schools and other civilian sites, according to the IDF.
In the north, the military says some 50 airstrikes were carried out against Hezbollah sites in Lebanon over the past week, including weapon depots. Dozens of rocket launchers in Lebanon were also struck, the IDF says. In the West Bank, more than 35 gunmen were killed and some 45 were detained amid an operation in the Jenin, Tulkarem and Far’a area, according to the military.
Also in the West Bank, dozens of firearms were seized, dozens of explosive devices were neutralized and three bomb-making labs were destroyed, the IDF adds.
IDF says airstrike targets Hamas command center in Gaza school
The IDF says it carried out an airstrike against a group of Hamas operatives at a command room embedded within a former school in Gaza City.
According to the military, Hamas was using the Halima al-Sadia School in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood to plan and carry out attacks against troops and Israel.
Palestinian media report several casualties in the strike.
To mitigate harm to civilians in the strike, the IDF says it carried out “many steps,” including using precision munitions, aerial surveillance, and other intelligence.
“The Hamas terror organization systematically violates international law, brutally exploiting civilian institutions and the population as a human shield for terror activity,” the military adds.
In recent months, dozens of airstrikes have been carried out against Hamas sites embedded within schools and other sites used as shelters for civilians, according to the IDF. link
The Painful Reality on the Ground Complicating Hostage Rescue Efforts
Ironically, the tactical success of the IDF and the military pressure policy have become a threat to the safety of the hostages. Continued Israeli insistence could turn into a security vulnerability. Furthermore, it's not just about Philadelphi – Israel needs to block all Hamas’s routes of reinforcement. Major General (Res.) Tamir Hayman offers a special analysis column for N12 Magazine.
The horrific and painful event that occurred last weekend, where Hamas terrorists brutally executed our loved ones, raises difficult moral and professional questions, including the effectiveness of military pressure and what Israel should do now. In other words, what is the best way to bring the hostages back alive, and to what extent is the Philadelphi Route a top security interest, as recently presented?
Effectiveness of Operational Pressure
Recent events show that operational pressure without accompanying diplomatic actions has run its course. While military operations have successfully returned eight hostages home, Hamas has adapted and "changed the instructions." Achieving these successes has now become more challenging. Moreover, due to the operational friction inherent in the fighting, unfortunately, more hostages have been killed than released. Military pressure serves as a negotiation tool, and as seen in the operation in Rafah, it managed to shift Hamas's stance on one of the most critical components — stopping the war. Hamas is now willing to make a deal where the initial phase of a hostage agreement is not contingent on an Israeli commitment to cease the war. This turning point occurred at the end of May, when Hamas agreed to a framework that was presented to the public a few days later by President Biden at the beginning of June.
Although this agreement still left unresolved disputes — such as the veto mechanism, the order of prisoner releases, the scope of Palestinian prisoners to be released, and their remaining sentences — the current insistence on maintaining a permanent IDF presence on the Philadelphi Route presents an obstacle likely to frustrate the chances of reaching a deal.
Importance of the Philadelphi Route - "The Southern Seal"
Closing Gaza to arms smuggling is critically important. Without this closure, Hamas will succeed in rebuilding its strength. However, this does not necessitate a permanent military presence along the Philadelphi Route. To understand how Hamas has built its power and to prevent its buildup, it is essential to address all five routes through which Hamas has built its destructive power:
Underground: The underground area between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (beneath the Philadelphi Route) must be blocked. This can be achieved by building a subterranean barrier and a sensor array capable of alerting to tunnel construction, with the IDF being notified. A mechanism must be established to address these alerts, including a military force that destroys or blocks the new tunnels or destroys them with their occupants. Ideally, this force would be based on an Egyptian force with Israeli/American involvement.
Rafah Crossing: Prevent the smuggling of weapons through the Rafah Crossing by implementing a more stringent inspection mechanism that can be realized by enhancing the inspection and screening components of goods at the crossing, along with an independent inspection and monitoring force, such as a private security company funded by an Arab state. A condition for building a new and modern Rafah Crossing with such oversight is cooperation with the Gulf states and Egypt, which insist on the presence of the Palestinian Authority at the crossing.
Kerem Shalom Crossing: Stop the import of dual-use materials that are used in Hamas’s production network. These materials, primarily used for civilian needs, are also used in military manufacturing — metal plates, pipes, fertilizers, and more. These materials enter the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing after being legally imported via Ashdod Port, and most of the raw materials for rocket production have arrived this way. This route requires stricter supervision of the lists of permitted imports into Gaza, and in the post-war period, it would be appropriate to minimize these imports as part of the general trend of disconnecting Israeli responsibility for the Gaza Strip.
Unexploded Ordnance: Standard explosives for the warheads of rockets mainly come from unexploded bombs from the Air Force, which are abundant throughout Gaza. Hamas collects bombs that have not detonated, extracts the explosives, and reuses them. Only by continuing to weaken Hamas and preventing its functioning as a military entity, and transferring civilian authority over Gaza from Hamas to another entity, can this be addressed. For example, an alternative civilian governmental authority to Hamas, dealing with administrative matters in Gaza, should also handle the clearance of unexploded ordnance to prevent it from falling into Hamas’s hands, as is currently happening, such as a local Palestinian civilian authority (the Palestinian Authority in Gaza under international supervision).
Finances: Salaries of Hamas operatives, as well as procurement of raw materials and weapons, depend on funding for Hamas's military wing. This money enters Gaza through a sophisticated exchange mechanism, and in recent years also directly through "money suitcases." This must be stopped and the economic warfare mechanism against Hamas improved. It is worth remembering that Qatar is a central funding source beyond Iran.
Bottom Line:
From a security standpoint, a good response can be planned and implemented for the Philadelphi Route, assuming it is a security issue and not a political one. If holding the Philadelphi Route is a political issue, it essentially represents the first step toward restoring Israeli sovereignty over Gaza. In this case, visible Israeli control of the Philadelphi Route is part of asserting sovereignty. It is a first step towards full control over the Gaza Strip, which requires public debate and an update of the IDF’s objectives in the war. This is not the IDF’s goal; the army is not prepared for this, and it has severe negative implications in terms of economic, international, legal, and internal aspects.
The Implications of Failing to Change the Operational Strategy:
The decision to maintain a permanent presence on the Philadelphi Route, which means continued fighting in Gaza, presents a serious problem. Continued insistence on operational pressure in Gaza endangers Israel’s vital national security interests:
Focus on Gaza prevents changing the reality on the northern border. Whether the solution in the north will come from an agreement stemming from a military threat and increased attacks there, or from an agreement after a limited war, both scenarios are complex challenges requiring the full attention of the security system. It is a pressing need of the security system. Continued northern reality as it stands erodes Israeli deterrence and creates a situation where we lose sovereignty and governance over a region.
Current operational pressure endangers the lives of the hostages and prevents achieving the war’s objectives. Apart from the fact that as time passes without a deal, the hostages languish and die, continued maneuvering in areas not yet thoroughly handled by the IDF directly endangers the hostages. In these areas are the remnants of the Hamas military, alongside the hostages. The clear separation that was previously possible no longer exists, limiting Israel’s freedom of action. For example, what is happening now in Rafah — the IDF is systematically monitoring and destroying the underground. All the underground there is connected between offensive and smuggling tunnels that are systematically scanned to strategic tunnels deep in the built-up area. Ironically, this tactical success, which we have long awaited, and the successful IDF maneuver underground, now severely endangers the hostages as their possible locations have been dramatically reduced, limiting flexibility.
Continuous erosion of Israel’s international standing. As long as Israel does not present a clear outline for ending the war in Gaza, global public criticism accumulates, risking international isolation. The world is now much more focused on the damage and harm to Gaza’s civilians than on Hamas’s atrocities. Even if we complain about hypocrisy and unfairness, it will not help. The harsh images from Gaza need to be balanced with a clear outline to end the war. Without it, the international community interprets that Israel does not intend to end the war but hides its true war objective. The fear is that Israel’s true intention is the occupation of Gaza, settlement, and expulsion of the Palestinian population. Moreover, creative proposals for relocating the population from northern Gaza and starving the remaining population do not help in the battle for international legitimacy and Israel’s status.
Weakening social resilience and cohesion in Israel. Everything has become political in Israel, and even the war has become so. History shows that when politics and the blood of soldiers intertwine, the political struggle can tear society apart in a way that is irreparable. This is not just about differing opinions; it is about sacrificing soldiers in what is considered by some of the public as futile and motivated by political considerations. This is a very serious situation and somewhat reminiscent of the criticism of the First Lebanon War, but mainly the American entanglement in Vietnam. We must not reach this level of division given the significant external threats.
Conclusion:
Weapons smuggling into Gaza must be blocked, but the solution is not a permanent presence above ground on the Philadelphi Route, a presence that would be a security vulnerability rather than a security asset. If indeed such a concession improves the chance for a hostage deal, it is morally imperative. And if we are wrong? It is not an irreversible step. The IDF repeatedly returns for raids in Gaza unhindered. Even if we are wrong and the alternative security response proposed here is not feasible, the situation can be relatively easily restored.
More importantly, we have reached the "strategic exhaustion point" in Gaza. This exhaustion point is an operational state in the war, after which, once achieved, the strategy must change; otherwise, the marginal benefit of military operations diminishes to futility, failure, and damage to achieving the objectives. In other words, continued insistence on the current method in the Gaza Strip worsens our situation. The IDF has succeeded in achieving an operational state that allows for a hostage deal, but operational achievements, however great, do not guarantee the deal. At this point, it's worth trying a different strategy.
