🎗️Lonny's War Update- October 393, 2023 - November 2, 2024 🎗️

  

🎗️Day 393 that 101 of our hostages in Hamas captivity
**There is nothing more important than getting them home! NOTHING!**

“I’ve never met them,

But I miss them. 

I’ve never met them,

but I think of them every second. 

I’ve never met them,

but they are my family. 

BRING THEM HOME NOW!!!”

Yarden Bibas, a couple of days before he, Shiri, little Ariel and baby Kfir were abducted from their home and have been in hell for 393 days.

We’re waiting for you, all of you.
A deal is the only way to bring
all the hostages home- the murdered for burial and the living for rehabilitation.

#BringThemHomeNow #TurnTheHorrorIntoHope

There is no victory until all of the hostages are home!

‎אין נצחון עד שכל החטופים בבית

 The two sections at the end, personal stories and Dark Legacy - The Abandonment of October 7th Hostages are very important to read, as important or more than the news of the day.

Red Alerts - Missile, Rocket, Drone (UAV - unmanned aerial vehicles), and Terror Attacks and Death Announcements

*9:15pm yesterday -south - rockets- Mefalsim

*2:15am - north center and center- rockets/missiles
*6:50am - north - rockets/missiles
*7:00am - north, center north, Haifa surrounding areas 
*8:10am - north -hostile aircraft - Naharia, Gersher Haziv, Saad, Evron, Shavei Zion, Mizra'a, Regba, Bustan Hagalil, Beit Haemek, Mes AMim, Nativ Hashayara, Acre
*8:10am - north - rockets/missiles - Around 15 rockets were fired from Lebanon triggering sirens in northern Israel a short while ago, the IDF says.

Some five rockets fired at the Upper Galilee were mostly intercepted, the IDF states. Some 10 rockets were also fired at the Haifa Bay area and Galilee. Some were intercepted while others fell in open areas, the military adds. There are no reports of injuries.

*8:15am - north - hostile aircraft - Shomrat, Lochemei Hagheto'ot, Goren, Gordot Hagalil, Hila, Ma'ilia, Maalot Tarshiha, Meona, Acre, Sha'ar Neaman, Kfar Mazarik
*8:15am - Haifa, Acre and Surrounding areas- hostile aircraft - Kfar Masrik, Ein Hamifratz, Acre, Kiryat Bialik
*8:20am - Acre, Haifa areas - hostile aircraft - Gedida Macker, Acre, Kiryat Yam, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Haim, Haifa, Kfar Bialik, Ahihod, Kiryat Ata
*8:25am - Haifa areas - hostile aircraft - Kiryat Haim, Tal-El, Bar Lev, Usha, Kfar Hamacabi, Ramat Yohanan, , Kiryat Ata, Kiryat Bialik
*8:30am - north - hostile aircraft - Beit Hilil, Hagoshrim
*8:35am - north - hostile aircraft - Kfar Yehoshua -The Magen David Adom ambulance service says 11 were injured, three moderately, in an overnight rocket attack on the central town of Tira.

Seven others were treated for acute anxiety, MDA says. video of the explosiion

*9:15am - north - rockets/missiles
*9:50am - north - rockets/missiles -Drone shot down, another said to hit factory in north in latest attack
Several drones were launched from Lebanon at northern Israel in the past hour, setting off sirens in the Haifa area. According to the IDF, one of the drones was successfully shot down by the Israeli Air Force. Another drone reportedly impacted a factory building in an industrial zone near Nahariya.
There are no reports of injuries in the attack.Footage posted to social media purports to show some of the drones and the damage caused to the factory.  video
*10:10am - north - rockets/missiles

*11:00am - south - Three drones launched at Israel from Iraq were shot down by Israeli air defenses over the Red Sea a short while ago, the military says.
The drones were launched “from the east,” a term the IDF uses to describe attacks from Iraq.
The Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq takes responsibility for launching them, claiming to have targeted sites in Eilat.
No sirens sounded in Eilat as the drones were shot down before entering Israeli airspace.

*11:05am- north -rockets/missiles
*12:05pm - north - rockets/missiles
*12:35pm - north - rockets/missiles
*12:45pm - north - rockets/missiles
*1:40pm - north - rockets/missiles
*1:55pm - north - rockets/missiles
*2:15pm - north - rockets/missiles
*3:05pm - north -rockets/missiles - over 80 rockets launched from Lebanon since the night
*3:55pm - north - rockets/missiles
*4:15pm - north - hostile aircraft - Shlomi, Metzuba, Batzet, Leeman, Gesher Haziv, Milu'ot, Naharia, Saar
*4:20pm - north - hostile aircraft - Evron, Shavei Zion, Mizra'a, Regba, Lochemei Haghetto'ot, Nes Amim, Shomrat, Bustan Hagalil
*4:25pm - Acre, Haifa and areas surrounding - hostile aircraft -Footage posted to social media shows a Hezbollah drone flying over northern Israel.

The IDF says it is working to intercept the device, as sirens continue to sound in northern communities from Nahariya to Haifa along the coast, and now also in Yokneam in the Jezreel Valley. video

*4:30pm - Haifa and areas surrounding - Hostile aircraft 

*4:35pm - East of Haifa, hostile aircraft - Yokneam, Elyikim, Bat Shlomo, Zichron Yaacov, Maayan Zvi, Ramat Hanadiv, Binyamina -Several drones were launched from Lebanon at northern Israel in the past hour, setting off sirens in the Haifa area.
According to the IDF, one of the drones was successfully shot down by the Israeli Air Force.
Another drone reportedly impacted a factory building in an industrial zone near Nahariya.
There are no reports of injuries in the attack.
Footage posted to social media purports to show some of the drones and the damage caused to the factory.  video

*

Hostage Updates 

• This is a call to Netanyahu and to Hamas, to Qatar and to Egypt:  there is no place for partial deals, short ceasefires, and small releases of hostages from Gaza and Palestinian prisoners from Israel. There is no place for deals that will take months to implement - there are too many exit points and the war will continue and too many more people will be killed. The deal that can be done and must be done is the following:

  1. The deal must last a short few weeks - from beginning to completion (something like three weeks). 

  2. All of the 101 hostages must be released by the end of three weeks - living and dead, civilian and military.

  3. Within three weeks the war will be over.

  4. Within three weeks Israel will completely withdraw from Gaza.

  5, By the end of three weeks, Hamas will turn over the control over Gaza to a Palestinian civilian-professional-technocrat government whose head will be appointed by Mahmoud Abbas, but the governing council of Gaza will be independent of the Palestinian Authority.

  6. Israel and Egypt will allow any Hamas personnel -military or civilian to exit Gaza safely to a third country.

  7. Hamas personnel remaining in Gaza will be integrated into the new regime, on the condition of their swearing loyalty to the new regime.

  8. The new regime in Gaza will renounce the armed struggle and work with the neighboring Arab countries in the deployment of an Arab-led international peacekeeping force in Gaza.