Major General (Res.) Tamir Hayman is the former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate (Military Intelligence) and currently the head of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). link
Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria
- **The IDF Attacked More Than 15 Hezbollah Launchers, Some of Which Were Ready for Immediate Launch**
The Chief of Staff in the North: Focused on Fighting Hezbollah and Preparing for Offensive Moves • Palestinian reports of casualties in IDF strikes in the north and center of the Gaza Strip • Three anti-tank missiles fired from Lebanon hit Metula, causing damage to several buildings, with no bodily injuries reported | Live updates link
- **The IDF Attacked More Than 15 Hezbollah Launchers, Some of Which Were Ready for Immediate Launch**The Chief of Staff in the North: Focused on Fighting Hezbollah and Preparing for Offensive Moves • Palestinian reports of casualties in IDF strikes in the north and center of the Gaza Strip • Three anti-tank missiles fired from Lebanon hit Metula, causing damage to several buildings, with no bodily injuries reported | Live updates link
West Bank and Jerusalem and Terror attacks within Israel
- An American woman was shot and killed by IDF troops during a protest near Nablus in the northern West Bank on Friday, two doctors told The Associated Press.
Separately, a 13-year-old Palestinian girl was reported shot dead when extremist settlers stormed a village near Nablus and clashed with villagers.
In the first case, witnesses and Palestinian media reported that the woman was shot by Israeli troops while attending a pro-Palestinian demonstration against settlement expansion in the Palestinian town of Beita, southeast of Nablus. Dr. Ward Basalat said the 26-year-old woman was shot in the head and died after arriving at a hospital. Dr. Fouad Naffa, the head of the hospital, also confirmed the death of an American citizen.The slain woman was named as Aysenur Ezgi Eygi, 26, an American originally from Turkey. She was reportedly an activist with the International Solidarity Movement (ISM).
The Israeli military said it was investigating the matter.
Protests happen regularly and have grown violent in the past. A month ago, American citizen Amado Sison was shot in the leg by Israeli forces, he said, as he tried to flee tear gas and live fire. According to the IDF, during operations near the town of Beita close to Nablus, troops opened fire at a “main instigator” who was hurling stones at the forces and had “posed a threat.”“A claim that a foreign citizen was killed by gunfire in the area is being investigated. The details of the incident and the circumstances of her being hit are under investigation,” the IDF added.
“We deplore this tragic loss,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on a visit to the Dominican Republic, offering his “deepest condolences” to the family of Aysenur Ezgi Eygi, a US-Turkish dual national.
Asked if the United States would take action against Israel, Blinken said: “First things first — let’s find out exactly what happened and we will draw the necessary conclusions and consequences from that.
“When we have more info, we will share it, make it available and, as necessary, we’ll act on it,” he said. “I have no higher priority than the safety and protection of American citizens wherever they are.” Meanwhile, Palestinian media reported that a 13-year-old was killed after being shot by Israeli forces near Nablus amid a clash between extremist settlers and local villagers.She was evacuated in serious condition from the village of Qaryut to a hospital in Nablus, according to the PA official news agency Wafa, where doctors pronounced her death.
According to the report, Bana Amjad Bakr was shot while in her room at her home in Qaryut.
The Yesh Din rights group said the incident began when dozens of settlers, allegedly guarded by Israeli soldiers, stormed the West Bank village and lit fires in the area. The shots that killed Bakr were fired during clashes that ensued between the settlers and Palestinian villagers.
Earlier Friday, Kan reported that a car was set alight overnight and the word “revenge” graffitied in Hebrew along with a Star of David in the West Bank village of Khirbet Abu Falah, near Ramallah.
Arrests of perpetrators in such so-called “price tag attacks” on Palestinians by settlers are exceedingly rare and rights groups lament that convictions are even more unusual, with the majority of charges in such cases being dropped. In Jenin, Palestinian media reported earlier that Israeli troops had withdrawn from the West Bank city following a 10-day operation. The Palestinian Authority’s official Wafa news agency said the troops pulled out of the city at dawn. However, the army said that “troops are continuing with the operation until its objectives are achieved.”The IDF has been carrying out a major operation in the northern West Bank since August 28. The operation — internally dubbed “Summer Camps” by the army — began with simultaneous raids on Jenin, Tulkarem and the Far’a camp near Tubas, with the goal of dismantling Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror networks in the three areas of the northern West Bank.
So far, according to the IDF, more than 36 gunmen have been killed in the operation, among them the head of Hamas in Jenin and the head of Islamic Jihad in the Tulkarem area. Another 46 wanted Palestinians have been detained. Violence in the West Bank has surged in the past year, following the October 7 Hamas terror onslaught in southern Israel, in which some 1,200 people were massacred and 251 were taken hostage.Since that date, Israeli troops have arrested some 5,000 wanted Palestinians across the West Bank, including more than 2,000 affiliated with Hamas.
According to the Palestinian Authority health ministry, more than 670 West Bank Palestinians have been killed in that time. The IDF says the vast majority of them were gunmen killed in exchanges of fire, rioters who clashed with troops or terrorists carrying out attacks.
During the same period, 29 people, including Israeli security personnel, have been killed in terror attacks in Israel and the West Bank. Another six members of the security forces have been killed in clashes with terror operatives in the West Bank. link
**17
Years After Abu Mazen's Decree and the Rift with Fatah: Al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades Continue Their Activities**
In
2007, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority decided to ban armed militias
from operating within the Authority's territories and to act against those
involved in terrorism. This decision led hundreds of terrorists to lay down
their arms, creating a rift between the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Fatah.
However, the brigades continue to operate in most of the camps in the West
Bank. "Military action will destroy us," Abu Mazen once said.
For
many years, there has been a split between the Fatah movement and the Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades, which were the military arm of that movement. The separation
between the two began in 2007, when the Palestinian Authority Chairman Abu
Mazen signed a decree prohibiting armed militias from operating in the
Authority's territories. Since then, the Al-Aqsa Brigades have maintained
"parallel battalions" in Palestinian cities and in numerous refugee
camps throughout the West Bank.
At
the beginning of this week, the rift between the sides was tangibly evident
when the National Security Headquarters in Hebron refused to provide protection
to the terrorist Muhannad Al-Asauda, who shot and killed three police
officers—Hadas Bernatz, Commander Arik Ben Eliahu, and Sergeant Major Roni
Shakuri—in an attack on Route 35 near the Tarkumia checkpoint, north of Hebron.
The reason for the refusal of the Palestinian security headquarters was that
the mechanisms do not take responsibility for terrorists acting against
Israel—and Al-Asauda carried out a shooting attack. After being refused protection,
Al-Asauda fled to a building in Hebron, where IDF and Shin Bet forces located
him, and he was killed by the Duvdevan unit using an anti-tank missile.
Al-Asauda
is identified with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which continue to function as
a terrorist organization with dozens of operatives in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. He worked for about a year in the Presidential Guard and was dismissed
from his position there in 2015, likely due to instability and a lack of
loyalty to the mechanisms.
The
separation between the brigades and Fatah came after Abu Mazen signed the
decree banning armed militia activity in the Palestinian Authority. He also
canceled the funding that was allocated to the organization and removed them
from the purview of his office and official institutions. A year later, in
2008, about 300 members of the Al-Aqsa Brigades agreed to surrender their
weapons to the Palestinian Authority and pledged not to engage in terrorism in
exchange for assurances that Israel would not target them. Among the prominent
figures who agreed to the deal was a senior commander in the brigades in the
West Bank, Zakaria Zubeidi, whose son Muhammad was killed this week in an IDF
strike near Tubas. Zakaria Zubeidi himself is serving a prison sentence for
carrying out several shooting attacks and for his attempted escape from Megiddo
Prison.
Despite
the separation of the brigades from the Palestinian Authority, the organization
maintained its status in the West Bank, operating in camps in Jenin, Nur Shams,
Tulkarm, and Qalqilya, among other places. Some of the group's members even
collaborated with other terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Jihad and
the Al-Qassam Brigades, establishing the "Lion's Den" group in
Nablus, most of whose members have been eliminated by the IDF in the past two
years.
The
Palestinian Authority officially and publicly opposes the activity of armed
groups in its territories, and Abu Mazen has frequently spoken in favor of
peaceful resistance. For example, in an interview about two years ago with the
Saudi television network Al-Arabiya, Abu Mazen stated, "The people are
oppressed, but I embrace peaceful resistance, which has its effect." In
another interview with Egyptian television, he added, "Military action
will destroy us, I can't handle it. We don't have military capabilities; Hamas
went to war, and as a result, Gaza was completely destroyed. I'm not willing
for that."
The
Palestinian Authority, through its mechanisms, significantly enforces the ban
and acts against anyone connected to a terrorist organization. The Authority
clarifies that this is primarily the "national interest of the PLO—to
prevent any armed organization" due to concerns over a coup or regime
change in the West Bank territories. The Authority even arrests activists who
oppose its policies, and the most prominent prisoner held in Jericho by the
mechanisms is Mousab Ashtiyeh, a senior member of Hamas's military wing who is
wanted by Israel.
Meanwhile,
Palestinians have expressed significant criticism of the Palestinian Authority
and its mechanisms, especially after the October 7 massacre, which led to an
increase in the number of detainees and IDF military operations in the
Authority's territories. However, a security source told Ynet that
"security coordination between the Palestinian security mechanisms and the
Israeli ones is operating optimally."
He
added, "The attempt to involve the Palestinian Authority in the current
wave of terrorism is not factually correct—and could harm Israel's security
interests." He also noted, "Those spreading the rumors are extremist
elements trying to undermine one of the fundamental security components in the
West Bank region."
**Dozens of Terrorists Eliminated in Judea and Samaria Last Week, Over 100 Eliminated in Gaza Strip**
Over the past week, IDF forces operated with intensity across Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, the Gaza Strip, and the northern sector. Extensive operations were conducted in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Far’a, resulting in the elimination of approximately 35 terrorists and the arrest of about 45 others. Additionally, dozens of weapons and explosives were seized, and three explosive laboratories were destroyed.
In the northern sector, about 50 strikes were carried out on buildings, infrastructure, and weapons depots, and dozens of launchers aimed at northern communities were destroyed. In the Gaza Strip, IDF forces attacked and destroyed over 40 terrorist infrastructures, including command and control complexes hidden within schools, colleges, and humanitarian areas. More than 100 terrorists were eliminated, and several tunnels were located.
Separately, a 13-year-old Palestinian girl was reported shot dead when extremist settlers stormed a village near Nablus and clashed with villagers.
In the first case, witnesses and Palestinian media reported that the woman was shot by Israeli troops while attending a pro-Palestinian demonstration against settlement expansion in the Palestinian town of Beita, southeast of Nablus. Dr. Ward Basalat said the 26-year-old woman was shot in the head and died after arriving at a hospital. Dr. Fouad Naffa, the head of the hospital, also confirmed the death of an American citizen.The slain woman was named as Aysenur Ezgi Eygi, 26, an American originally from Turkey. She was reportedly an activist with the International Solidarity Movement (ISM).
The Israeli military said it was investigating the matter.
Protests happen regularly and have grown violent in the past. A month ago, American citizen Amado Sison was shot in the leg by Israeli forces, he said, as he tried to flee tear gas and live fire. According to the IDF, during operations near the town of Beita close to Nablus, troops opened fire at a “main instigator” who was hurling stones at the forces and had “posed a threat.”“A claim that a foreign citizen was killed by gunfire in the area is being investigated. The details of the incident and the circumstances of her being hit are under investigation,” the IDF added.
“We deplore this tragic loss,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters on a visit to the Dominican Republic, offering his “deepest condolences” to the family of Aysenur Ezgi Eygi, a US-Turkish dual national.
Asked if the United States would take action against Israel, Blinken said: “First things first — let’s find out exactly what happened and we will draw the necessary conclusions and consequences from that.
“When we have more info, we will share it, make it available and, as necessary, we’ll act on it,” he said. “I have no higher priority than the safety and protection of American citizens wherever they are.” Meanwhile, Palestinian media reported that a 13-year-old was killed after being shot by Israeli forces near Nablus amid a clash between extremist settlers and local villagers.She was evacuated in serious condition from the village of Qaryut to a hospital in Nablus, according to the PA official news agency Wafa, where doctors pronounced her death.
According to the report, Bana Amjad Bakr was shot while in her room at her home in Qaryut.
The Yesh Din rights group said the incident began when dozens of settlers, allegedly guarded by Israeli soldiers, stormed the West Bank village and lit fires in the area. The shots that killed Bakr were fired during clashes that ensued between the settlers and Palestinian villagers.
Earlier Friday, Kan reported that a car was set alight overnight and the word “revenge” graffitied in Hebrew along with a Star of David in the West Bank village of Khirbet Abu Falah, near Ramallah.
Arrests of perpetrators in such so-called “price tag attacks” on Palestinians by settlers are exceedingly rare and rights groups lament that convictions are even more unusual, with the majority of charges in such cases being dropped. In Jenin, Palestinian media reported earlier that Israeli troops had withdrawn from the West Bank city following a 10-day operation. The Palestinian Authority’s official Wafa news agency said the troops pulled out of the city at dawn. However, the army said that “troops are continuing with the operation until its objectives are achieved.”The IDF has been carrying out a major operation in the northern West Bank since August 28. The operation — internally dubbed “Summer Camps” by the army — began with simultaneous raids on Jenin, Tulkarem and the Far’a camp near Tubas, with the goal of dismantling Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror networks in the three areas of the northern West Bank.
So far, according to the IDF, more than 36 gunmen have been killed in the operation, among them the head of Hamas in Jenin and the head of Islamic Jihad in the Tulkarem area. Another 46 wanted Palestinians have been detained. Violence in the West Bank has surged in the past year, following the October 7 Hamas terror onslaught in southern Israel, in which some 1,200 people were massacred and 251 were taken hostage.Since that date, Israeli troops have arrested some 5,000 wanted Palestinians across the West Bank, including more than 2,000 affiliated with Hamas.
According to the Palestinian Authority health ministry, more than 670 West Bank Palestinians have been killed in that time. The IDF says the vast majority of them were gunmen killed in exchanges of fire, rioters who clashed with troops or terrorists carrying out attacks.
During the same period, 29 people, including Israeli security personnel, have been killed in terror attacks in Israel and the West Bank. Another six members of the security forces have been killed in clashes with terror operatives in the West Bank. link**17
Years After Abu Mazen's Decree and the Rift with Fatah: Al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades Continue Their Activities**
In
2007, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority decided to ban armed militias
from operating within the Authority's territories and to act against those
involved in terrorism. This decision led hundreds of terrorists to lay down
their arms, creating a rift between the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Fatah.
However, the brigades continue to operate in most of the camps in the West
Bank. "Military action will destroy us," Abu Mazen once said.
For
many years, there has been a split between the Fatah movement and the Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades, which were the military arm of that movement. The separation
between the two began in 2007, when the Palestinian Authority Chairman Abu
Mazen signed a decree prohibiting armed militias from operating in the
Authority's territories. Since then, the Al-Aqsa Brigades have maintained
"parallel battalions" in Palestinian cities and in numerous refugee
camps throughout the West Bank.
At
the beginning of this week, the rift between the sides was tangibly evident
when the National Security Headquarters in Hebron refused to provide protection
to the terrorist Muhannad Al-Asauda, who shot and killed three police
officers—Hadas Bernatz, Commander Arik Ben Eliahu, and Sergeant Major Roni
Shakuri—in an attack on Route 35 near the Tarkumia checkpoint, north of Hebron.
The reason for the refusal of the Palestinian security headquarters was that
the mechanisms do not take responsibility for terrorists acting against
Israel—and Al-Asauda carried out a shooting attack. After being refused protection,
Al-Asauda fled to a building in Hebron, where IDF and Shin Bet forces located
him, and he was killed by the Duvdevan unit using an anti-tank missile.
Al-Asauda
is identified with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which continue to function as
a terrorist organization with dozens of operatives in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. He worked for about a year in the Presidential Guard and was dismissed
from his position there in 2015, likely due to instability and a lack of
loyalty to the mechanisms.
The
separation between the brigades and Fatah came after Abu Mazen signed the
decree banning armed militia activity in the Palestinian Authority. He also
canceled the funding that was allocated to the organization and removed them
from the purview of his office and official institutions. A year later, in
2008, about 300 members of the Al-Aqsa Brigades agreed to surrender their
weapons to the Palestinian Authority and pledged not to engage in terrorism in
exchange for assurances that Israel would not target them. Among the prominent
figures who agreed to the deal was a senior commander in the brigades in the
West Bank, Zakaria Zubeidi, whose son Muhammad was killed this week in an IDF
strike near Tubas. Zakaria Zubeidi himself is serving a prison sentence for
carrying out several shooting attacks and for his attempted escape from Megiddo
Prison.
Despite
the separation of the brigades from the Palestinian Authority, the organization
maintained its status in the West Bank, operating in camps in Jenin, Nur Shams,
Tulkarm, and Qalqilya, among other places. Some of the group's members even
collaborated with other terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Jihad and
the Al-Qassam Brigades, establishing the "Lion's Den" group in
Nablus, most of whose members have been eliminated by the IDF in the past two
years.
The
Palestinian Authority officially and publicly opposes the activity of armed
groups in its territories, and Abu Mazen has frequently spoken in favor of
peaceful resistance. For example, in an interview about two years ago with the
Saudi television network Al-Arabiya, Abu Mazen stated, "The people are
oppressed, but I embrace peaceful resistance, which has its effect." In
another interview with Egyptian television, he added, "Military action
will destroy us, I can't handle it. We don't have military capabilities; Hamas
went to war, and as a result, Gaza was completely destroyed. I'm not willing
for that."
The
Palestinian Authority, through its mechanisms, significantly enforces the ban
and acts against anyone connected to a terrorist organization. The Authority
clarifies that this is primarily the "national interest of the PLO—to
prevent any armed organization" due to concerns over a coup or regime
change in the West Bank territories. The Authority even arrests activists who
oppose its policies, and the most prominent prisoner held in Jericho by the
mechanisms is Mousab Ashtiyeh, a senior member of Hamas's military wing who is
wanted by Israel.
Meanwhile,
Palestinians have expressed significant criticism of the Palestinian Authority
and its mechanisms, especially after the October 7 massacre, which led to an
increase in the number of detainees and IDF military operations in the
Authority's territories. However, a security source told Ynet that
"security coordination between the Palestinian security mechanisms and the
Israeli ones is operating optimally."
He
added, "The attempt to involve the Palestinian Authority in the current
wave of terrorism is not factually correct—and could harm Israel's security
interests." He also noted, "Those spreading the rumors are extremist
elements trying to undermine one of the fundamental security components in the
West Bank region."
**Dozens of Terrorists Eliminated in Judea and Samaria Last Week, Over 100 Eliminated in Gaza Strip**
Over the past week, IDF forces operated with intensity across Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, the Gaza Strip, and the northern sector. Extensive operations were conducted in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Far’a, resulting in the elimination of approximately 35 terrorists and the arrest of about 45 others. Additionally, dozens of weapons and explosives were seized, and three explosive laboratories were destroyed.
In the northern sector, about 50 strikes were carried out on buildings, infrastructure, and weapons depots, and dozens of launchers aimed at northern communities were destroyed. In the Gaza Strip, IDF forces attacked and destroyed over 40 terrorist infrastructures, including command and control complexes hidden within schools, colleges, and humanitarian areas. More than 100 terrorists were eliminated, and several tunnels were located.
Politics and the War (general news)
**Former
Shin Bet Chief Nadav Argaman's Biggest Frustration is When People Say He Was
Part of the Conception. According to Him, a Commission of Inquiry Will Reveal
Proof of His Claim That He Opposed the Transfer of Millions of Dollars to
Hamas—and That Netanyahu Repeatedly Rejected His Proposal to Assassinate
Sinwar. In an Especially Concerned Interview, He Warns That Israel is Losing
Its Democracy, Calls on Netanyahu to Resign to Save the Country, and Explains
Why the Shin Bet Shouldn't Be Protecting Yair Netanyahu in Miami. Shabbat
Shalom to Former Shin Bet Chief Nadav Argaman. You’ve Given Only a Few
Interviews Since the War Began. Why Did You Decide to Speak Again?**
"It's
important for me to speak after I saw the biggest show in town this week,
regarding the Philadelphi Route, and I thought it was time to explain the truth
to the people of Israel, also about the Philadelphi Route."