  9. With the new regime in Gaza, and the deployment of the peacekeeping force, international funds (with most of the funds coming from the Arab Gulf countries) will be deployed  for the reconstruction of Gaza.

  10. Humanitarian aid will flow into Gaza in great quantities to provide shelter, medical needs, food and water and other supplies badly needed by the Gaza population.

  11.  Israeli forces will be deployed on the Israel-Gaza border.

  12. US monitors will be deployed along the Philidephli corridor on the Egyptian side of the line.

  13. The Rafah crossing will be reopened and the new regime's security and border management team will administer the crossing. International inspectors will be deployed on both sides of the Rafah crossing.   
  (Gershon Baskin, November 2, 2024)         
   
• **The Dance of the Machine in the Secret Documents Affair: "Trampling Secrets and Spreading Disinformation to Sabotage the Deal"**
  
  
  Three publications, unauthorized removal and dissemination of highly classified materials, reckless handling of secret documents, and an intense disinformation campaign aimed at explaining why the hostages were not returned—these elements illustrate the battle over public perception against Israeli citizens. This battle involved classified documents, allowing access to individuals who failed security clearance tests for highly sensitive information, and a distorted narrative: "They bypassed the military's path. The leaks were targeted at internal debate."
  
  
  The "Sinwar Documents" affair, which some call the secret documents affair, should more aptly be named "the security scandal at the Prime Minister's Office." If the detainees—including an office spokesperson and several other suspects—are convicted of the charges, according to a senior official familiar with the details, they could face lengthy prison sentences, with some offenses carrying up to 15 years of incarceration. This is actually a conglomeration of four separate cases, intertwined into a stinking knot that is criminal, security-related, and political.
  
  
  The first involves the extraction of the most classified materials from the defense establishment and their subsequent movement beyond the military and even out of the country. This isn't just about the content of the documents but the potential risk to highly sensitive operational methods once it becomes public knowledge that Israel holds such materials, a fact that could aid the enemy in understanding how they were obtained.
  
  
  The second concerns how and why someone who failed their security clearance—barred by the Shin Bet from entering secured meetings and zones, including an absolute ban on access to the "aquarium" within the Prime Minister's Office—was granted entry to these areas, involved in the most confidential discussions, and allowed to accompany the Prime Minister on car rides during which classified conversations took place, on helicopter flights, and to intelligence community situation assessments. If the Prime Minister’s Office's version is correct and the detained individual had no formal role there, then who exactly authorized such proximity to one of the world's most heavily protected figures?
  
  
  The third element relates to the negligent handling of classified documents within the Prime Minister's Office. "The phrase 'risk to state security' barely scratches the surface," an insider described the handling of sensitive documents there, not limited to this case. "Documents taken out of the military secretary's safes, containing Israel's most guarded secrets, circulate without oversight in countless locations. It’s shocking to see the level of disdain shown towards matters critical to national security," said the source.
  
  
  The fourth aspect involves a vast, malevolent, false, coordinated, and sophisticated influence network using a strategic and falsified leak of the first type of documents to justify why the hostages had not been returned. Examining this effort offers a first glimpse into one of many initiatives within the Prime Minister's Office and among Netanyahu’s close circles that began immediately after October 7 last year. "This is the main effort, and everything else is subordinate to it," an individual deeply familiar with the office's operations said. "The overriding goal is not the release of hostages or ending the war, but preserving the current government, reshaping public perception, distancing any prospect of a state inquiry commission, while maintaining the coalition and countering the push for elections."
  
  
  **Netanyahu's Double Problem**  
  “The issue of the hostages,” he explains, “is part of the overarching strategy and should be viewed as such. It's clear Bibi wants to rescue hostages. If Bibi could secure their release at a minimal cost without compromising this greater goal, he would certainly do it. But Bibi has much higher priorities—his partners have warned him that any deal could unravel the coalition, and he himself fears a deal that could spark calls for elections or a state commission of inquiry.”
  
  
  “Netanyahu found himself in a double bind—not only unable to tell the public the truth about his opposition to the deal but also as both sides reached an extremely close point in early July, and the office feared it was slipping away. Thus, figures in his circle orchestrated perception-shaping campaigns, some overseas but all aimed at the Israeli public, concocting plausible but baseless reasons and backing them with manipulated or fabricated documents.”
  
  
  “At the end of the day, if one were to summarize what is happening here in a single sentence, this is it,” said a senior military-intelligence-investigative figure familiar with the secret documents case involving the detained spokesperson who worked with the Prime Minister’s Office: “A group of individuals, operating in the shadows, schemed, activated agents in the IDF, trampled on secrets with blatant disregard, endangered methods and sources, forged documents, fed disinformation to the media—all to sabotage the hostage deal.”
  
  
  “How do these people live with themselves? How can they look in the mirror? What do they tell themselves each morning?” added the frustrated source. Another source noted, “This wasn’t just betrayal against the hostages but against the army as well—they spied, disrupted, lied, and committed numerous legal, moral, and ethical violations—all in an atmosphere of reckless impunity, where anything goes, and each person does what they see fit, even when dealing with the most sensitive issues.”
  
  
  On October 21, the Rishon LeZion Magistrate's Court held a secretive session under extreme confidentiality. Attendees feared leaks about the topic of the hearing, the requested orders, the justifications, and the suspects in the serious case brought before the judge. Eden Masali, an investigator from Lahav 433 of the Israel Police, requested and received a strict gag order, including one on the order itself, alongside additional directives for the Shin Bet and police team.
  
  
  The secrecy appeared to be maintained and paid off. Before dawn last Sunday, as the overt phase of the investigation commenced, police and Shin Bet units raided the homes of the suspects. Among them was an adviser close to the Netanyahu couple and three others, who were caught off guard in their beds at 4 a.m., completely shocked.
  
  
  Dramatic events struck like thunder on the Prime Minister's Office when a special unit raided at 4 a.m. the home of an individual without proper security clearance who roamed the most restricted zones in the country—classified facilities, bases, within the office, and inside the "aquarium." Since then, a parade of lawyers connected to Netanyahu’s associates fearful of being summoned for questioning resumed.
  
  
  **The Dance of the Machine**  
  Not only did the lawyer parade reappear, but also a highly aggressive letter from one of Netanyahu’s associates, published promptly in sympathetic media. The following day, seemingly unrelated to the previous events, Communication Minister Shlomo Karhi suddenly sent a harsh letter to Mandelblit. But this time it was directed at Chief Military Censor Brigadier General Kobi Mandelblit. Unlike the previous Mandelblit incident, this letter wasn’t preceded by prior confrontations or correspondence between Dr. Karhi and Brig. Gen. Mandelblit.
  
  
  “These letters concern censorship bans on publishing information, which was later disseminated by the IDF spokesperson. In some instances, information that one outlet was prohibited from publishing was subsequently given exclusively to others by the IDF spokesperson. In other cases, journalists who worked for months on revelations were restricted from publishing, only for the details to be broadly released by the IDF spokesperson later,” Karhi wrote. The censorship division was puzzled as to why Karhi suddenly targeted them, but then someone in the IDF's information security system recalled the secret investigation and the interrogation rooms where another Netanyahu associate found himself and connected the dots.    link                                                                                                                                                        

Gaza and the South

• IDF Says troops destroyed large Hamas underground arms manufacturing plant in central Gaza
  

The inside of a Hamas weapons manufacturing tunnel, found in the central Gaza Strip, in a handout image published by the IDF on November 2, 2024. (Israel Defense Forces)

A large underground weapons manufacturing plant operated by Hamas was recently located and demolished by troops in the central Gaza Strip, the IDF announces.

Troops with the 252nd Division located the tunnel network, where Hamas had previously manufactured weapons.

The site was located “in the heart of a civilian population,” near Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighborhood, the IDF says.

In the tunnel, the IDF says troops found lathes, and hundreds of components used to build rockets, mortars, grenades, and diving equipment, the latter of which would have been used by Hamas terrorists to infiltrate into Israel via the sea.

The inside of a Hamas weapons manufacturing tunnel, found in the central Gaza Strip, in a handout image published by the IDF on November 2, 2024. (Israel Defense Forces)

Also in the tunnel, the IDF says it found several rooms where Hamas operatives could reside for long periods. The rooms included kitchens, bedrooms, and offices.

Combat engineers mapped out the tunnel system, before demolishing it.

The IDF says that by demolishing the tunnel and seizing the equipment, it “foiled another attempt by the Hamas terror organization to rearm.” 

• The Kfir Infantry Brigade has been deployed to northern Gaza’s Jabalia, as the IDF expands its ongoing operation against Hamas there.

  The military says Kfir joins the Givati and 401st brigades, which have operating under the 162nd DIvision in Jabalia since last month.

  So far during the operation in Jabalia, the IDF says troops have killed and detained hundreds of terror operatives.

Northern Israel - Lebanon/Hizbollah/Syria

• Lebanon’s health ministry says 52 people had been killed in Israeli strikes today in the country’s east, attacks for which the Israeli army had not issued evacuation warnings.

  Without differentiating between civilians and combatants, the ministry reports “52 people killed and 72 wounded in an updated toll of today’s Israeli enemy strikes on the Baalbek-Hermel region.”

  Twelve of the victims were killed in the village of Amhaz, it said, while nine others were killed in Yunin and eight in Bednayel.

  Israel has been targeting Hezbollah sites throughout Lebanon in response to the terror group’s near-daily attacks against Israel since October 8, 2023.

• Lebanon’s Transport Minister Ali Hamieh says an Israeli strike near a border crossing between northeast Lebanon and Syria forced the crossing to shut after it had been partly reopened.

  The strike hit the same location within Syria, just past the Syrian border installation, as an Israeli bombardment last month closed the crossing, Hamieh says. It had been partly reopened for cars but not trucks and was now closed again.

• A Hezbollah drone that set off sirens in northern Israel in the past hour was shot down by an Israeli Air Force attack helicopter in the Binyamina area, south of Haifa.

  Footage posted to social media shows the moment that the drone was shot down. Footage shows the moment an IAF attack helicopter shot down a Hezbollah drone over northern Israel this afternoon.

• Israeli Navy SEALs captured last night Imad Amhaz - a senior member of Hezbollah's naval force in an operation in Northern Lebanon, an Israeli official tells me. The official said Amhaz was detained in order to interrogate him and learn more about Hezbollah's naval operations
  
  

• Israeli fighter jets struck the Hezbollah rocket launchers used in this morning’s barrage on central Israel, the IDF says.

  Three rockets were launched in the attack, one of which struck a home in Tira, wounding 11 people.

  The IDF releases footage of the strike on the launchers in Lebanon. video. Meanwhile, a barrage of some 30 rockets was fired from Lebanon at the Galilee an hour ago.

  The IDF says most of the rockets were shot down by air defenses. There are no reports of injuries.

• The commander of Hezbollah’s coastal region in southern Lebanon was killed in an Israeli airstrike yesterday, along with another top member of the terror group, the IDF announces.

  The military says that Moein Musa Izz al-Din, the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal regional unit, and Hassan Majed Diab, the commander of the unit’s artillery array, were killed in the strike yesterday in the Tyre area.

  Diab was responsible for a rocket barrage on the Haifa Bay area on Thursday, which killed a mother and son, along with more than 400 other rockets in the past month, according to the IDF.

West Bank and Jerusalem and Terror attacks within Israel

•     

Politics and the War (general news)

•  
• 
  
  
• **The Weapon That Became Hamas’s Nightmare: "It’s Every Commander’s Battlefield Dream"**

  
  
  
  The decision to use a drone for further inspection before troops entered revealed four explosives that could have collapsed the entire building on the soldiers. The products of the Drone School of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, hastily established during the war, are saving dozens of soldiers under fire. Now, the instructor-soldiers talk about the revolution in urban combat, the terrorist who froze when he saw a drone before him, and the moment when Sinwar realized that a tiny aircraft had sealed his fate.
  
  
  It happened in the narrow alleys of the Nur al-Shams refugee camp, not far from the communities of Bat Hefer and Yad Hana. A special unit patrolling the area with a drone detected an armed terrorist cell hiding among the houses. The drone, which approached within a few meters of the cell, took the terrorists by surprise. In response, they opened fire at it and even threw stones and objects to try and bring it down – similar to what Yahya Sinwar also did.
  
  
  The drone operators in the refugee camp quickly reacted, pulled it back, and launched a replacement drone for the mission. The new drone pinpointed the terrorists’ exact location and identified their weapons. Next, a third drone was sent up, armed, and attacked them. Shortly after, a fourth drone was deployed to confirm the results of the strike: four terrorists were eliminated without endangering a single soldier. This event, part of a brigade operation conducted in the refugee camp in May of this year, tells the whole story. While in the past, drones were exclusively used by elite units, today they have become essential equipment for every combat force in Gaza, the West Bank, or southern Lebanon. The change is so dramatic that commanders are unwilling to send forces for building raids or tunnel discovery without them.
  
  
  Exclusive footage for the N12 magazine from the fighting in Gaza demonstrates another instance where a drone saved soldiers' lives and sealed the fate of a terrorist. In a video being published for the first time, a drone captures its entry into a building in Sajaiya. The drone precisely scanned the area and spotted a terrorist sitting in a corner, lying in wait for the forces. The drone revealed the terrorist’s location, who was then neutralized before he could execute his ambush.

   
  The drone spots the terrorist lying in wait for IDF troops – and thwarted his plan | Photo: IDF Spokesperson
  
  
  **Once and For All: UAV or Drone?**  
  Many use the terms UAV and drone interchangeably, but the difference is significant: UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is the broad family name for anything flying without a pilot. The drone, on the other hand, is the agile and flexible member of the family: a compact device equipped with a bladed rotor, relatively simple mechanics, and the ability to take off vertically. Its major advantage lies in enabling the operator to see every detail of the target, thanks to its slow flight and ability to sneak into buildings.
  