**Why
do you call it a show?**
"As
a salesman, there’s no doubt, he put on the best performance in town. But he
sold an empty product—there is no connection between the weapons in the Gaza
Strip and the Philadelphi Route. None at all. The Prime Minister said that the
Philadelphi Route is required for the Axis of Evil, and I say that the
Philadelphi Route is required for the axis between Bibi, Ben-Gvir, and
Smotrich. This whole thing is solely intended to keep this government in power.
But the Philadelphi Route is a micro-tactic relevant to the entire story, but
it’s not the whole story."
"I
think we should take a bird’s-eye view and discuss our situation in the Middle
East, what threatens us, and how the overall picture looks: Iran has built a
ring of fire around Israel, and we all feel it; we experienced Hamas on October
7; we see what’s happening with Hezbollah in Lebanon; we see what’s happening
with the Houthis in Yemen, with the militias in Iraq, and we experienced an
unprecedented direct attack from Iran."
"The
head of the snake is Iran, the main target is Iran, and our main problem is
Iran—everything else is just the arms that need to be dealt with, but Iran is
above all. Now we have an immediate problem—first and foremost, bringing back
all the hostages, because people are at risk of not surviving. The second issue
is Judea and Samaria, which are starting to simmer and bubble, and we might
face a very difficult reality, perhaps even worse, and, of course, neutralizing
the Hezbollah threat in Lebanon. These are direct and immediate threats to us.
The Prime Minister and the government, in general, must constantly prioritize
and ask themselves—what is the greatest threat? What is the most urgent? And
what is the right approach?"
**“The
Price is Painful, But There is No Choice”**
Did
you believe that after almost a year, you would be in this situation with
Hamas?
"No,
I didn't believe we would be in such a situation; I thought it could be done
much faster. I think it should have been done much faster. Israel is not built
for long wars, neither socially nor economically, so I think this war should
have ended long ago."
If
Sinwar is eliminated, will that end the war?
"Eliminating
Sinwar is necessary, but it’s not enough. We can continue fighting for a long
time, but the lives of hostages take precedence over everything. For Israeli
society, we must bring them home."
**Is
that possible?**
"If
we fail to bring the hostages home, it will create an unbearable rift in
Israeli society for many years. I think we need to stop the fighting in the
Gaza Strip now, go for a ceasefire, and go for ‘all for all’."
Withdraw
from the Gaza Strip? Return hundreds and thousands of murderers?
"Do
whatever it takes. The price is high, the price is painful, but we have no
choice after October 7 when Israeli citizens were kidnapped from their beds. We
have a commitment—the people of Israel have a commitment, the government of
Israel has a commitment—to bring back all the kidnapped citizens and all the
kidnapped soldiers. The price is difficult, there’s no doubt that this deal
will be a very painful one for Israel, dangerous prisoners will be released—but
Israel has no price for returning lives, there is no price, and it’s our duty
to bring everyone home, and we will deal with the risks and dangers that arise
from such a deal later."
**“A
Messianic Worldview Has Taken Over”**
"Our
top priority—returning all the hostages, a ceasefire in Gaza, shifting our
focus to the north and Judea and Samaria, establishing a regional and
international coalition with the Americans and led by the Americans against the
head of the snake, which is our main target in the future. Therefore, the only
way to do this is to initiate a ceasefire, withdraw from Gaza as needed, and
bring all the hostages home."
The
claim of government officials, of Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, and their colleagues, is
that if you withdraw from Gaza, you'll get another October 7.
"I
don’t accept the arguments of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. None of them attended any
college that deals with strategy and security. They may believe they are the
smartest and know best what needs to be done, but they are fueled by a
messianic worldview that, unfortunately, has taken over Israel. This is the
reality in which we live, but it’s not the reality in which we should be
living."
**Let’s
go back to the Philadelphi Route for a moment. Why do you think we can really
give up control of this border line?**
"There
were smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt until around 2016-2017. Egypt, at
Israel’s request, dug a canal that flooded the tunnels with seawater,
collapsing them, destroying entire neighborhoods in Egyptian Rafah, and
clearing the area so that smuggling tunnels would not be close to the border.
According to the information we have, very few weapons have been smuggled into
Gaza through these tunnels since that Egyptian action. The main smuggling
activity into Gaza was through the Rafah crossing; we know this unequivocally.
Most of the weapons in Gaza are Hamas-made from materials brought into Gaza
through dual-use materials that entered via the Kerem Shalom crossing, like
fertilizers for agriculture."
So
Netanyahu doesn’t understand this?
"Now,
when Netanyahu talks about sitting on the Philadelphi Route, he knows very well
that there are no smuggling activities over the Philadelphi Route but rather
under it. So now we are living with this invention that the most important
thing for Israel is the Philadelphi Route, which has nothing to do with the
smuggling into Gaza."
**In
other words, you’re saying that in this government format, there probably won’t
be a hostage deal.**
"Unfortunately,
what drives Bibi now is maintaining his rule and preserving the coalition, not
Israel’s security or the unity of Israeli society."
**These
are very serious things you’re saying, that the government is more important to
him than the security of Israel.**
"This
is the reality as I see it, that’s how I see it, there’s no other explanation.
The Prime Minister knows very well, understands very well; I know his views and
beliefs, both regarding Ben-Gvir and Smotrich and regarding Israel’s security
and what is right. There’s no doubt—he’s a knowledgeable man, he’s a smart man,
but right now, what drives him is not Israel’s welfare but the welfare of the
dangerous messianic coalition he created and controls."
**Let’s
remind ourselves—you worked together, you worked under him.**
"We
worked together; I worked under him."
**He’s
not the same person?**
"He’s
not the same person; it’s not the same reality, and what drives him today is
the desire to continue ruling, no matter the cost. I ask myself, does Bibi want
to? Can Bibi? The answer is very simple—Bibi can do anything; Bibi doesn’t want
to. The Prime Minister needs to set a personal example above all else. The
Prime Minister needs to know how to make tough decisions—it takes courage, it
takes compassion, it takes knowing how to look people in the eye and tell them
the truth, and unfortunately, I don’t see any of this in the Prime Minister of
Israel."
**“The
Prime Minister Joined Dangerous People”**
Ronin
Bar replaced you as Shin Bet Chief. He’s negotiating, traveling to Doha and
Cairo, and right now, it seems like pretty futile negotiations. Do you think he
should take action?
"I
think Ronen should do everything he can to influence the completion of a
hostage deal and bring all our hostages home."
**And
if he sees there’s no chance, that he’s just traveling in vain?** "Then he should argue and explain to the
Prime Minister and the cabinet what is required and how it should be done.
These are currently his boundaries."
**Should
he go public, perhaps?**
"I
don’t want to comment on that matter; I won’t give him advice on this
topic."
Nitzan
Alon? The President?
"In
my opinion, the President should have taken a much more active stance and not
just sat on the sidelines. I see the deliberate harm to Israeli society in the
division, in the friction between populations—I see what’s happening to the
Israeli economy, I see what’s happening to Israeli security, I see what’s
happening with reservists serving over 150 days, loss of workdays, loss of
jobs, harm to families, to the environment of companies from Israel, economic
harm that could ultimately be devastating for Israel."
"If
we had a prime minister who took Israel’s interests into account, who had
compassion and listened to everyone, not just those near and dear to him but to
the public at large, who respected democracy and the rule of law, who didn’t
join forces with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich in order to maintain the messianic
worldview, which in my opinion is very dangerous for Israel—he should have sat
at the head of the government, with the cabinet, with the military, with the
other security forces, and led a policy that would be good for Israel. I expect
Bibi, as Prime Minister, to do the right thing for the people of Israel, and if
he can’t do it, it’s time to step down and let someone else lead."
"He
made Israel dependent on a very dangerous, very extreme messianic group. He has
no government, and he’s in the process of bringing the most extremist people,
the most dangerous people, into the government because he wants to rule at any
cost. He needs to make decisions that are correct for Israel’s national
security; in his heart, he knows the truth, and I call on him to do so."
**“I
Never Believed We Would End Up Here”**
**When
Netanyahu heard from you that there were proposals to assassinate Sinwar, did
he say no to them?**
"I
don’t remember if he said no or if he didn’t want to take action, but the
essence was ‘no.’ I think there were two or three such cases. After October 7,
I said there’s a certain justification for the claim that I’m part of the
conception, but in this case, I can’t be included, and I should clarify: during
my tenure, there were two to three recommendations to assassinate Sinwar, and
unfortunately, none of them was carried out."
How
can we deal with Hamas without eliminating Sinwar?
"Sinwar
is the head of Hamas in Gaza; he’s a threat to Israel and a danger to Israeli
society. We should definitely eliminate him, but the question is not just whether
to eliminate him but how to do so—by creating and maintaining international and
regional coalitions against Hamas, Iran, and the threats that they pose."
**What
do you say to families who feel like they have been abandoned?**
"I
say to the families, your loved ones are not abandoned. We think about them all
the time; the issue is that the political echelon does not have the same
priority system that they should have, and unfortunately, that’s where things
stand."
**And
there are those who criticize the Shin Bet for cooperating with Bibi’s orders
to protect his son Yair Netanyahu in Miami.**
"I
think there’s no justification for Yair Netanyahu to receive protection in
Miami. It’s an absolute waste of public resources, and it’s unnecessary. The
rule of thumb in Israel is that protection is provided to an official who holds
a senior position or to someone who is in a position of influence in the
government, not to those who are not, and Yair Netanyahu has no influence. He
shouldn’t be protected, especially not abroad."
**Do
you sleep well at night?**
"I
don’t sleep well at night. I think about the people of Israel, and I’m very
concerned about what’s happening to us. I’m especially worried about Israeli
society—about our values, about our identity, and about our future. Israel is
in a difficult and dangerous situation, and we must all come together and make
the right decisions for our future. This is our country, our home, and we must
protect it."
**"The Prime Minister Lacked Compassion."**
Should Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar resign?
"He must not resign, for a simple reason—he should
resign, but not now, because the current Prime Minister of Israel, Bibi
Netanyahu, should not, in my view, appoint the Shin Bet Chief, the Chief of
Staff, or anyone else. Someone who failed as Israel's Prime Minister on October
7, who was a significant part of the conception, who facilitated the transfer
of funds from Qatar, who thought it was right to prefer quiet in and from the
Gaza Strip and to buy quiet with Qatari money, knowing there would be a price
to pay someday, is the one who should resign here and now, hand over the keys,
and go to the voters."
"An event of this magnitude requires going to
elections. Someone who failed on October 7 as he did cannot continue to be
Prime Minister in Israel or anywhere. Therefore, I would expect him, from a
moral standpoint, not to run again, to admit failure, to acknowledge
responsibility, to take responsibility, and to step down from leading the State
of Israel."
Do you see the leaks from the cabinet discussions and how
ministers speak to the Chief of Staff, for example?
"I think it’s a scandal, the way the Prime Minister and
government ministers address, behave, and speak towards the heads of the
security system. Ultimately, our war is against Hamas, not against the heads of
the security system. I see a continuous line that started with the loss of
democratic values in the governmental coup two years ago, followed by the loss
of human values of compassion, mutual assistance, and our togetherness."
Has the Prime Minister lost his compassion?
"I don’t think he ever had it. If he did, I don’t see
it today. Clearly, I have nothing personal against Bibi; I have great respect
for the man and his abilities. Unfortunately, he has taken those abilities in
the wrong direction. Instead of using them for the good of Israel, he used them
for his own benefit. The only thing driving Netanyahu right now is the desire
to remain Israel’s Prime Minister at all costs."
**"Yair Netanyahu—Not a Symbol of Governance"**
In an unusually rare, perhaps unprecedented move, Shin Bet
security personnel are protecting the Prime Minister's son in Miami. What do
you think as a security expert, as someone who was Shin Bet Chief?
"I believe Yair Netanyahu should not be receiving
protection, especially not where he is today. There is no justification for
it—certainly not by the Shin Bet."
"The Shin Bet is supposed to protect seven symbols of
governance, and I haven't heard yet that Yair Netanyahu is a symbol of
governance in Israel. If there is information regarding Yair Netanyahu, the
security personnel of the Prime Minister's Office, the 'Magen' unit, should
handle it."
We have not yet received the Prime Minister's response to
this interview, but I can guess it will be something like: "We’ve heard
from all the security experts and seen where that got us, and Nadav Argaman has
joined the opinions of the left."
(Laughs) "Okay. So, I'll direct the public to the Prime
Minister to tell them how many times I came to him with proposals to attack,
initiate, and strike at the leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza
Strip."
Including Sinwar?
"Including everyone. The Prime Minister knows my views
well. I know how to extend a hand for peace on one side and be very active and
decisive in dealing with terror on the other. So any attempt to label me one
way or another—we’ll leave that to the smear machine. Hamas has kidnapped over
250 citizens and soldiers from Israel. It’s our duty to bring them home
yesterday. We have been captured by an extreme, fanatical government that needs
to be replaced the day before yesterday."
**Former Shin Bet Chief Nadav Argaman, thank you for these
words, and may we have good news.**
"Thank you, Shabbat Shalom, and good luck to us
all."
**Response from the Prime Minister's Office:** "Nadav
Argaman, who encouraged refusal in the IDF and says 'the Palestinian Authority
is not an entity that encourages terrorism,' has long lost all touch with
reality, as is evident in this bizarre interview." link
**Crisis
of Trust: Most Israelis Don’t Believe the Government Is Doing Everything to
Return the Hostages | "Ulpan Shishi" Survey**
According
to the survey, 60% of Israelis think it is more important to promote a hostage
deal than to stay on the Philadelphi Route, but most Netanyahu bloc voters hold
the opposite view. Netanyahu is seen as less trustworthy than Lapid, Gantz, and
Bennett, and more Israelis view him as the primary person responsible for the
October 7 failure than any other figure.
A
large majority of the Israeli public disagrees with Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s stance and believes it is more important to promote a hostage deal
than to remain on the Philadelphi Route, according to the survey we published
yesterday (Friday) evening on "Ulpan Shishi." The survey also shows
that most Israelis do not trust the government to do everything possible to
return the hostages, and that Netanyahu has less trust than Lapid, Gantz, and
Bennett among the Israeli public.
**Netanyahu
Did Not Convince: Most Israelis Support Promoting a Hostage Deal**
According
to the survey conducted by the Midgam Institute, led by Mano Geva, 60% of
Israelis believe it is more important to promote a hostage deal than to stay on
the Philadelphi Route, compared to 28% who think it is more important to remain
on the route. However, most Netanyahu bloc voters prefer to stay on the
Philadelphi Route. Earlier this week, the Prime Minister held a press conference
where he spoke at length about the importance of the route, and before that,
the Cabinet voted in favor of keeping IDF forces in the area.
Additionally,
61% of the Israeli public does not trust the government to do everything
possible to return the hostages from Gaza. In response to the question:
"What do you think is the reason behind Netanyahu's insistence on keeping
the IDF on the Philadelphi Route?", half of the respondents said that
Netanyahu's insistence stems from political considerations. In the past week,
many have protested across the country in favor of a hostage deal and
criticized the government for not doing enough to promote a deal.
**Trust
in the Candidates for Prime Minister**
The
survey also found that Netanyahu enjoys less trust from the Israeli public than
other candidates for Prime Minister. 35% of Israelis trust opposition leader
Lapid more than Netanyahu, compared to 33% who trust Netanyahu more, and 28%
who do not trust either of them. The gap in trust widens against the Chairman
of the National Unity Party, Benny Gantz—41% of respondents said they trust
Gantz more, while 27% said they trust Netanyahu more. Compared to Netanyahu,
former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett enjoys the most trust. 44% of the Israeli
public trusts Bennett more than Netanyahu, compared to 29% who trust the Prime
Minister. In a survey published on "Ulpan Shishi" last week, Bennett,
who has retired from politics, led over Netanyahu in suitability for the role
of Prime Minister.
Additionally,
more Israelis see Netanyahu as the main person responsible for the October 7
failure than any other figure. According to the survey, 43% of Israelis see
Netanyahu as the main person responsible, followed by Chief of Staff Herzi
Halevi, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, with a
significant gap.
The
survey also examined the public's position on Ben Gvir’s attempt to change the
status quo on the Temple Mount and promote Jewish prayers there. The survey
findings indicate that more than two-thirds of the Israeli public oppose Jewish
prayers on the Temple Mount, thereby opposing any change to the current
situation. link
"It's
important for me to speak after I saw the biggest show in town this week,
regarding the Philadelphi Route, and I thought it was time to explain the truth
to the people of Israel, also about the Philadelphi Route."
**Why
do you call it a show?**
"As
a salesman, there’s no doubt, he put on the best performance in town. But he
sold an empty product—there is no connection between the weapons in the Gaza
Strip and the Philadelphi Route. None at all. The Prime Minister said that the
Philadelphi Route is required for the Axis of Evil, and I say that the
Philadelphi Route is required for the axis between Bibi, Ben-Gvir, and
Smotrich. This whole thing is solely intended to keep this government in power.
But the Philadelphi Route is a micro-tactic relevant to the entire story, but
it’s not the whole story."
"I
think we should take a bird’s-eye view and discuss our situation in the Middle
East, what threatens us, and how the overall picture looks: Iran has built a
ring of fire around Israel, and we all feel it; we experienced Hamas on October
7; we see what’s happening with Hezbollah in Lebanon; we see what’s happening
with the Houthis in Yemen, with the militias in Iraq, and we experienced an
unprecedented direct attack from Iran."
"The
head of the snake is Iran, the main target is Iran, and our main problem is
Iran—everything else is just the arms that need to be dealt with, but Iran is
above all. Now we have an immediate problem—first and foremost, bringing back
all the hostages, because people are at risk of not surviving. The second issue
is Judea and Samaria, which are starting to simmer and bubble, and we might
face a very difficult reality, perhaps even worse, and, of course, neutralizing
the Hezbollah threat in Lebanon. These are direct and immediate threats to us.
The Prime Minister and the government, in general, must constantly prioritize
and ask themselves—what is the greatest threat? What is the most urgent? And
what is the right approach?"
**“The
Price is Painful, But There is No Choice”**
Did
you believe that after almost a year, you would be in this situation with
Hamas?
"No,
I didn't believe we would be in such a situation; I thought it could be done
much faster. I think it should have been done much faster. Israel is not built
for long wars, neither socially nor economically, so I think this war should
have ended long ago."
If
Sinwar is eliminated, will that end the war?
"Eliminating
Sinwar is necessary, but it’s not enough. We can continue fighting for a long
time, but the lives of hostages take precedence over everything. For Israeli
society, we must bring them home."
**Is
that possible?**
"If
we fail to bring the hostages home, it will create an unbearable rift in
Israeli society for many years. I think we need to stop the fighting in the
Gaza Strip now, go for a ceasefire, and go for ‘all for all’."
Withdraw
from the Gaza Strip? Return hundreds and thousands of murderers?
"Do
whatever it takes. The price is high, the price is painful, but we have no
choice after October 7 when Israeli citizens were kidnapped from their beds. We
have a commitment—the people of Israel have a commitment, the government of
Israel has a commitment—to bring back all the kidnapped citizens and all the
kidnapped soldiers. The price is difficult, there’s no doubt that this deal
will be a very painful one for Israel, dangerous prisoners will be released—but
Israel has no price for returning lives, there is no price, and it’s our duty
to bring everyone home, and we will deal with the risks and dangers that arise
from such a deal later."
**“A
Messianic Worldview Has Taken Over”**
"Our
top priority—returning all the hostages, a ceasefire in Gaza, shifting our
focus to the north and Judea and Samaria, establishing a regional and
international coalition with the Americans and led by the Americans against the
head of the snake, which is our main target in the future. Therefore, the only
way to do this is to initiate a ceasefire, withdraw from Gaza as needed, and
bring all the hostages home."
The
claim of government officials, of Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, and their colleagues, is
that if you withdraw from Gaza, you'll get another October 7.
"I
don’t accept the arguments of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. None of them attended any
college that deals with strategy and security. They may believe they are the
smartest and know best what needs to be done, but they are fueled by a
messianic worldview that, unfortunately, has taken over Israel. This is the
reality in which we live, but it’s not the reality in which we should be
living."