  
  The use of drones, serving as the "pioneering force" for advancing troops, allows for quick and precise responses. Within seconds, they can take to the air, patrol between buildings, enter through windows, navigate booby-trapped structures, and locate terrorist cells—all without endangering the soldiers, who remain one step behind and advance according to the live images captured by the small aircraft. Their compactness and operational simplicity make them a significant force multiplier on the ground and, most importantly, life savers.

  

  
  

  

  
  

  **The Aerial Power of the Infantry**

  
  

  The Counter-Terrorism Unit (LOTAR) of the Marom Brigade, typically responsible for training all IDF units in counter-terrorism, quickly recognized the tremendous potential that drones offer to any combat team on the battlefield. As early as October 7, when the unit's fighters were deployed to combat in the Gaza border area, they witnessed firsthand the critical importance of drone capabilities. The operational lessons gathered during the intense fighting were swiftly translated into a new combat doctrine, leading to the rapid establishment of the first military drone school.

  
  

  This school, established with unprecedented speed even by LOTAR standards, has become a hub for IDF field units. Each week, dozens of trainees from commando units and infantry battalions come to practice and train in operating these innovative tools. "Before the war, the army had intelligence-gathering capabilities at the battalion and company levels, but we realized there was a crucial need for intelligence at the individual combat team level," explains Major B., head of the drone division in LOTAR.

  

  
  

  

  
  

  During the three-day course, the fighters undergo an intensive program of learning and practice. In special facilities simulating tunnels in Khan Yunis or booby-trapped buildings in Jabalia, trainees learn not only how to fly the drones but also how to counter enemy tactics. "Most of the course focuses on how to fight using the drone, not just on flying it," says Senior Warrant Officer (res.) Rotem, one of the school’s founders. "Flight training is on the first day, and the next two days are dedicated to combat techniques."

  
  

  The urgent need for quick solutions led to a significant revolution. In a short time, hundreds of fighters have completed the training, and the circle of skilled operators in the army continues to expand. "At the end of the training," says B., "every fighter knows how to operate a drone independently, even without prior experience or knowledge."

  
  

  **The Identification That Saved an Entire Reconnaissance Team**

  
  

  The realization that the drone is a "game changer" on the battlefield was solidified in the early days of the war. LOTAR instructors, who joined forces in Be'eri and Urim equipped with drones, successfully identified terrorists hiding in corners and inside houses, saving entire teams from ambushes. "It's what every commander dreams of – to have eyes on the battlefield without risking their force," Rotem describes.

  
  

  One unit deployed to the Urim base, swarming with terrorists, encountered heavy fire from a terrorist concealed in a protected shelter but could not pinpoint his exact location. A reservist, who brought a drone from home, launched it into the air and identified the terrorist in the shelter. "Without the drone, the troops would have simply opened the door and faced 'muzzle-to-muzzle,' a scenario where someone always gets hurt," Senior Sergeant Y., a senior instructor and LOTAR fighter, recounts.

  
  

  Instead, the team planned an accurate operational move: snipers were positioned in control spots and provided suppressive fire. The terrorist, who tried to flee, was neutralized without endangering the soldiers. "The terrorist was hit in three different points and fell without being able to harm our forces," Y. recalls. The conclusion was clear: every combat team must carry a drone. "That was a pivotal event that proved beyond doubt that the drone is an operational necessity in combat. On that day, without question, it saved soldiers' lives."

  
  

  The IDF currently employs tiny FPV (First Person View) drones. These are not military-developed or defense industry products created at the request of the IDF but civilian items that can be easily purchased online. Unlike regular drones, operated with a mobile phone or tablet, the FPV operator wears VR goggles that show the operational field from the drone's perspective. Some army drones are also equipped with offensive capabilities: they can "kamikaze" a target without risking soldiers, fire various grenades, including fragmentation grenades, or drop small charges.

  
  

  The IDF acknowledges that Hamas and Hezbollah have also mastered drone technology and turned it into a weapon capable of causing significant damage. On October 7, Hamas drones succeeded in damaging advanced Israeli systems worth millions of dollars. The threat of bomb-carrying drones against soldiers and armored vehicles had not previously received enough attention.

  
  

  As the fighting continued, more and more evidence accumulated of the effectiveness of drones moving ahead of forces. One notable example occurred during the battles in Rafah, where an instructor from the drone school joined a Givati reconnaissance team. After a tank hit a suspicious building, the drone sent inside discovered a tunnel shaft, a cache of weapons including sniper rifles and Kalashnikovs, and a sophisticated charge system designed to collapse a four-story building on the entire reconnaissance team. The drone’s preliminary scan averted a major disaster.

  
  

  In another incident in Gaza involving a paratrooper reconnaissance team, a dog from the Oketz Unit was initially sent to scan a suspect building. Although the dog "cleared" the structure, indicating no immediate danger, the commanders decided to deploy a drone for further inspection. This decision turned out to be life-saving: the drone discovered four explosive charges that would have brought down the building on anyone entering it.

  
  

   

  IDF soldier operating a drone in the Golan Heights, archive | Photo: Michael Giladi, Flash 90  

  

  Operational lessons learned during the intense fighting were quickly implemented. The military drone school | Photo: IDF Spokesperson  
  
  

  **"The Terrorist Didn't Know What to Do"**
  

  Another testament to the central role of drone use in Gaza emerged from an encounter in Rafah, where Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was neutralized. A military drone identified three figures exiting a building in Tel al-Sultan. Following an exchange of fire and tank shelling, the soldiers used the drone to scan the building where Sinwar was hiding. The drone detected an injured masked figure in the corner of a room, who, with his remaining strength, threw a piece of wood at it. After another tank shot, the forces scanned the structures with drones and found the bodies. Only then did the soldiers enter and noticed that the body of the masked figure resembled Sinwar.

  
  

  Although the soldiers did not initially know it was Sinwar, they chose to proceed cautiously and avoid risking lives. According to the new combat doctrine, they employed a drone to achieve two goals: obtaining an updated view of the situation inside the building where Sinwar had taken refuge and conducting a precise post-strike scan.

  

  Yihya Sinwar from the drone images

  
  

  Indeed, field responses speak for themselves. The instructors at the school receive about four messages a week from soldiers reporting instances where drones prevented casualties. "The realization hits when you achieve an identification that saves lives," shares B. "Almost every deployment is a significant operational event. Any team that flies a drone into a house they intend to enter and flags it as a booby-trapped target automatically saves half of the soldiers’ lives." Rotem agrees: "Understanding the importance of this work and the ability to save lives changes everything."

  
  

  In one prominent case, B. received a heartfelt message from the father of a soldier: "I want you to know that the drone you provided saved my son's platoon." Two soldiers from the platoon had completed drone training that weekend, and by Sunday, they were deployed to Gaza. During a building-clearing mission, the drone they had discovered a militant hiding in one of the rooms. The militant, likely thinking it was an explosive drone, emerged from his hiding spot and opened fire at it. Following the detection, a tank was brought in to demolish the structure. "Had the drone not scanned the rooms one by one, the militant would have waited for the soldiers to enter and then attacked them with gunfire and grenades."

  

  An IDF soldier operating a drone in the Golan Heights, archive | Photo: Michael Giladi, Flash 90
  
  

  

  An intelligence gathering drone in action Photo: IDF spokesman

  
  

  
  

  The psychological effect of drones on militants is also significant. This was demonstrated during an assault by Egoz Unit fighters on approximately 100 buildings in Khan Younis’s “Qatari” neighborhood. A drone entered a house and filmed a heavily armed militant at close range. Instead of shooting or attempting to flee, the militant froze. "He stood there with his weapon, unsure what to do," recalls a LOTAR officer. "He realized he was encircled." These brief moments of shock provided the tactical advantage needed, and the militant was neutralized.

  
  

  Hamas militants' behavior towards drones evolved dramatically throughout the fighting: in the initial months, they tended to freeze when spotting a drone above them, but later they developed countermeasures—shutting doors and windows, shooting at drones, and attempting to hide. "The initial shock effect is gone," LOTAR admits.

  
  

  **A Lab on the Battlefield**

  
  

  A visit to the school’s site at the Adam base reveals a setup that is far from conventional classrooms. The enclosed spaces have been replaced with open-air "lounges," long-winded presentations have been swapped for practical videos, and reading materials have been converted into hands-on experiences.

  
  

  "We created a course tailored for the TikTok generation," explains Rotem. "It’s not a standard military course—the audience consists of combat soldiers usually in active operations, not people coming from air-conditioned homes. Put them in a regular classroom for 15 minutes, and you’ve lost them."

  
  

  **The Unique Structure of the School**

  
  

  The school's uniqueness lies in its instructor-combatants who blend teaching with ongoing operational activity. Major B. exemplifies this well—he commands both the school and a LOTAR operational team simultaneously. He conducted the interview between missions, just hours after returning from combat in southern Lebanon and before heading back. "LOTAR is an operational unit that works at night," Rotem explains. "The instructors fight at night and teach during the day. This is the school’s great advantage—all the instructors have fought with this drone and developed a comprehensive combat doctrine for its use in any battlefield scenario."

  
  

  Alongside LOTAR personnel, about 60% of the instructors are reservists who combine combat experience with strong technological backgrounds. "We recruited top professionals from Microsoft, Elbit, and HP," Rotem notes. The facility also hosts a lab providing 24/7 technical support: "If a drone breaks or is hit by gunfire, we repair it. Every course graduate becomes part of our community, and the instructors are available 24/7 for any questions or issues."
  
  

  "In love with drones, living and breathing it."

  
  

  Over the past year, LOTAR’s operational teams have been fighting in Gaza and southern Lebanon as part of brigade combat teams, utilizing their operational skills in breaching, demolitions, sniping, and drone operation. “We tailor our training content to the ever-changing reality on the ground,” says Rotem. “When our people find something new in Lebanon, the operational insights are immediately incorporated into the training.”

  
  

  The demand for courses is tremendous, with a waiting period of about two months. To meet operational needs, LOTAR decided to open branches at IDF training bases. This led to the creation of a new role: maneuver drone instructors. These instructors undergo a month-long professional training at the school, which includes drone operation, combat, and instruction. After completing the training, they lead training programs for soldiers at various basic training bases. “I never thought I would become part of this field, but it ended up being fascinating,” shares Private Shahar, one of the first two instructors.

  
  

  “What sets us apart,” one instructor describes, “is that people here genuinely care. This isn’t just another classroom – we create an environment that reflects our passion for the subject. We don’t just ‘like’ the job; we’re in love with it, living and breathing it every moment.”

  
  

  What started as an urgent response to an operational need quickly developed into a permanent institution leading the drone revolution in the IDF. “This school was established to stay,” states Major B. “We are constantly examining new technologies that will enhance the lethality of our troops in the field and improve combat methods.”link
• 
  

The Region and the World

• "Fell into a Trap": This is How Hundreds of Israelis Were Ordered to Spy for Iran. 
  "It seemed innocent at first": Hundreds of Israelis, perhaps more, are in contact with Iranian operatives and receive orders from them. Through deception, persuasion, and money, they are lured into committing serious and daring acts, with some even willing to carry out assassinations on behalf of Iran. The recruitment and operational methods are now being revealed: "Interrogations uncovered astonishing details about the way Iranian intelligence operates." Exclusive for N12 Magazine.
  "He claimed he received orders and didn't fully understand what he was doing. His Hebrew isn’t fluent. When he realized what he was suspected of, he broke down in tears." The story of the spy cell from the Haifa and Krayot region, which operated within Israel for two years, could have ended with much greater consequences: the seven members of the cell conducted around 600 intelligence-gathering missions and received millions of shekels in return. The cell’s operation began when one member visited Azerbaijan, where he was approached by an Iranian agent and persuaded to recruit others. Small requests quickly accumulated and turned into a full-fledged espionage command center.  
  

Sometimes it starts with a pop-up message on a computer or phone. In other cases, talk of "easy money" for simple photo assignments spreads by word of mouth among different Israelis, ensnaring them in the network. In many other cases, a tourist or business trip to certain countries leads to a meeting between an unsuspecting Israeli and an Iranian posing as a friendly local or businessperson: "Every such encounter could turn into a spy deal," warns a senior security official in an interview with N12 Magazine.

Just today (Thursday), another severe espionage case was revealed: Rafael and Lela Guliyev, around 32 years old from Lod, were activated and directed by Iran. According to the indictment, they documented the Mossad headquarters and other sites, physically tracked an investigator as preparation for an assassination, and transmitted encrypted messages—all for approximately $26,000. Investigations revealed that they were recruited by a man named Elshan (Elkhan) Aghayev, 56, of Azeri origin, who was actually working for entities connected to the Tehran regime.
Hours later, it was revealed that another young Israeli, Asher Benjamin Weiss from Bnei Brak, tracked a nuclear scientist on Iranian orders to assassinate him. During his interrogation, Weiss claimed, "I was unaware of the identity of the person who contacted me; I only discovered it after my arrest," and later stated that he "played along" and deceived the Iranians, merely pretending to carry out the instructions he received.
As Israel continues to deal with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and its other proxies, another front has opened quietly, behind the scenes—a front no less dangerous. The Islamic Republic recruits Israeli citizens for espionage missions, documenting military sites, and targeting military personnel and senior officials, even planning their assassination as part of wartime support for the enemy.
Some of the footage taken by these Israelis later contributed to strikes on those locations during Iran's attack waves in April and October, raising significant concern in Israel. Now, accounts from security sources in conversations with N12 Magazine, along with the findings from recently exposed investigations, reveal the methods of recruitment and operation used by Iranian operatives within Israel.