**Let’s
go back to the Philadelphi Route for a moment. Why do you think we can really
give up control of this border line?**
"There
were smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt until around 2016-2017. Egypt, at
Israel’s request, dug a canal that flooded the tunnels with seawater,
collapsing them, destroying entire neighborhoods in Egyptian Rafah, and
clearing the area so that smuggling tunnels would not be close to the border.
According to the information we have, very few weapons have been smuggled into
Gaza through these tunnels since that Egyptian action. The main smuggling
activity into Gaza was through the Rafah crossing; we know this unequivocally.
Most of the weapons in Gaza are Hamas-made from materials brought into Gaza
through dual-use materials that entered via the Kerem Shalom crossing, like
fertilizers for agriculture."
So
Netanyahu doesn’t understand this?
"Now,
when Netanyahu talks about sitting on the Philadelphi Route, he knows very well
that there are no smuggling activities over the Philadelphi Route but rather
under it. So now we are living with this invention that the most important
thing for Israel is the Philadelphi Route, which has nothing to do with the
smuggling into Gaza."
**In
other words, you’re saying that in this government format, there probably won’t
be a hostage deal.**
"Unfortunately,
what drives Bibi now is maintaining his rule and preserving the coalition, not
Israel’s security or the unity of Israeli society."
**These
are very serious things you’re saying, that the government is more important to
him than the security of Israel.**
"This
is the reality as I see it, that’s how I see it, there’s no other explanation.
The Prime Minister knows very well, understands very well; I know his views and
beliefs, both regarding Ben-Gvir and Smotrich and regarding Israel’s security
and what is right. There’s no doubt—he’s a knowledgeable man, he’s a smart man,
but right now, what drives him is not Israel’s welfare but the welfare of the
dangerous messianic coalition he created and controls."
**Let’s
remind ourselves—you worked together, you worked under him.**
"We
worked together; I worked under him."
**He’s
not the same person?**
"He’s
not the same person; it’s not the same reality, and what drives him today is
the desire to continue ruling, no matter the cost. I ask myself, does Bibi want
to? Can Bibi? The answer is very simple—Bibi can do anything; Bibi doesn’t want
to. The Prime Minister needs to set a personal example above all else. The
Prime Minister needs to know how to make tough decisions—it takes courage, it
takes compassion, it takes knowing how to look people in the eye and tell them
the truth, and unfortunately, I don’t see any of this in the Prime Minister of
Israel."
**“The
Prime Minister Joined Dangerous People”**
Ronin
Bar replaced you as Shin Bet Chief. He’s negotiating, traveling to Doha and
Cairo, and right now, it seems like pretty futile negotiations. Do you think he
should take action?
"I
think Ronen should do everything he can to influence the completion of a
hostage deal and bring all our hostages home."
**And
if he sees there’s no chance, that he’s just traveling in vain?** "Then he should argue and explain to the
Prime Minister and the cabinet what is required and how it should be done.
These are currently his boundaries."
**Should
he go public, perhaps?**
"I
don’t want to comment on that matter; I won’t give him advice on this
topic."
Nitzan
Alon? The President?
"In
my opinion, the President should have taken a much more active stance and not
just sat on the sidelines. I see the deliberate harm to Israeli society in the
division, in the friction between populations—I see what’s happening to the
Israeli economy, I see what’s happening to Israeli security, I see what’s
happening with reservists serving over 150 days, loss of workdays, loss of
jobs, harm to families, to the environment of companies from Israel, economic
harm that could ultimately be devastating for Israel."
"If
we had a prime minister who took Israel’s interests into account, who had
compassion and listened to everyone, not just those near and dear to him but to
the public at large, who respected democracy and the rule of law, who didn’t
join forces with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich in order to maintain the messianic
worldview, which in my opinion is very dangerous for Israel—he should have sat
at the head of the government, with the cabinet, with the military, with the
other security forces, and led a policy that would be good for Israel. I expect
Bibi, as Prime Minister, to do the right thing for the people of Israel, and if
he can’t do it, it’s time to step down and let someone else lead."
"He
made Israel dependent on a very dangerous, very extreme messianic group. He has
no government, and he’s in the process of bringing the most extremist people,
the most dangerous people, into the government because he wants to rule at any
cost. He needs to make decisions that are correct for Israel’s national
security; in his heart, he knows the truth, and I call on him to do so."
**“I
Never Believed We Would End Up Here”**
**When
Netanyahu heard from you that there were proposals to assassinate Sinwar, did
he say no to them?**
"I
don’t remember if he said no or if he didn’t want to take action, but the
essence was ‘no.’ I think there were two or three such cases. After October 7,
I said there’s a certain justification for the claim that I’m part of the
conception, but in this case, I can’t be included, and I should clarify: during
my tenure, there were two to three recommendations to assassinate Sinwar, and
unfortunately, none of them was carried out."
How
can we deal with Hamas without eliminating Sinwar?
"Sinwar
is the head of Hamas in Gaza; he’s a threat to Israel and a danger to Israeli
society. We should definitely eliminate him, but the question is not just whether
to eliminate him but how to do so—by creating and maintaining international and
regional coalitions against Hamas, Iran, and the threats that they pose."
**What
do you say to families who feel like they have been abandoned?**
"I
say to the families, your loved ones are not abandoned. We think about them all
the time; the issue is that the political echelon does not have the same
priority system that they should have, and unfortunately, that’s where things
stand."
**And
there are those who criticize the Shin Bet for cooperating with Bibi’s orders
to protect his son Yair Netanyahu in Miami.**
"I
think there’s no justification for Yair Netanyahu to receive protection in
Miami. It’s an absolute waste of public resources, and it’s unnecessary. The
rule of thumb in Israel is that protection is provided to an official who holds
a senior position or to someone who is in a position of influence in the
government, not to those who are not, and Yair Netanyahu has no influence. He
shouldn’t be protected, especially not abroad."
**Do
you sleep well at night?**
"I
don’t sleep well at night. I think about the people of Israel, and I’m very
concerned about what’s happening to us. I’m especially worried about Israeli
society—about our values, about our identity, and about our future. Israel is
in a difficult and dangerous situation, and we must all come together and make
the right decisions for our future. This is our country, our home, and we must
protect it."
**"The Prime Minister Lacked Compassion."**
Should Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar resign?
"He must not resign, for a simple reason—he should
resign, but not now, because the current Prime Minister of Israel, Bibi
Netanyahu, should not, in my view, appoint the Shin Bet Chief, the Chief of
Staff, or anyone else. Someone who failed as Israel's Prime Minister on October
7, who was a significant part of the conception, who facilitated the transfer
of funds from Qatar, who thought it was right to prefer quiet in and from the
Gaza Strip and to buy quiet with Qatari money, knowing there would be a price
to pay someday, is the one who should resign here and now, hand over the keys,
and go to the voters."
"An event of this magnitude requires going to
elections. Someone who failed on October 7 as he did cannot continue to be
Prime Minister in Israel or anywhere. Therefore, I would expect him, from a
moral standpoint, not to run again, to admit failure, to acknowledge
responsibility, to take responsibility, and to step down from leading the State
of Israel."
Do you see the leaks from the cabinet discussions and how
ministers speak to the Chief of Staff, for example?
"I think it’s a scandal, the way the Prime Minister and
government ministers address, behave, and speak towards the heads of the
security system. Ultimately, our war is against Hamas, not against the heads of
the security system. I see a continuous line that started with the loss of
democratic values in the governmental coup two years ago, followed by the loss
of human values of compassion, mutual assistance, and our togetherness."
Has the Prime Minister lost his compassion?
"I don’t think he ever had it. If he did, I don’t see
it today. Clearly, I have nothing personal against Bibi; I have great respect
for the man and his abilities. Unfortunately, he has taken those abilities in
the wrong direction. Instead of using them for the good of Israel, he used them
for his own benefit. The only thing driving Netanyahu right now is the desire
to remain Israel’s Prime Minister at all costs."
**"Yair Netanyahu—Not a Symbol of Governance"**
In an unusually rare, perhaps unprecedented move, Shin Bet
security personnel are protecting the Prime Minister's son in Miami. What do
you think as a security expert, as someone who was Shin Bet Chief?
"I believe Yair Netanyahu should not be receiving
protection, especially not where he is today. There is no justification for
it—certainly not by the Shin Bet."
"The Shin Bet is supposed to protect seven symbols of
governance, and I haven't heard yet that Yair Netanyahu is a symbol of
governance in Israel. If there is information regarding Yair Netanyahu, the
security personnel of the Prime Minister's Office, the 'Magen' unit, should
handle it."
We have not yet received the Prime Minister's response to
this interview, but I can guess it will be something like: "We’ve heard
from all the security experts and seen where that got us, and Nadav Argaman has
joined the opinions of the left."
(Laughs) "Okay. So, I'll direct the public to the Prime
Minister to tell them how many times I came to him with proposals to attack,
initiate, and strike at the leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza
Strip."
Including Sinwar?
"Including everyone. The Prime Minister knows my views
well. I know how to extend a hand for peace on one side and be very active and
decisive in dealing with terror on the other. So any attempt to label me one
way or another—we’ll leave that to the smear machine. Hamas has kidnapped over
250 citizens and soldiers from Israel. It’s our duty to bring them home
yesterday. We have been captured by an extreme, fanatical government that needs
to be replaced the day before yesterday."
**Former Shin Bet Chief Nadav Argaman, thank you for these
words, and may we have good news.**
"Thank you, Shabbat Shalom, and good luck to us
all."
**Response from the Prime Minister's Office:** "Nadav
Argaman, who encouraged refusal in the IDF and says 'the Palestinian Authority
is not an entity that encourages terrorism,' has long lost all touch with
reality, as is evident in this bizarre interview." link
**Crisis
of Trust: Most Israelis Don’t Believe the Government Is Doing Everything to
Return the Hostages | "Ulpan Shishi" Survey**
According
to the survey, 60% of Israelis think it is more important to promote a hostage
deal than to stay on the Philadelphi Route, but most Netanyahu bloc voters hold
the opposite view. Netanyahu is seen as less trustworthy than Lapid, Gantz, and
Bennett, and more Israelis view him as the primary person responsible for the
October 7 failure than any other figure.