 

"Only Some Knew the True Intent"
The assessment is that the recently exposed cases are just the tip of the iceberg of the domestic threat. "Hundreds of Israelis have already been in contact with Iranian intelligence agents in recent years," says the senior security official, clarifying: "Only dozens of them were aware of the true intentions of the 'investor' or 'innocent entrepreneur'; the rest were not." According to security officials, Israelis traveling abroad—particularly to countries with good relations with the Islamic Republic—face a real risk of recruitment. But they are not the only targets.
In the past year, security officials have identified a sharp increase in attempts to recruit Israelis. People have reported suspicious contact attempts, with some even describing a personal feeling of "exploitation" after realizing they were being directed by a hostile actor.
The "Price List" from Some of the Recent Cases

"People are unaware of the depth of the danger. When there are dozens of reports of individuals finding themselves in contact with Iranian operatives, it’s hard to downplay the severity of the threat," the senior security official emphasizes. "Iran acts in any country where it can deploy agents and conduct recruitment on the ground."

This gradually developing phenomenon poses a new threat: Tehran is working to activate spies within Israel and exploit Israelis' economic, personal, and moral vulnerabilities to advance its security objectives. The understanding within the defense system is that the enemy is sophisticated and skilled, employing a "spray" method: shooting in all directions, hoping to hit any potential target, with the expectation that eventually, some Israelis will agree to work for them in exchange for short-term financial gain. The recruits receive specific instructions, sometimes without understanding their implications, driven primarily by immediate financial incentives.

 *“Trust is built and missions escalate”**     

Surveillance in Israel and Assassination Orders

There appears to be no single, definitive characteristic among the recruits; they come from a wide variety of backgrounds: ultra-Orthodox, new immigrants, and even older, established residents. However, most recruits share a clear common denominator: the pursuit of money and a weakened sense of connection to the state and its institutions. One suspect even stated during interrogation: "When I needed help, the state wasn’t there for me. The state screwed me over. I was left without a single penny. I needed the money."

Aziz Nisnov Accused of Spying for Iran Aziz Nisnov, accused of spying for Iran, is part of a cell from the Kiryat region. From the investigations revealed so far, it appears that beyond gathering information and documenting strategic facilities, Iranian recruiters do not stop at documentation and photography tasks; they aim to track senior Israeli officials. For instance, three members of the Kiryat-based cell were "caught red-handed" near the home of a senior official, tasked with following senior security figures. Suspicious communications found in the social media accounts of one of the accused suggest the Iranians were particularly interested in tracking the movements of the official and their family members around their home.

When Iranian agents identify someone willing to "move forward" and take on more dangerous tasks, they attempt to recruit them for primary missions—assassination of key figures. The head of a spy cell from the Beit Safafa neighborhood in Jerusalem, for instance, acquired a rifle with the intent to assassinate an Israeli nuclear scientist. He even visited the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot to "study" the location and its surroundings but retreated at the last moment and only photographed the entrance gate due to the security arrangements there. In another case, Vladimir Varkhovsky, a 35-year-old resident of Petah Tikva, agreed to assassinate an Israeli figure and even obtained a weapon for the purpose.

Surveillance, Cryptocurrency Payments, and Makeshift Explosives Iran operates remotely with multiple cells, hoping that at least some efforts will result in shocking assassinations in Israel. Moti Maman, a 73-year-old Israeli businessman from Ashkelon, is at the center of another case: he was accused of meeting Iranian agents in Turkey and Iran and discussing potential assassination plots against senior Israeli figures, including the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the head of the Shin Bet. The indictment states that he was even smuggled into the Islamic Republic twice for meetings with intelligence officials. In his interrogation, Maman claimed he initially thought he was trading fruits, vegetables, and spices with Turkish businessmen and only realized what was happening when he was brought to Iran: "Thank you for arresting me, I didn’t know what to do," he said.

Just before the Sukkot holiday, the Shin Bet and police reported foiling an assassination attempt for the fifth time in a month, directed by Iranian intelligence. Seven residents of Beit Safafa in Jerusalem were arrested on suspicion of planning not only to assassinate the senior Israeli scientist but also a major city mayor. In a previous case, seven Jewish suspects from the north, including a deserter soldier and two minors, were arrested. They were recruited through social media and carried out tasks for Iranian agents for over two years. This cell documented military installations, including the Nevatim and Ramat David air bases, the Kirya base in Tel Aviv, and Iron Dome sites, allegedly receiving payments in cryptocurrency amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Exploitative Recruitment and Economic Desperation The Iranian strategy appears focused on exploiting economically and socially marginalized Israelis, drawing in individuals who may feel detached or betrayed by state institutions. The investigations show a common pattern: starting with seemingly harmless tasks like photographing public places before gradually advancing to more severe espionage and assassination missions.

In a recently exposed case, a couple from Ramat Gan—Vladislav Viktorson (30), with a significant criminal record, and Anna Bernstein (18)—was recruited through a Telegram group. According to investigations, Viktorson carried out tasks such as spraying anti-Prime Minister graffiti, printing flyers, and setting cars on fire. The couple even attempted to assemble an improvised explosive device and acquire weapons as part of a plot to commit murder.

**"Gradually, the tasks become more dangerous"**  

Chief Superintendent Maor Goren, head of the Security Division at the Israel National Unit for Serious and International Crime Investigations (Lahav 433), shed light on Iranian recruitment methods and objectives in an interview with N12 magazine: “We’ve encountered eight cases so far, just within our unit, and they all share a common trait: they involve Israeli citizens who fell into the Iranian trap.” He explained that one of the main methods used by Iranian intelligence and its operatives is social media recruitment. Another method uncovered involves intermediaries in Turkey or Eastern Europe. “The handlers start with simple tasks, like taking photos of seemingly innocent locations in Israel, and gradually progress to more complex and dangerous assignments. A person might receive a task to photograph a building or restaurant in Israel and send the images to an unknown contact in exchange for tens of dollars. Over time, the missions escalate, including documenting military facilities, IDF bases, or even tracking senior Israeli officials.”

In some cases, the first task given to recruits was as simple as photographing certain public places or shopping centers. At this stage, recruits do not perceive their actions as serious, but in reality, for Iranian intelligence, each such photograph adds to a cache of useful information.

**How Iran Exploits “Frustrated” Israelis**  

When asked about the profiles targeted by Iranian intelligence officers, Chief Superintendent Goren replied: “Their characteristics are clear—they are often people in dire economic straits, in need of money, or looking for easy ways to earn cash. Many of them feel alienated from the state and its institutions or harbor resentment toward the government; some are new immigrants or people living on the fringes of society, economically and socially. These are individuals in distress who do not feel a genuine connection to the State of Israel. They feel abandoned by the state.” Goren noted, “Many of the suspects are new immigrants or residents facing significant financial difficulties and seek quick and easy economic solutions. In some cases, Iranian recruiters exploit feelings of anger and frustration these citizens harbor towards the system.” Most of the accused in these cases reported that they were initially unaware they were serving Iranian interests: “I needed the money,” one defendant admitted during his interrogation. “I didn’t know who was behind the tasks I was given. I did it because I had to.”

**“Sites Photographed Became Attack Targets”**  

A cell of seven Israelis from the Haifa and Krayot area also photographed the Glilot base and the dining hall that was targeted at the Golani Brigade training base near Binyamina, resulting in the deaths of four soldiers. Even after the incident, they were instructed to return to the sites and document the destruction and damage. Further investigations revealed they also documented other locations that were later targeted by missile fire. Images found on one suspect's computer showed precise targets that were subsequently attacked by missiles launched from Iran. “When we apprehend the suspect and find the photos they sent and the tasks they were given, we compare this to attacks carried out by Iran, and sometimes we see that places photographed by suspects indeed became actual targets during an attack,” emphasized Goren. “This is a classic example of how Israeli citizens, without fully understanding the implications, directly assist the enemy during wartime,” he said. The security establishment is acutely aware of these attempts, with the military involved in every case, underscoring collaboration among security bodies, led by the army and police. “We receive support from the relevant agencies, which study the methods to prevent future attempts. Even in cases where attackers did not physically enter IDF bases but observed them from outside, the information they collect can be catastrophic.”

Chief Superintendent Goren elaborated: “Recently, we detained several suspects willing to carry out assassinations. One was a man from Tel Aviv who agreed to kill a target for $100,000. Another case involved the Ramat Gan couple, who conducted intelligence missions ahead of a planned assassination. One of them sought to obtain a sniper rifle to hit a target from a distance. It’s a process of deterioration and escalation—from innocent photo-taking to dangerous assassination missions.”

**Infiltration into a Network of Over 2,000 Israelis**  

The most troubling aspect for the security establishment is the recruits’ lack of understanding regarding the true severity of their actions: Investigations have repeatedly revealed that suspects did not realize that seemingly harmless photography was actually espionage on behalf of Iranian intelligence. The recruits, in their view, received small payments for “trivial” and seemingly simple tasks, but in reality, they were handing critical information about the country over to an enemy. One of the methods exposed in recent investigations involved posing as businesspeople. A figure presenting themselves as an “innocent” investor or entrepreneur offered small documentation tasks, such as photographing specific sites or locations of public figures, making the recruit feel they were engaged in a legitimate “business connection,” thus gradually drawing them into espionage.

The security establishment understands that social media serves as a primary recruitment platform. Through social media, mass recruitment of potential candidates takes place, with each contact communicating with Iranian “intelligence couriers” posing as ordinary people or seemingly innocent parties. The working assumption in Israel is that Iran operates across the entire spectrum: from influence and psychological manipulation to the direct operation of agents. Security officials believe that it is easy to “feed” individuals with content and gradually guide them toward espionage missions, without them fully realizing for whom they are working, through social media. In this way, the Islamic Republic has managed to connect with Israelis via Telegram, Facebook, and even Instagram; the complete anonymity allows its operatives to manage Israeli recruits with almost no risk of exposure.

One of the accused in recent espionage cases, Eden Debas, created a Telegram group that included more than 2,000 politically inclined individuals, where direct instructions from Iranian handlers were passed along. This created a “digital network” within which Iranian recruiters could filter potential candidates and make direct contact with them.

Debas, a 30-year-old from Petah Tikva, printed and distributed subversive posters and recruited fake followers for an Iranian Telegram group. He received detailed instructions from his Iranian handler, including requests to photograph protesters and hide money in specific locations. “During the investigations, astounding details emerged about how Iranian intelligence worked carefully to secure the trust of the recruits. Every simple task would lead to a payment, which was a way to test their willingness to cooperate.”

According to Goren, “Once contact is established and trust is built between the Iranian handler and the Israeli, the missions escalate. There are two main tracks the Iranians pursue. The first is military—identifying targets, photographing, and documenting them precisely for potential strikes; the second is psychological—recruiting Israelis to influence public perception and sow division within the population through social media posts, graffiti, or flyers that undermine the government and Israeli leaders.”

Materials uncovered in investigations conducted by Lahav 433 shed light on psychological activities such as graffiti writing, flyer distribution, and the spread of divisive messages within Israeli society. The main goal is to fragment society in Israel and amplify feelings of hatred and social divides. “One of Iran’s objectives is to impact public perception and create social division,” Goren states. “They use methods like spreading extremist messages, leaflets, and graffiti. For example, one suspect was instructed to write ‘Netanyahu Hitler’ on walls in Tel Aviv. It may sound trivial, but it is just one of many examples of Iran’s efforts to undermine unity and foster political and social discord.”

**“They Did Not Realize They Were Part of an Espionage Operation”**  

But why has there been a surge in espionage cases with similar patterns in recent months, especially amidst the war? “When one case is exposed, it’s like mushrooms after rain—more people start reporting being approached on social media,” Goren explains. “Many receive simple tasks and don’t realize they are part of an Iranian espionage operation, but once they understand, they come to us. The challenge is distinguishing between cases of ‘paranoia and fear’ and real incidents, as each case is thoroughly investigated, sometimes leading back to the Iranian handlers themselves.” The Lahav 433 unit urges the public to be vigilant and recognize the seriousness of these threats, emphasizing that if there is any suspicion of a suspicious approach, it is advisable to contact security agencies immediately: “What may initially seem innocent, like a social media approach or a simple task, could turn out to be recruitment by an enemy. Be wary of anyone reaching out in a suspicious manner and requesting tasks in exchange for money. Any seemingly harmless message on social media could lead to collaboration with Iranian intelligence.”

**Could Changes in Penalties Reduce the Risk?**  

In addition to the issue of recruiting citizens, an important question arises within the legal and security system: Is the current level of punishment sufficiently deterrent? Security officials report that, in some cases, women who had direct contact with Iranian intelligence agents were exposed but were not subjected to severe punishment or sometimes weren’t prosecuted at all. Beyond arrests and serious indictments, penalties must be severe enough to deter individuals from taking the risk. Currently, there is consideration of harsher penalties—financial sanctions, revocation of citizenship, or confiscation of property—to create significant deterrence, sending the message that recruits are risking their future and freedom.