A
large majority of the Israeli public disagrees with Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s stance and believes it is more important to promote a hostage deal
than to remain on the Philadelphi Route, according to the survey we published
yesterday (Friday) evening on "Ulpan Shishi." The survey also shows
that most Israelis do not trust the government to do everything possible to
return the hostages, and that Netanyahu has less trust than Lapid, Gantz, and
Bennett among the Israeli public.
**Netanyahu
Did Not Convince: Most Israelis Support Promoting a Hostage Deal**
According
to the survey conducted by the Midgam Institute, led by Mano Geva, 60% of
Israelis believe it is more important to promote a hostage deal than to stay on
the Philadelphi Route, compared to 28% who think it is more important to remain
on the route. However, most Netanyahu bloc voters prefer to stay on the
Philadelphi Route. Earlier this week, the Prime Minister held a press conference
where he spoke at length about the importance of the route, and before that,
the Cabinet voted in favor of keeping IDF forces in the area.
Additionally,
61% of the Israeli public does not trust the government to do everything
possible to return the hostages from Gaza. In response to the question:
"What do you think is the reason behind Netanyahu's insistence on keeping
the IDF on the Philadelphi Route?", half of the respondents said that
Netanyahu's insistence stems from political considerations. In the past week,
many have protested across the country in favor of a hostage deal and
criticized the government for not doing enough to promote a deal.
**Trust
in the Candidates for Prime Minister**
The
survey also found that Netanyahu enjoys less trust from the Israeli public than
other candidates for Prime Minister. 35% of Israelis trust opposition leader
Lapid more than Netanyahu, compared to 33% who trust Netanyahu more, and 28%
who do not trust either of them. The gap in trust widens against the Chairman
of the National Unity Party, Benny Gantz—41% of respondents said they trust
Gantz more, while 27% said they trust Netanyahu more. Compared to Netanyahu,
former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett enjoys the most trust. 44% of the Israeli
public trusts Bennett more than Netanyahu, compared to 29% who trust the Prime
Minister. In a survey published on "Ulpan Shishi" last week, Bennett,
who has retired from politics, led over Netanyahu in suitability for the role
of Prime Minister.
Additionally,
more Israelis see Netanyahu as the main person responsible for the October 7
failure than any other figure. According to the survey, 43% of Israelis see
Netanyahu as the main person responsible, followed by Chief of Staff Herzi
Halevi, Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, with a
significant gap.
The
survey also examined the public's position on Ben Gvir’s attempt to change the
status quo on the Temple Mount and promote Jewish prayers there. The survey
findings indicate that more than two-thirds of the Israeli public oppose Jewish
prayers on the Temple Mount, thereby opposing any change to the current
situation. link
The Region and the World
-
Personal Stories
Israeli journalist Amir Tibon survived the Oct. 7 massacre. He worries the country won't: The story of a reporter’s family from Kibbutz Nahal Oz has gained traction as their rescue by father Noam, a retired major general, highlights some of the day’s lifesaving heroism
Israeli journalist Amir Tibon's 'The Gates of Gaza' retells his family's experience on October 7 and his country's experience since. (Courtesy: Tibon via JTA)
Almost a decade ago, Amir Tibon moved with his wife to Kibbutz Nahal Oz on the Gaza border. They arrived in the wake of a lengthy war that had brought tragedy to the kibbutz, and took part in its healing as they started their own family.
Nine years later, when a much deeper catastrophe struck Nahal Oz, Tibon’s family was at its center, and their story spread across the world. Tibon has since retold their ordeal of hiding in a safe room on October 7 as Hamas terrorists killed and abducted their neighbors, and of how his parents — Gali and Noam, a retired Israeli major general — drove to the kibbutz to rescue his family and others along the way. To many, the story encapsulated the tragedy of the terror onslaught — which saw 1,200 people brutally murdered in southern Israel and 251 kidnapped to the Gaza Strip — along with the day’s moments of lifesaving heroism.
Now Tibon, a journalist for Haaretz, is living as an evacuee with his family in Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek in northern Israel. There, he woke up every morning before 5 a.m. to write “The Gates of Gaza,” a book that traces the history of Nahal Oz and the region, interspersed with his account of the harrowing events of October 7 and the surrounding failures of the Israeli government and military. His father is also a public figure and has been an increasingly outspoken critic of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since October 7.
Tibon spoke with The Jewish Telegraphic Agency about his memories of October 7, his experiences since then and what he hopes readers will take away from the book. The interview took place in two parts, first in late August and then following the discovery of the bodies of six murdered hostages in Gaza, including that of Israeli-American Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in early September. Tibon had been in touch with Goldberg-Polin’s family in the months after October 7.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
JTA: How has the past week been for you?
Amir Tibon: This has been the worst week since October 7. I feel like we failed. Anybody who knows people who were kidnapped personally, the fear that this is going to end terribly is much worse than it’s ever been before. [Netanyahu] saw what happened to these young people, all of whom could have been saved, and instead of changing his approach and realizing [it] will cost all the lives of the hostages, he doubled down.
In some cases, the families of the hostages are your neighbors from Kibbutz Nahal Oz on the Gaza border. What brought you there, and how has your perspective on the kibbutz changed since October 7?
We moved to Nahal Oz immediately after the 2014 war [against Hamas in Gaza] and during that war there was a crisis in the community, and it suffered from a loss of population. We wanted to do something different, something significant and also were in search of community. Moving from Tel Aviv, where we lived at the time, to a small community on the border ticked all those boxes.
I still believe in the mission of life and maintaining community on Israel’s borders. I’m not sure this is a priority for the State of Israel under the leadership of the current government, because under this government, we have basically lost two strips of border that were inhabited by dozens of communities [on the Gaza border and in northern Israel].Can you take me back to how you were feeling on October 7? What feelings have stuck with you from that day?
For us, the date is still October 7 because of the hostages. As long as that issue isn’t resolved, we think we are still on October 7, until we get back our friends who have been kidnapped from the kibbutz on October 7.
How much do you think other Israelis share that feeling?
I think it’s a sentiment that is shared widely in the country but not everybody feels it as strongly as people who have a personal connection. I think a lot of people agree, I would even say a majority agree, with these two sentiments: that this is a major failure that we have basically lost these two border strips, that it goes against the founding principles of Zionism that we have allowed this to happen. And that, as long as we are waiting for the hostages, we cannot really say we’ve overcome the tragedy and the trauma of October 7.
I think people who don’t feel this personally, they don’t think about it every day and feel it every day.
How have your kids been over the past 10 months? And how are your parents, who came to rescue you on October 7?
My girls love being here right now in Mishmar Haemek. Most of the children from Nahal Oz are doing, I think, quite well here. It’s a wonderful kibbutz and it’s a very generous community…
Like a lot of people, [my father is] worried about the situation in this country. And he’s trying to do good, to help in all sorts of ways.
And, you know, he’s a person who spent most of his adult life serving in the military. And I think for him, the failure of the military on October 7 is not just something that impacted his family, but something that he felt really impacted his whole sense of, you know, what it is to be Israeli.
We always, in the family, knew that he was a very trustworthy person, and my mom too, and this has only strengthened that. I think what has changed is that we used to trust the military and the government. We never had appreciation for this specific government. We knew they were untrustworthy.
But the institutions of this country — you know, the military, the intelligence agencies, ministries — everything collapsed on October 7. This has been a crisis for us as a family, because we’re a family that is invested in the State of Israel, believes in the State of Israel. You know, it’s hard to see what is happening. It really creates a sense of a loss of not just confidence, but of something you deeply believe in.
What has surprised you most about the past 10-plus months?
What has surprised me a lot, it’s a very painful surprise, but if you would have asked me 10 months ago, at the end of August, would Benjamin Netanyahu still be the prime minister of Israel and would 108 Israeli hostages still be in the hands of Hamas, I would say no way on both, right?
And sadly, the hostages are still in Gaza and he’s still prime minister. The two things are of course related to one another.
What gives you hope right now?
There was a very, very hopeful and positive moment at the end of November.
We got back about 100 hostages in a deal that was orchestrated by the Biden administration. And we also specifically received five hostages out of the seven from the kibbutz.
I wanted to believe that even though the fighting continued and we didn’t immediately get a continuation of the deal, I wanted to believe that it would maybe be a few weeks, a few months and we would get there. And now it’s been almost nine months since the collapse of that deal and, you know, we’re stuck.
I think that was the last moment of real optimism. Of course, there were moments of joy when we had hostages released in military operations… Those were the moments that I really felt optimism and joy. Unfortunately, it’s rare at the moment.
What was it like to write a book about Nahal Oz while you were living somewhere else?
I returned to the kibbutz several times, already in December, to collect materials for the book in the archive of the community. The archive building was not damaged on October 7 — only from the outside — but everything inside was not damaged, and I went there to collect materials.
It was a very interesting experience to sit there while the kibbutz is being bombarded by mortars from Gaza and while the IDF is operating in the neighboring kibbutz. It was a really, really painful experience, but at the same time, I felt that it was important to be there.
Today, there’s about 20 people living in the kibbutz, but when I went during December, nobody was living there. It was only soldiers. And you’re in this ghost town, it’s deserted. You have people working in agriculture, pretty much, that’s it. It’s bombarded, it’s empty. The scars of October 7 are seen everywhere, and inside this situation, you’re sitting in this archive room reading the kibbutz’s little community biweekly newspaper that was sent to members of the community in 1967 in the weeks leading up to the Six Day War.
Was it difficult to interview members of the kibbutz for the book?
I actually felt that it was therapeutic for the people I interviewed. I interviewed people who went through very difficult things on October 7. I interviewed a member of our local security team who fought terrorists for an entire day, got dehydrated and almost died. I interviewed the mother of one of the hostages.
I felt that the interviews actually were good for them, were actually kind of helpful in digesting this.
What do you wish other Israelis knew about your experience?