The mission of disrupting any such contact is critical: in cases where espionage activity was uncovered, those involved were quickly detained to prevent the progression of their tasks and to halt the transmission of information. Most recruits never reach the stage of complex missions. The aim is to immediately block any such attempt: any “encounter,” whether via Telegram or in-person in another country, could pose a genuine danger to state security. “The key to withstanding the Iranian threat in the context of espionage attempts is internal resilience, where Israelis do not respond to Iranian approaches, alongside penalties that are significantly harsher than we have seen so far,” concludes the senior security official, who is closely monitoring the increasing number of cases with concern.  link

Survivors

Personal Stories

  

IDF announces death of Gaza hostage Idan Shtivi, killed on October 7

28-year-old was volunteering at desert rave as a photographer and arrived shortly before the Hamas massacre

 

Idan Shtivi was taken captive by Hamas terrorists at the Supernova desert rave on October 7, 2023 (Courtesy)

On October 7, 2024, the IDF confirmed the death of Idan Shtivi, 28, who was killed at the Supernova rave near Kibbutz Re’im and his body was taken hostage to Gaza. This is what we know of the events that led to his capture:

Idan Shtivi, 28, was taken hostage by Hamas terrorists at the Supernova desert rave, where he had volunteered to photograph the event.

He joined the party at 6 a.m., and called his girlfriend at 7, telling her about the missiles overhead and that he was leaving the party.

Shtivi left in his car with two other friends, Lior and Yulia, but was blocked by the terrorists on the road heading north. He then turned the car around and started driving south, but was driven off the road, lost control of the vehicle and hit a tree.

He was last seen in that location, and the car was later found, full of bullet holes and blood. His friends’ bodies were found, but Shtivi was later identified by security forces as having been taken hostage in Gaza.

The environmental sciences student lived in Tel Aviv and was making plans to move into a new apartment with his girlfriend, Stav and his new dog. A lover of nature, camping and music, Shtivi is described by his family as a resourceful person who can survive in extreme conditions.

He planned to work in the energy sector to combat climate change and to join a volunteer program in Africa that aids children.  link

A year later, authorities say hostage Idan Shtivi killed during October 7 attack

IDF cites new findings in declaring death of volunteer photographer, 28, apparently killed while trying to escape Nova rave; his body is one of 34 held in Gaza

The Israel Defense Forces said Monday that hostage Idan Shtivi was killed during Hamas’s October 7, 2023, onslaught in southern Israel, the announcement coming year to the day his body was kidnapped into Gaza, where it is still being held.

The grim development, announced on the first anniversary of the unprecedented assault, was based on new intelligence findings, the military said.

The IDF said it had informed Shtivi’s family on Sunday that the army had concluded that he was killed during the attack on the Nova music festival.

Shtivi’s death was first announced publicly Monday morning by the Hostage and Missing Families Forum. It was later confirmed by the IDF, which said the decision was made “based on intelligence information that was confirmed by a panel of experts from the Health Ministry.”

“The IDF operates with a range of methods to try and gather information on the hostages in Gaza,” the army said.

Shtivi was one of 251 people abducted on October 7 and is among 34 hostages killed on October 7 or while in captivity whose bodies are being held in Gaza, according to the IDF.

A total of 101 hostages and remains are currently thought captive, including two slain soldiers and two civilians held for around a decade.

Shtivi, 28, was a nature lover and photography enthusiast who was studying sustainability and government at Herzliya’s Reichman University.

He was seized by Hamas terrorists at the Nova desert rave, where he had volunteered to photograph the event.

He joined the party at 6 a.m., and called his girlfriend at 7, telling her about the missiles overhead and that he was leaving.

Shtivi left in his car with two friends, Lior and Yulia, but was blocked by the terrorists on the road heading north. He then turned the car around and started driving south, but was driven off the road, lost control of the vehicle and hit a tree.

He was last seen in that location, and the car was later found full of bullet holes and blood.

His friends’ bodies were found, but Shtivi was missing and later determined to have been taken hostage into Gaza.

Shtivi, a resident of Petah Tikva, is survived by his parents Eli and Dalit, siblings and his girlfriend Stav.  link

Dark Legacy - The Abandonment of October 7th Hostages

Let Us Say: No More.

Chen Arieli

Deputy Mayor of Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality and human rights activist.

There is a copious amount of poison running through our collective veins as a nation, flowing by order of Netanyahu, so much that we are enveloped in the despair he inflicts, so deeply entrenched in it, that we are unable to find hope. In his calculated use of misdirection and smokescreens, he has turned us all into hostages of his rule, blinding us to the most urgent and acute national responsibility - bringing the hostages home NOW.

How have we normalized having a Prime Minister so willing to abandon anyone who doesn’t serve his interests or bolster his power? A Prime Minister who operates a machine of political assassination against anyone who refuses to bend to his will? A Prime Minister who pits us against one another? When did we allow this poison to seep through our bones, when did we stop believing that a different reality is possible? What can we even expect from Netanyahu’s legacy of implementing a continuous policy of fear and chaos, of division and fomenting discord?

We’ve reached a point where the word “abandonment” has become so ubiquitous that it has seemingly lost all meaning. We have become so used to the neglect characterizing Netanyahu’s long tenure in office that we should have seen the signs; he isn’t abandoning the hostages, their families and the nation itself only now; for years he has been neglecting our children, Israeli women, members of the LGBTQ community, and Israeli Arabs.

What more needs to happen in this land in our time, and what will remain after his demise? Our country direly needs a respite from this horrible reality, fresh air to breathe instead of the stifling air in the tunnels of Gaza. The abandonment of the hostages is a terrifying symbol of the state of the entire country. Systematic neglect is Netanyahu’s legacy.

When he stands on international podiums, speaking eloquent English, Netanyahu prides himself on his supposed fight for LGBTQ rights in Israel. But here at home, time and again he abandons us in favor of his Messianic cronies. He builds coalitions with zealots who wreak havoc on all those who believe in equality and freedom. He props up political yes-men who systematically exclude women from decision-making processes, who prioritize war over human lives and Israel’s future. During Netanyahu’s rule he paved the road of abandonment and neglect, of warped narratives, of fearmongering and destabilization of everything that doesn't revolve around him.

Abandoning the hostages in Gaza is his worst feat yet. It symbolizes the abandonment of our future in this country, of our ability to seek hope beyond the horizon. Neglecting the Israeli homefront, leaving Northern Israel to burn, abandoning displaced citizens to their fate, with no home to return to.

We must dust off this shroud of abandonment and understand that it all begins and ends with Netanyahu’s worldview, which will live throughout history in his name. But we have the power to say: No more. Releasing the hostages is our most pressing responsibility - not just to bring them back home, but to bring us all, as a nation, to our true home. This is our opportunity to rid this country of Israel's “leaders” who took it from us, and to rebuild a society founded on hope, justice and social solidarity, instead of resigning to abandonment and despair.

Acronyms and Glossary

COGAT - Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories

ICC - International Criminal Court in the Hague

IJC - International Court of Justice in the Hague

MDA - Magen David Adom - Israel Ambulance Corp

PA - Palestinian Authority - President Mahmud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen

PMO- Prime Minister's Office

UAV - Unmanned Aerial vehicle, Drone. Could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, or be weaponized with missiles or contain explosives for 'suicide' explosion mission

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