I want people in Israel to read this book and realize that the history of Kibbutz Nahal Oz and the other border communities did not begin on October 7. These were places where people lived and dreamed and struggled and overcame, and built homes and communities and families long before October 7. I don’t want October 7 to be the one and only day that is associated and affiliated with my community and other communities like it.
What do you want American Jews to take away from the book?
That’s a complicated question. I want American Jews to read this book and first of all, feel confident that it’s important to keep telling this story and to keep standing up for the truth here, because I know there have been a lot of lies and deception and attempts to rewrite history, to minimize what happened, to justify what happened. And I want this book to be helpful in that regard, to tell the truth about what happened.
At the same time, I also hope that people in the American Jewish community who have a tendency to always look away from the failures of Netanyahu and the Israeli government will realize that if they keep looking away, their children and grandchildren will not have a safe place in this world if, God forbid, antisemitism raises its head to the levels we’ve seen in the past.
The State of Israel is in terrible danger. The State of Israel is the insurance policy of every Jew in the world, I really believe it. If we don’t fight to keep this country safe, strong, properly managed, prosperous and democratic, the Jews of the world will lose their insurance policy.
Where do we go from here?
This is the money time for the American Jewish community and American elected officials.
Anybody who is putting up obstacles to bringing back our people should pay a price, and the American Jewish community needs to start speaking up.
Biden is the only leader in the world trying to get the hostages out. If Trump spoke in favor of a deal it could actually make a difference because Netanyahu would understand that there is pressure for a deal on both sides, Republican and Democrat, and this is something that American Jews can play a role in. Trump, Biden and Harris care about the American Jewish community to some degree. link
Israeli journalist Amir Tibon's 'The Gates of Gaza' retells his family's experience on October 7 and his country's experience since. (Courtesy: Tibon via JTA)
Almost a decade ago, Amir Tibon moved with his wife to Kibbutz Nahal Oz on the Gaza border. They arrived in the wake of a lengthy war that had brought tragedy to the kibbutz, and took part in its healing as they started their own family.
Nine years later, when a much deeper catastrophe struck Nahal Oz, Tibon’s family was at its center, and their story spread across the world. Tibon has since retold their ordeal of hiding in a safe room on October 7 as Hamas terrorists killed and abducted their neighbors, and of how his parents — Gali and Noam, a retired Israeli major general — drove to the kibbutz to rescue his family and others along the way. To many, the story encapsulated the tragedy of the terror onslaught — which saw 1,200 people brutally murdered in southern Israel and 251 kidnapped to the Gaza Strip — along with the day’s moments of lifesaving heroism.
Now Tibon, a journalist for Haaretz, is living as an evacuee with his family in Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek in northern Israel. There, he woke up every morning before 5 a.m. to write “The Gates of Gaza,” a book that traces the history of Nahal Oz and the region, interspersed with his account of the harrowing events of October 7 and the surrounding failures of the Israeli government and military. His father is also a public figure and has been an increasingly outspoken critic of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since October 7.
Tibon spoke with The Jewish Telegraphic Agency about his memories of October 7, his experiences since then and what he hopes readers will take away from the book. The interview took place in two parts, first in late August and then following the discovery of the bodies of six murdered hostages in Gaza, including that of Israeli-American Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in early September. Tibon had been in touch with Goldberg-Polin’s family in the months after October 7.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
JTA: How has the past week been for you?
Amir Tibon: This has been the worst week since October 7. I feel like we failed. Anybody who knows people who were kidnapped personally, the fear that this is going to end terribly is much worse than it’s ever been before. [Netanyahu] saw what happened to these young people, all of whom could have been saved, and instead of changing his approach and realizing [it] will cost all the lives of the hostages, he doubled down.
In some cases, the families of the hostages are your neighbors from Kibbutz Nahal Oz on the Gaza border. What brought you there, and how has your perspective on the kibbutz changed since October 7?
We moved to Nahal Oz immediately after the 2014 war [against Hamas in Gaza] and during that war there was a crisis in the community, and it suffered from a loss of population. We wanted to do something different, something significant and also were in search of community. Moving from Tel Aviv, where we lived at the time, to a small community on the border ticked all those boxes.
I still believe in the mission of life and maintaining community on Israel’s borders. I’m not sure this is a priority for the State of Israel under the leadership of the current government, because under this government, we have basically lost two strips of border that were inhabited by dozens of communities [on the Gaza border and in northern Israel].Can you take me back to how you were feeling on October 7? What feelings have stuck with you from that day?
For us, the date is still October 7 because of the hostages. As long as that issue isn’t resolved, we think we are still on October 7, until we get back our friends who have been kidnapped from the kibbutz on October 7.
How much do you think other Israelis share that feeling?
I think it’s a sentiment that is shared widely in the country but not everybody feels it as strongly as people who have a personal connection. I think a lot of people agree, I would even say a majority agree, with these two sentiments: that this is a major failure that we have basically lost these two border strips, that it goes against the founding principles of Zionism that we have allowed this to happen. And that, as long as we are waiting for the hostages, we cannot really say we’ve overcome the tragedy and the trauma of October 7.
I think people who don’t feel this personally, they don’t think about it every day and feel it every day.
How have your kids been over the past 10 months? And how are your parents, who came to rescue you on October 7?
My girls love being here right now in Mishmar Haemek. Most of the children from Nahal Oz are doing, I think, quite well here. It’s a wonderful kibbutz and it’s a very generous community…
Like a lot of people, [my father is] worried about the situation in this country. And he’s trying to do good, to help in all sorts of ways.
And, you know, he’s a person who spent most of his adult life serving in the military. And I think for him, the failure of the military on October 7 is not just something that impacted his family, but something that he felt really impacted his whole sense of, you know, what it is to be Israeli.
We always, in the family, knew that he was a very trustworthy person, and my mom too, and this has only strengthened that. I think what has changed is that we used to trust the military and the government. We never had appreciation for this specific government. We knew they were untrustworthy.
But the institutions of this country — you know, the military, the intelligence agencies, ministries — everything collapsed on October 7. This has been a crisis for us as a family, because we’re a family that is invested in the State of Israel, believes in the State of Israel. You know, it’s hard to see what is happening. It really creates a sense of a loss of not just confidence, but of something you deeply believe in.
What has surprised you most about the past 10-plus months?
What has surprised me a lot, it’s a very painful surprise, but if you would have asked me 10 months ago, at the end of August, would Benjamin Netanyahu still be the prime minister of Israel and would 108 Israeli hostages still be in the hands of Hamas, I would say no way on both, right?
And sadly, the hostages are still in Gaza and he’s still prime minister. The two things are of course related to one another.
What gives you hope right now?
There was a very, very hopeful and positive moment at the end of November.
We got back about 100 hostages in a deal that was orchestrated by the Biden administration. And we also specifically received five hostages out of the seven from the kibbutz.
I wanted to believe that even though the fighting continued and we didn’t immediately get a continuation of the deal, I wanted to believe that it would maybe be a few weeks, a few months and we would get there. And now it’s been almost nine months since the collapse of that deal and, you know, we’re stuck.
I think that was the last moment of real optimism. Of course, there were moments of joy when we had hostages released in military operations… Those were the moments that I really felt optimism and joy. Unfortunately, it’s rare at the moment.
What was it like to write a book about Nahal Oz while you were living somewhere else?
I returned to the kibbutz several times, already in December, to collect materials for the book in the archive of the community. The archive building was not damaged on October 7 — only from the outside — but everything inside was not damaged, and I went there to collect materials.
It was a very interesting experience to sit there while the kibbutz is being bombarded by mortars from Gaza and while the IDF is operating in the neighboring kibbutz. It was a really, really painful experience, but at the same time, I felt that it was important to be there.
Today, there’s about 20 people living in the kibbutz, but when I went during December, nobody was living there. It was only soldiers. And you’re in this ghost town, it’s deserted. You have people working in agriculture, pretty much, that’s it. It’s bombarded, it’s empty. The scars of October 7 are seen everywhere, and inside this situation, you’re sitting in this archive room reading the kibbutz’s little community biweekly newspaper that was sent to members of the community in 1967 in the weeks leading up to the Six Day War.
Was it difficult to interview members of the kibbutz for the book?
I actually felt that it was therapeutic for the people I interviewed. I interviewed people who went through very difficult things on October 7. I interviewed a member of our local security team who fought terrorists for an entire day, got dehydrated and almost died. I interviewed the mother of one of the hostages.
I felt that the interviews actually were good for them, were actually kind of helpful in digesting this.
What do you wish other Israelis knew about your experience?
I want people in Israel to read this book and realize that the history of Kibbutz Nahal Oz and the other border communities did not begin on October 7. These were places where people lived and dreamed and struggled and overcame, and built homes and communities and families long before October 7. I don’t want October 7 to be the one and only day that is associated and affiliated with my community and other communities like it.
What do you want American Jews to take away from the book?
That’s a complicated question. I want American Jews to read this book and first of all, feel confident that it’s important to keep telling this story and to keep standing up for the truth here, because I know there have been a lot of lies and deception and attempts to rewrite history, to minimize what happened, to justify what happened. And I want this book to be helpful in that regard, to tell the truth about what happened.
At the same time, I also hope that people in the American Jewish community who have a tendency to always look away from the failures of Netanyahu and the Israeli government will realize that if they keep looking away, their children and grandchildren will not have a safe place in this world if, God forbid, antisemitism raises its head to the levels we’ve seen in the past.
The State of Israel is in terrible danger. The State of Israel is the insurance policy of every Jew in the world, I really believe it. If we don’t fight to keep this country safe, strong, properly managed, prosperous and democratic, the Jews of the world will lose their insurance policy.
Where do we go from here?
This is the money time for the American Jewish community and American elected officials.
Anybody who is putting up obstacles to bringing back our people should pay a price, and the American Jewish community needs to start speaking up.
Biden is the only leader in the world trying to get the hostages out. If Trump spoke in favor of a deal it could actually make a difference because Netanyahu would understand that there is pressure for a deal on both sides, Republican and Democrat, and this is something that American Jews can play a role in. Trump, Biden and Harris care about the American Jewish community to some degree. link
Acronyms and Glossary
ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague
IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague
MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp
PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen
PMO- Prime Minister's Office
UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission
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